

Security and International Relations in the 21st Century: United States' Continuum of Counterinsurgency: Anti-Communism to Anti-Terrorism

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Abstract

This article describes the perspective, context and meaning of the global war on terrorism through an examination of prior counterinsurgency efforts by the United States. To do so, this manuscript surveys the foundations of such efforts, deeply rooted in the traditions of United States foreign policy. To gain a perspective of the impact of contemporary policy, a brief survey of prior efforts is completed in order to better understand the continuity of United States foreign policy. Accordingly, this paper examines efforts to foster internal stability using civil police in concert with military operations as part of an overall counterinsurgency strategy dating to the administration of John F. Kennedy. In short, contemporary counterinsurgency efforts reflect the use of traditional methodology including technical assistance, humanitarian aid and the training of indigenous security forces.

Introduction

In the modern era, the role of a historian is not to direct policymakers how to formulate implement policy. Rather, the function of historical inquiry is to “try to make the past speak to the present in a meaningful way” giving “context, perspective, and meaning to what is occurring in the present.”¹ To fully understand and assess the perspective, context and meaning of the contemporary war on terrorism, a survey of the foundations of such efforts, deeply rooted in the traditions of United States foreign policy is warranted.

The menace of the contemporary era is not, as was true of the Cold War Era, communism; it is terrorism. Though the face of the enemy has changed, contemporary methodology remains firmly rooted in the policy traditions of containment that dominated the Cold War Era (1945-1989). Indeed, when assessing the contemporary policy initiatives being used in the global war on terror, there “exists more continuity than change in the policies of the Bush administration.”² Accordingly, my purpose is not to critique either contemporary or prior efforts, but to gain perspective of the impact of such policy through a brief survey of prior efforts in order to better understand the continuity of United States foreign policy. In particular, I will survey efforts to foster internal stability using civil police in concert with military operations as part of an overall counterinsurgency strategy dating to the administration of John F. Kennedy. As Frederick H. Gareau observed, such “a review of the Cold War period provides the opportunity to be forewarned of the pitfalls of such policy in waging the war on terrorism.”³

¹ David L. Anderson, “SHAFR Presidential Address: One Vietnam War Should Be Enough and Other Reflections on Diplomatic History and the Making of Foreign Policy,” *Diplomatic History* 30 (January 2006): 1-21.

² Melvyn P. Leffler “9/11 and American Foreign Policy,” *Diplomatic History* 29 (June 2005): 395-413.

³ Frederick H. Gareau, *State Terrorism And The United States: From Counterinsurgency to the War on Terrorism* (Atlanta, GA: Clarity Press, Inc, 2004), 19.

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The terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 acted as a catalyst that produced a resolute focus in the foreign and domestic policy of the administration of President George W. Bush that focused on thwarting terrorist encroachment both domestically and globally as part the “global war on terror.” Accordingly, within days of the attacks on the United States, President Bush asserted the intent to launch a war on terror that would not end “until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.”⁴

By 2003, such efforts produced U.S. operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq to advance the war on terror. With the end of major combat operations in May 2003 coalition forces in Iraq initiated reconstruction efforts to stabilize a nation suffering the effects of more than a decade of sanctions imposed by the United Nations and the recent damage of military operations led by the United States. While coalition forces established internal security in post war Iraq, the Bush administration launched concurrent efforts to rebuild the infrastructure and economy and to provide immediate humanitarian aid to the Iraqi people. As part of the reconstruction of Iraq, the Agency for International Development, created by the administration of John F. Kennedy in 1961, disbursed financial assistance, equipment, and advisory personnel to U.S. reconstruction efforts.

Such efforts were hampered, however, as insurgents intensified attacks on coalition troops. In response, the United States launched counterinsurgency efforts including OP DESERT SCORPION, IVY SERPENT, and SIDEWINDER to attempt to control guerrilla style attacks targeting coalition forces occupying Iraq.

Engaged in what CENTCOM Commander General John Abizaid characterized as a “classical guerrilla-type war situation” by July 2003, U.S. led coalition troops focused on stabilization of internal security using a combination of local forces and regular military personnel.⁵ In particular, U.S. advisory personnel initiated efforts to equip and train indigenous forces bolstering coalition counterinsurgency efforts to address such conditions.

With the establishment of counterinsurgency operations in post war Iraq, in response to the intensification of guerrilla tactics by Iraqi insurgents, questions regarding the length of U.S. troop commitments, financial cost, and troop loss estimates of the occupation dominated media outlets world wide. In the course of such debates, United States’ efforts in Vietnam provides an

⁴ President George W. Bush, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People,” September 20, 2001.

⁵ Vernon Loeb, “‘Guerrilla’ War Acknowledged New Commander Cites Problems” *Washington Post* 17 July 2003.

often used basis for historical comparison. As a basis of comparison, the Vietnam War indeed presents an opportunity to evaluate a similar situation that used counterinsurgency tactics from which to developed the contemporary operational paradigm especially in regard to the use of military operations. Still, such analysis has not explored the role of civil police in counterinsurgency operations despite the critical role of public safety programs within the overall foreign policy strategy of the United States in the later half of the 20th Century.

In particular, the administration of John F. Kennedy used counterinsurgency operations to defend against communist encroachment, supplementing such efforts with humanitarian aid and technical assistance in the Third World. To combat growing insurgencies in underdeveloped nations, the Kennedy administration advanced the use of civil police training, or public safety programs, not just in South East Asia, but globally.

The focus of the Kennedy administration on counterinsurgency operations reflected the overall intensification of the Cold War in the first months of his tenure in office. Specifically, in his State of the Union Address to Congress, 26 May 1961, the President outlined what he deemed the “freedom doctrine.” In short, the address focused on the funding and reorganization of the military in the United States with the greatest emphasis placed on the defense against subversion, guerrilla warfare, and unconventional warfare. To address such dangers, the President outlined the goal of establishing “partnerships for self-defense,” using the existing Military Assistance Program (MAP) to assist nations in the defense against “local attack, subversion, insurrection or guerrilla warfare.” Additionally, Kennedy urged the refocusing of conventional forces and increasing the presence of special and unconventional forces to address “non-nuclear war, paramilitary operations, and sub-limited, or unconventional wars.”⁶ Moreover, Kennedy warned that “the most skillful counter-guerrilla operations” would prove unsuccessful “where the local population is too caught up in its own misery to be concerned about the advance of communism.”⁷

In fact, by July 3, 1962, the President indicated that the nation would have less reliance on nuclear weapons, urging agencies within the Government that “they must be prepared to combat Communist-inspired guerrilla warfare” at a State Department seminar dedicated to

⁶ “Transcript of Kennedy Address to Congress on U.S. Role in Struggle for Freedom,” *New York Times*. 26 May 1961.

⁷ *Ibid*

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addressing the issues of underdeveloped nations. Specifically, Kennedy declared that his goal to place “a great deal more emphasis on counter-insurgency.”⁸

To achieve the goals of counterinsurgency, the administration created the Office of Public Safety to halt communist inspired insurgencies. Based upon the development and establishment of a strong and reliable police organization in every Third World nation threatened by insurrection, the goal of the OPS program attempted to avoid direct United States military intervention. By doing so, the United States secured the opportunity to influence the course of development of Third World nations without the expense and commitment of a full scale military intervention. Though the Office of Public Safety operated missions worldwide during its thirteen years of operation, particular attention focused on efforts within the Western Hemisphere to ensure the containment of the spread of communism following the 1959 Cuban Revolution of Fidel Castro.

As mandated by NSAM No. 146 (National Security Action Memorandum) 1962, the Interagency Committee On Police Assistance Programs In Newly Emerging Countries, chaired by U. Alexis Johnson, assessed the existing organizational structure and criticized its state of “bureaucratic inertia.”⁹ Specifically, the Committee asserted that the Overseas Internal Security Program (OISP), as directed by the International Cooperations Administration ICA¹⁰ and then AID, “tended to regard police programs as marginal in comparison to their primary economic aid mission,” resulting in the absence of “strong management.”¹¹ Due to such neglect, police assistance programs failed to fulfill their potential in terms of acting as a counter subversive and counterinsurgency tools.

According to the Committee, police programs held the potential to act as “preventative medicine” to contain both urban and rural unrest and insurgency as part of the normal

⁸ “Kennedy Sees Drop in A-Weapon Need,” *New York Times*, 4 July 1962. The conference held at the White House and attended by representatives of agencies involved in programs and with representatives abroad including both the Department of Defense and the State Department, focused on coordination efforts in underdeveloped nations.

⁹ Interagency Committee On Police Assistance Programs In Newly Emerging Countries, *Report*, 1962, pg.6. Record Group 286 Public Safety, Office of the Director, Box 3.

¹⁰ In 1955 The International Cooperation Administration (ICA) assumed responsibility for administering public safety programs in Third World nation as part of the overall efforts of the administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower to foster internal security programs abroad. Once created, The International Cooperation Administration provided technical assistance to struggling nations to both encourage economic development and increased stability. Housed within the ICA, the Civil Police Administration (CPA) provided training and equipment to police forces overseas. Operating on the principle that a more effective police force could keep the peace and allow for economic growth, the CPA assisted overseas civil forces in administration, records, traffic control, and technical duties.

¹¹ Interagency Committee On Police Assistance Programs In Newly Emerging Countries, .6-7.

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responsibilities of a nations police apparatus. Thus, the Committee recommended that “the U.S. should increase its emphasis on the use of police programs as counter-insurgency tools wherever there is a clearly demonstrable need.”¹²

In response, the Committee urged increases in the overall use of police assistance programs as part of the agenda of Agency for International Development, suggesting multiple changes in the existing policy. To increase the impact and efficiency of such operations, The Committee on Police Assistance Programs favored the recruitment and training of qualified personnel, autonomous funding, and the establishment of an International Police Academy to coordinate training for participant nations and more vigorous leadership directed by “an office specifically charged with police matters.”¹³ By 7 August 1962, the approval of the National Security Action Memorandum No. 177 codified recommended suggestions.¹⁴ With NSAM No. 177, the Agency for International Development proceeded on 1 November 1962 to establish the Office of Public Safety (OPS) to centralize police assistance programs world wide.

Responsible for counterinsurgency operations in the Third World, the OPS,1962-1975, operated 34 public safety programs in Latin America, South East Asia, and Africa by 1973. Operating within the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the primary objective of the OPS focused on exploring and exploiting the role of training indigenous police forces in the Third World, serving as a first line of defense against communist insurgency. By doing so, the OPS attempted to promote stability in regions traditionally plagued by political, military, and economic upheaval.

Once established, the OPS attempted to utilize indigenous police forces against insurgent threats by providing, through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), a carefully balanced program of technical advice, training, and equipment. In particular, according to USAID, police assistance programs represented “an important part of our [US] efforts to help less developed countries achieve the internal security essential if our [US] major economic development aid is to help create viable free nations.”¹⁵

¹² Memo For The President. 20 July 1962. Committee on Police Assistance Programs, *Report of Committee on Police Assistance Programs*, 1. Record Group 286 Public Safety, Office of Director General Records, Box 3.

¹³ Memo For The President. 20 July 1962. Committee on Police Assistance Programs, *Report of Committee on Police Assistance Programs*, 1-4.

¹⁴ *National Security Action Memorandum No. 177*. “Police Assistance Programs.” 7 August 1962.

¹⁵ Agency for International Development. AID General Notice. Subject: Office of Public Safety (O/PS). 1 November 1962. Record Group 286 Public Safety, Office of Director General Records, Box 3. 1.

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Accordingly, the Kennedy administration envisioned an integrated law enforcement apparatus that the general populace would recognize as a legitimate peace keeping force. In order to promote internal security in Third World nations, the OPS aimed to bolster the ability of local police to conduct regular operations, master investigative skills in order to identify and neutralize criminal or subversive activities, and create the capability for controlling militant disturbances, such as demonstrations, disorders, and riots, through small-scale guerrilla operations.¹⁶

Counterinsurgency for the Kennedy administration became the focal point in its fight against the spread of communism throughout the world. In particular, the United States sought to eliminate internal subversion before it could escalate to the point where direct United States military intervention would be required to restore order.

According to Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, revolutionary conflicts consisted essentially of three characteristics: independence from external domination, regional identity, or communist inspired.¹⁷ The logical response to guerrilla warfare was counterinsurgency operations which, for conventional military force with a primary objective of destruction, was unacceptable. In contrast, the essence of counterinsurgency was “not to kill but bring the insurgent back into national life.”¹⁸ As a result, the focal point of counterinsurgency rested in the effort to adhere to fundamental rules of law and fair dealing.¹⁹ Civil police forces consequently became a critical weapon in the fight against insurgency. Throughout normal functions, regular and legitimate contact, the civil police constituted the “first line of defense” against internal upheaval. According to U. Alexis Johnson, former Under Secretary for Political Affairs in the State Department, President Kennedy took great interest in United States police programs. Johnson also felt that “it was his [Kennedy’s] firm conviction, given the experiences of countries in many parts of the world, that the police forces are a basic element in resisting the threats posed by insurrection and internal subversion, themselves the enemies of the growth and stability he sought.”²⁰

Focusing on a “preventative strategy” devoted to the development of a strong reliable

¹⁶ “AID Public Safety Program,” *NACLA Newsletter* (September 1970): 21.

¹⁷ Robert F. Kennedy, “Counterinsurgency,” *The Annals of America*, 1965, 323.

¹⁸ Kennedy, “Counterinsurgency,” 325.

¹⁹ Kennedy, “Counterinsurgency,” 326.

²⁰ U. Alexis Johnson, “The Role of Police Forces in a Changing World,” *Department of State Bulletin* (13 September 1971, 280.

police organization in every Third World nation threatened by insurrection, the goal of public safety programs was to control a crisis before it could escalate by identifying and destroying radical movements in the early stages of development.²¹ According to Kennedy, police forces represented “a basic element in resisting the threats posed by insurrection and internal subversion, themselves enemies of the growth and stability sought.”²² Shown the principles of proper leadership, discipline, and possessing modern equipment, “the police could maintain order and suppress subversion and communism.”²³ By identifying and destroying potential movements, police, utilizing normal operations, could prevent radical movements from threatening a nation’s stability. Focusing on communications, transportation, and intelligence gathering capabilities, the OPS programs, in theory, were to be apolitical and to remain outside of a nation’s normal internal operations.

Hand-picked by President Kennedy, Byron Engle, a career law enforcement official, oversaw the development of the public safety program, serving as director of the Office of Public Safety throughout the majority of its twelve-year existence. Engle, who began his career in 1930, participated at nearly every level of law enforcement, ranging from patrolman, investigator, detective police lieutenant, police captain, and police administrator.

In fact, Engle became one of the youngest administrators in the nation as he rose quickly through the Kansas City Police Department. Appointed director of personnel and training, Engle advanced the department’s reform agenda as he attempted to eliminate corruption within the department. Due to his success in Kansas City, Engle served as one of 6 administrators to oversee the reorganization of the police in Japan during the U.S. Occupation following World War II.²⁴

While acting as a police administrator for the Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, Tokyo, Japan, from 1945-1950, “Engle learned that training could reform foreign police behavior; yet before he left America, he believed already in training as an effective instrument of reform.”²⁵ Following an assessment of the existing system, Engle transformed the old imperial

²¹ Senate Committee on Appropriations Foreign Assistance and Related Programs, *Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1973*, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., 1973, 789.

²² Johnson, “The Role of Police Forces in a Changing World,” 280.

²³ Lobe, *United States National Security Policy*, 9.

²⁴ Robert H. Bruce. “Impact Of The Occupation In Japan On American Notions About US-Induced Reform In The Third World.” *Indian Journal of American Studies*. 75, no. 2 (1985): 124-125.

²⁵ Bruce, 124-125.

police force into one based on the latest United States law enforcement technique relying on “the principle of training the trainers” or training a relatively few individuals who in turn train the remainder of the police force in modern and humane policing.

Operating under this principle, Engle’s training programs, in the end, reached some 85,000 officers per year until his departure from Japan in 1951. Thus, “from his experiences in Japan, Engle drew the lesson that U.S. training could reform the behavior of foreign police by training trainers to train other policemen.”²⁶ Based on his success in Occupied Japan, Engle subsequently served as the first chief of the Civil Police Administration of the International Cooperation Administration from 1955-1962 until appointed as director of the OPS in November 1962.²⁷

The greatest potential role in the counterinsurgency effort, according to Engle, could be played by the “cop on the beat.” Believing that the civil police should be kept separate from the military, Engle felt that police effectiveness could be augmented by skilled intelligence and paramilitary units, such as riot control squads, paramilitary groups, and intelligence analysis.

Engle’s vision of the role of the peace officer rested on the premise that essential to the stability of any nation is the acceptance of the government by the governed. Therefore, the response of the population is generally based on what it perceived the government to be doing to protect their interest and property. The civil police, through their basic peacekeeping functions, represented a significant and critical point of contact between the government and the people. Highly visible to the populace, the police function as the cornerstone of society by providing “the maintenance of order and the protection of life and property.” By providing such general security, Public Safety Programs stressed “the importance of directing the forces of change within the society away from violence and toward constructive development through the pressure of public sentiment.”²⁸ More important, police functioned as the “eyes and ears” of the government.²⁹

Under Engle, the OPS focused on developing the capabilities for regular police

²⁶ Bruce, 126-127.

²⁷ *Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1973*, 796. In addition to functioning as director of the CPA, Engle acted as a training and intelligence advisor with the CIA starting in 1950, and he continued to work with the CIA even after he was appointed director of the OPS in 1962. Engle’s dual status as OPS director and CIA advisor enabled the CIA and OPS to exchange and “share information, cooperate on short term operations, and promote each others long term goals.” Ibid, 796.

²⁸ *Administrative History of AID*, 571.

²⁹ U. Alexis Johnson, “The Role of Police Forces in a Changing World,” 282-283.

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operations in participant nations. In order to ensure efficient police action, the OPS attempted to enhance the ability of the law enforcement apparatus to investigate and identify criminal or subversive individuals and organizations in order to neutralize their activities. In addition, OPS intervention advocated the use of small scale guerrilla operations by police to control militant activities, including demonstrations, disorders, and riots.

Overall, public safety assistance centered on three components: technical advisory activities, training, and distribution of equipment to participant nations. Technical advisory activities focused on providing supervision and guidance to existing police structures within host nations. Stressing institutional capability, technical advisory operations attempted to assist “developing countries in the development of democratic police institutions capable of preserving public order and controlling internal security situations within the framework of the country’s civil law and with minimum use of force.”³⁰ To achieve greater efficiency of police capabilities, the Office of Public Safety emphasized training programs within host nations as well as at a variety of institutions located within the United States.³¹

Once in country, Public Safety Advisors provided general training in law enforcement techniques reflective of the contemporary United States’ example. Public Safety Advisors, as experienced technical specialists, law enforcement professionals, or military personnel, provided training to professionalize and modernize indigenous police forces. In addition to continuous training, Public Safety Advisors assessed and implemented commodity support within host nations organized around four basic categories: communication, general, transportation, and weapons and ammunition.³²

Though individual in country programs focused on the individual needs of host nations through training and commodity provisions, all public safety missions focused on the same goal: the improvement of internal security capabilities in a humane manner by indigenous law

³⁰ *The Agency For International Development During the Administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson November 1963-January 1969*. Volume I, Administrative History, Part I. LBJ Library, 570.

³¹ To enhance the capability and professionalism of participant police officers, the program trained indigenous personnel at the International Police Academy (IPA) established at 3520 Prospect Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., in December 1963. As envisioned by the OPS Director the IPA reflected the experiment first formulated in Occupied Japan as the “IPA trained a relatively small number of foreign policemen to train other policemen in the ideas they had learned at the IPA,” in a manner similar to the process previously utilized by Engle in Japan. *Ibid.*

Within the organizational training hierarchy of the Public Safety Division of USAID, the International Police Academy represented the principal location for the bulk of training programs conducted by the OPS within the United States. Once established, the IPA operated as a cooperative, multilateral effort to allow for the exchange and utilization of information for the benefit of all participants.

³² Comptroller General of the United States. *Stopping U.S. Assistance to Foreign Police and Prisons*. Washington, 1976. 9-10.

enforcement agencies. Once operational, public safety missions operated both autonomously or in conjunction with indigenous police forces, attempting to transform the police into a paramilitary force that could function as the first line of defense against insurgency.

To reorganize police forces, the OPS emphasized communications, mobility, intelligence gathering, and psychological warfare. Specifically, Public Safety provided computers and radios to participant nations to enhance the communication network of the the indigenous police apparatus. Further, the OPS furnished cars and helicopters to increase the mobility of recipient nations, and stressed training in interrogation techniques to improve an agency's intelligence gathering capabilities.

The key component of the basic OPS provisions was psychological as indigenous police organizations attempted to create stabilization within nations through high visibility, large numbers of officers, weapons, and checkpoints. Efficient control of the populations could be achieved by combining enforcement tactics with a nationwide data bank and an identification system generally consisting of identification cards.

Through such efforts, the Office of Public Safety developed civil police institutions that would accomplish several objectives: earn the respect of the population by being responsible to their needs, protect life and property, utilize the most modern administration and management practices and resources while asserting the necessity to practice humane tactics of law enforcement, providing and maintaining the essential levels of stability necessary for economic, social, and political growth. In order to prevent internal threats and to control subversion so that military intervention would not become necessary, the OPS attempted to create a institutional structure that was both flexible and strong enough to adapt to changing needs.³³

Operational 1 November 1962 until its termination 17 August 1974, the Office of Public Safety provided technical assistance, training, and commodities to 52 nations.³⁴ Building off of preexisting police assistance programs, the OPS established 34 missions by FY 1965 with total expenditures reaching \$20.9 million.³⁵ In 1968, the peak year of the agency, public safety provided assistance to 34 nations at a cost of \$54.9 million.³⁶ Thereafter, public safety

³³ *Appropriations for Fiscal year 1973*, 791.

³⁴ *Stopping U.S. Assistance To Foreign Police and Prisons*, 10.

³⁵ Memorandum for Special Group (CI). 5 April 1965. Record Group 286 Public Safety, Office of Director, Box 3.

³⁶ *Administrative History of AID*, 574. Of the total assistance distributed by the public safety program, East Asian programs, particularly Vietnam and Thailand, persistently received the largest appropriations. For example, in FY 1968 the East Asian program received some 72 percent, or \$39.3 million, of the programs budget. *Administrative History of AID*, p. 574, and *he*

assistance began a steady decline with only 19 overseas programs remaining as the phase out of the division began in 1974.³⁷ The International Police Academy, once the heart of public safety training operations also terminated classes scheduled in December 1974.³⁸

Throughout their operational lifespan, members of Congress and the law enforcement community applauded the Office of Public Safety and the International Police Academy. For example, David D. Burks' *Survey Of The Alliance For Progress: Insurgency In Latin America*, prepared for the United States Senate Committee On Foreign Relations, declared in 1968 that "the Division has an outstanding record of achievement in Latin America. It has stressed responsible and humane procedures and the necessity for good community relations. It has sought to avoid strengthening dictatorships."³⁹

In fact, at the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) general assembly, delegations of Pakistan, Kenya, and Colombia praised public safety advisors by the end of the 1960s.⁴⁰ In response, the Treasury official who headed the delegation declared that "considering how seldom our government gets thanks or credit, these statements were heartwarming."⁴¹

Despite such acclaim and continual claims of successful containment of insurgency abroad, the Office of Public Safety increasingly faced criticism from the private sector, certain members of Congress, and indigenous populations within nations hosting OPS missions. Specific charges included public safety advisors acting as intelligence operatives, encouraging inhumane policing techniques including torture, manipulating politics within host nations, and fostering the capabilities of repressive regimes.⁴² Even with vehement assertions to the contrary by the OPS, between 1969 and 1974, public safety assistance decreased as the program moved into the periphery of United States foreign policy.

Subsequently, in December 1974 Congress prohibited the training of international police personnel in the United States after 1 July 1975 and "effectively ended AID involvement in

Office Of Public Safety And The Future. 1974. Record Group 286 Public Safety, Office of Director, Box 11.

³⁷ *The Office Of Public Safety And The Future*. 1974. Record Group 286 Public Safety, Office of Director, Box 11.

³⁸ *Stopping U.S. Assistance To Foreign Police and Prisons*, 14-15.

³⁹ United States Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. *Survey Of The Alliance For Progress: Insurgency In Latin America; A Stud*, 1968.

⁴⁰ Peter Chew, "America's Global Police Officers," *The Kiwanis Magazine*, (April 1969): 24.

⁴¹ Chew, "America's Global Police Officers," 24.

⁴² Memorandum For The Administrator. Subject: Public Safety Activities. 26 February 1974. Records Group 286. Office of Director, General Records Box 2. 1.

public safety activities.”⁴³ In short, the legislative action that dismantled the Public Safety Program by 1975 reflected Congressional concerns regarding the character and impact of OPS assistance long raised by critics of the program. According to the Government Accounting Office, the termination of the OPS reflected

a recurring criticism regarding U.S. assistance to foreign law enforcement organizations is that U.S. assistance, in effect, supports authoritarian regimes that use repressive tactics, including imprisonment, to suppress political opposition and dissent. Thus, the issue of political prisoners is linked with the issue of U.S. assistance to foreign civilian or military law enforcement organizations.⁴⁴

Though Congressional action in 1973-1974 mandated the termination of the Public Safety Program by 1975, United States’ narcotics control efforts abroad remained operational based on the foundations of OPS activities. With the invitation of assistance to expedite Richard Nixon’s call “for an all-out attack” on the supply and demand of international narcotics, the OPS assumed an integral role in U.S. anti drug efforts worldwide. Narcotics control efforts, first established during the Public Safety Program, continued in country after the phase-out of the program as USAID assumed specific responsibility for the provision of technical assistance to contain the expansion of international drug trafficking.

Based upon such foundations, tactics utilized in the ongoing war on drugs for the remainder of the 20th century and into the 21st century, represent neither a radically new approach nor a new foe.⁴⁵ That is, the Department of State argued in 1999 that the

underlying premise of our [U.S.] drug control strategy has been to promote long term change in key national institutions of the main drug source and transit countries. Throughout training programs conducted by the principle U.S. law enforcement agencies, we have helped governments to modernize and professionalize law

⁴³ Comptroller General, 2.

⁴⁴ Comptroller General, 2.

⁴⁵ Federal Drug enforcement efforts are not a new phenomenon. Created in 1930, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) led the fight against illicit drugs within the United States. Headed by Harry J. Anslinger, the FBN with a world wide jurisdiction, proceeded to attack the illicit drug problem virtually unchallenged until the 1960s. The FBN was reorganized in 1968 into the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) and moved from the Treasury to the Justice Department. A final reorganization occurred in 1973 with the BNDD remaining in the Justice Department but being transformed into the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA).

enforcement agencies.⁴⁶

To effectively combat the traffic of illegal narcotics across U.S. borders, efforts focus on attacking “drug supply at critical points. . . in a source country.”⁴⁷ Characterizing counter narcotic efforts in a source nation as “analogous to removing a malignant tumor before it can metastasize” mirrors the OPS counterinsurgency theory of containing communist encroachment at the source using civil police to combat such threats at the local level. Thus, while the focus of U.S. foreign policy shifted from communism to drugs by the 1990s, the methodology and justifications for U.S. participation remains the same.

Facing a changing foreign policy paradigm with the disintegration of the Soviet Union by 1990, then President George H. W. Bush codified U.S. anti narcotic efforts providing a multilateral program focused on the provision of training, equipment, and economic assistance to foreign nations in the international war on drugs. The “Andean Strategy To Control Cocaine” implemented by the Bush administration in 1990 represented the most comprehensive program to date. With an operational budget of \$423 million in FY 91, The Andean Strategy offered economic, military, and law enforcement assistance to participant nations.⁴⁸ At its core, the Andean Strategy relied on the use of the U.S. military to supplement such programs based on the designation by Congress that the Department of Defense represented the lead agency in the battle against drugs by 1988.⁴⁹ Nevertheless, the State Department in 1990 argued that the Bush counter narcotics policy “should not be characterized as a ‘militarized effort, but rather one that seeks to provide legitimate governments with the tools and assistance to help defend their political sovereignty.”⁵⁰

By January 2000 the administration of William J. Clinton not only continued but expanded foreign assistance in the global war to combat illicit drugs. Specifically, Secretary of State Madeline Albright announced a four fold increase of assistance to Colombia, a nation then struggling to contain a state of civil war based on an alliance between drug traffickers and

⁴⁶ Department of State. *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1999*, Released by the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State. Washington, D.C., March 2000. 3

⁴⁷ *International Narcotics Control*, 5

⁴⁸ Melvin Levitsky, *The Andean Strategy To Control Cocaine*. Washington, D.C.: United States Department of State, July 1990, p. 1. See also, Tom Morganthau, “A Mission to Nowhere?” *Newsweek*, 19 February 1990; Ted Gest, “Soldier’s Can’t Beat Smugglers,” *US News and World Report*, 30 May 1988; Peter Reuter, “Can the Borders Be Sealed?” RAND Corporation, August 1988; Lester C. Thurow, “US Drug Policy: Colossal Ignorance,” *New York Times*, 8 May 1988.

⁴⁹ Ed Magnuson, “More and More a Real War,” *Time Magazine*, 22 January 1990, 23.

⁵⁰ Levitsky, 2.

antigovernment rebels the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Even with criticism that security forces practiced inhumane tactics in their anti drug and anti guerrilla campaigns, Albright defended the increase in assistance as necessary for U.S. security interests.⁵¹

Despite the continuation of U.S. assistance, by March 2002 Colombian rebels continued to wage a vicious campaign, utilizing tactics including sabotage, kidnappings, and murder to undermine the stability of Colombia.⁵² Moreover, critics raised age old questions concerning the nature and impact of U.S. assistance fearing that counter narcotics aid held the possibility of allowing the United States to be “sucked into another Vietnam.”⁵³ The failure of anti narcotic technical assistance to stabilize at risk nations including Colombia, however, represented by 2002 a sub goal of the overall focus of the United States foreign policy as counter terrorism efforts proliferated. Centered on contemporary concerns of internal security and stability, the current administrations global war on terror struggles with the same issues confronted by proceeding administrations.

As part of the ongoing global war on terrorism, the administration comparatively faces a less well-defined enemy than previous antagonists. Though wider in scope, contemporary terrorist tactics resemble the urban terrorism of groups in previous decades. Similarly, the response to the present threat fundamentally continues the use of traditional approaches deeply rooted in U.S. foreign policy, including economic assistance, commodity exchange, and counterinsurgency operations.

Contemporary counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq reflect former policy foundations as the United States currently employs a variety of foreign policy tools, including military operations, technical assistance, humanitarian aid, and the training of indigenous security forces. In fact, the restoration of law and order using indigenous security forces based upon a U.S. model of policing represents such a critical component of U.S. efforts in Iraq that 2006 has been declared “The Year of the Police.”

Accordingly, the head of the Multi-National Security Transition Command in Iraq, U.S. Army Lieutenant General Martin Dempsey, puts emphasis on United States’ efforts to upgrade

⁵¹ Elliott Smith, “Albright Seeks \$1.3 billion to aid Colombia in fighting drug wars,” *USA Today*, 12 January 2000.

⁵² Juan Forero, “Colombian Rebels Go on Killing Rampage,” *New York Times*, 22 March 2002.

⁵³ Christopher Marquis, “Word for Word/Picking a Fight; The U.S. Struggle to Battle Drugs, Just Drugs, In Colombia,” *New York Times*, 26 May 2002.

security forces in Iraq.⁵⁴ Focusing on providing training and equipment, restructuring and modernizing a professional Iraqi police force to allow for the “Iraqization” of security efforts. Moreover, argues U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilshad, it is essential for U.S. trained police to gain credibility “in their own communities” as part of the effort stabilize post war Iraq.⁵⁵

Initial efforts to foster internal security as part of the overall reconstruction efforts of the United States were however hampered by bureaucratic struggles. The lack of a clearly defined post war strategy especially in regard to internal security operations is reflected in initial struggles of the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority to establish a viable professional Iraqi police force. In particular, little attention was afforded to the Interior Ministry of Iraq which holds responsibility for national police operations. According to Robert Charles, then head of the Bureau of Law Enforcement of the United States State Department, the goal of the U.S. was to reestablish a police presence in post war Iraq as quickly as possible. Charles argued in fact that “if you have overwhelming presence on the streets, you create a deterrent and you unleash intelligence.”⁵⁶

The primary focus of contemporary efforts in Iraq center on a combination of the disbursement of materials, technical assistance centered on a basic training course and then mentoring by western police officers as part of an on the job training effort.⁵⁷ Specifically, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz asserted in June of 2004 that U.S. efforts would center on providing “the training and the leadership development appropriate for law enforcement in a society that respects the rule of law.”⁵⁸

Accordingly, Coalition Police Assistance Training Teams (CPAT) have focused on the provision of equipment and training including the use of police academies to reach the goal of placing “135,000 trained and resourced Iraqi police officers working on the streets within the 18 provinces by the end of the year.”⁵⁹ However, the success or failure of such efforts remains to be seen.

⁵⁴ David I. McKeeby, “In Iraq, 2006 is the ‘Year of the Police,’ says U.S. General” U.S. Department of State. USINFO website. 24 March 2006.

⁵⁵ Jim Garamone, “Ambassador Says 2006 to Be ‘Year of the Police’ for Iraq. American Forces Press Service, 20 December 2005.

⁵⁶ Kevin Whitelaw, “Baghdad Blues” U.S. News & World Report. 10 April 2006.

⁵⁷ Ibid..

⁵⁸ Paul Wolfowitz, “The Road Map for A Sovereign Iraq” *The Wall Street Journal*. 9 June 2004.

⁵⁹ *News Briefing with Col. Barham from Iraq*. 28 April 2006.

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