

The West Indian Diaspora to the USA: Remittances and Development of the Homeland

Aubrey W. Bonnett, Professor, Department of American Studies, SUNY College at Old Westbury

Abstract:

In a global world in which over 150 million people migrate from one country to another every year, the new Black Diaspora, now termed transnational and very circular in nature, is quite different from the initial Diaspora born of slavery, or that born of colonialism and post colonialism. It is argued, that within the late twentieth century, and now in the new millennium, the transnational forces of the new migrations have brought into play a different and new Diaspora which contributes more financially to the homeland, has redrawn the political interconnections between the “homelands” and the host society, and which now play a pivotal intervening role in the reconstruction of “Home”. Finally, it is contended that it behooves the homeland(s) of the sending societies, to establish facilitating, structural arrangements at the national governmental levels, to ensure that there is: transparency, mutuality, efficacy and accountability in these evolving relationships-especially in an increasingly globally interconnected world.

Introduction and the Concept of Home:

It is often said that you can't go home again; indeed, was it not Stuart Hall who said that you can go home again, you just can't stay.”(1) Roy Bryce La Porte continues this argument by contending that because there exists a wide range of differences in the manner and condition in which Blacks have left their ancestral or native homelands, in the process of being dispersed all over the world.....as a consequence of all this, some rather interesting dimensions have begun to develop among Blacks in the Diaspora with regard to these notions of “home.”(2)

Hence the concept “home or “homeland” for Blacks in the Diaspora may refer to different places, real or imagined, in their trek across the continent and passage across the ocean to the city or locality of their present abode.(3) Further, for these Diasporic Blacks, Bryce La Porte pointedly contends, that Home “ may well be their official country origin or birth, adopted country of resettlement or nationality, or their intermediate country of passage; for others it may be a spiritual or biblical reference. For those who seek to “return “it may well refer to a set of conditions or state of being, a condition or state to be strived for, emulated, or constructed, or a place of destination (not always coincident with their precise place of origin) to which they hope to (re)migrate and (re) settle and prosper and retire (.4)

Contextually, this debate rings true for many in the Black Diaspora of old. Initially torn from the motherland (Africa) by greed and profit, and initialized by slavery and a new world plantation system, diapsoric Blacks were forcibly transplanted to strange new homelands in Europe , minimally; and maximally to the new world nations of Latin America, North , South, and Central America and the Caribbean.

Forum on Public Policy

During slavery, emancipation and the end of slavery, these diasporic Blacks were so forcibly deculturized that they had no realistic notion of Home- namely Africa- or in some instances had a distorted , anglicized or Europeanized version of what “Home” is (was). To be sure there were exceptions where diapsoric Blacks returned to Africa – Sierra Leone, Liberia for example- and became one again with their “sending “societies. And yes, there were millennium and nationalistic movements - Garveyism, Father Divine , Black Muslims , and the like- that focused on the glories of the “motherland”(Africa) and worked to spark the liberation of all dispossessed Blacks in the homeland and the Diaspora. But, generally, “home” for Diasporic Blacks were the societies to which their forefathers were dragged, subjugated and resocialized- societies in Jamaica, Brazil, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, Haiti, Dominican Republic, Cuba for example. This was the homeland for these dispersed peoples. In many of these societies, (especially Latin and Central American ones), diasporic Blacks formed a minority, and they were marginalized and their cultures amalgamated by massive European immigration or incorporation of Native American elements. This was, generally, not so for those Blacks in the Anglo Caribbean nations of Jamaica, Guyana- formerly British Guiana, Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago- and in Haiti, where Blacks formed the numerical majority in these societies.

Initially ruled by colonial white minorities, these groups became acculturated creoles, while others held on to remnants or residuals of African cultures –largely nostalgic and symbolic- in societies in geographically sited areas called the West Indies.

Save for the original native Amerindian populations, the West Indies have, often been described as migration –oriented societies inasmuch as they have been brought into being, first by voluntary and later by the process and effects of involuntary forced migrations, and even later indentured servitude of other immigrants from Asia and Europe. With the abolition of slavery, the formal ending of colonialism and the granting of political independence and nationhood many nationals found that this new status did not drastically alter their economic relationship with their international metropolitan former masters in any meaningful way and, in some instances, as a result of larger international macro forces, their economic situations worsened internally as their now “national” government were unable to provide them with economic viability, even as they flaunted their political independence , and tried to find ways , collectively and otherwise , to become meaningful players on the world stage.

In an effort to deal with these dilemmas West Indians began to migrate to look for work and economic security. First these migrations were internally focused on countries such as Panama, Costa Rica, and even Cuba; and from the smaller islands- such as Barbados and Grenada for example- to larger land masses such as Guyana, to earn their livelihood. Predominantly, however, the greater migrations were to the United Kingdom(the U.K)- especially in the 1950's and 1960's –pre political independence and, in even larger numbers, to the United States of America after the passage of the sweeping post liberal national immigration legislation , often known as the Mc Carran –Walter Act of 1952.The USA after World War 11, had replaced the U.K as the undisputed leader of the free world and, with rapid industrialization and a burgeoning economy, had shifted its immigration policy to capture immigrants coming from the former colonial territories – albeit now touting a new political symbol of independent nation states.(5)

Specifically, this paper looks at the migration to the USA of Black diasporic Afro Caribbeans from Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados, post 1965; their adaptations to their new “home”; and relations with their old sending societies – “back Home”. It utilizes the perspective or frame of remittances –cultural, material and financial; the new political formulations, and the attempt to use human, social, and economic capital to initiate and spur homeland development and modernization. (6)

The Homelands-Barbados, Jamaica, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago: A Brief Overview

These four nation- states are the four most populous in the Anglo Caribbean, but are quite varied in their populations, economic, political and demographic formulations, their levels of political legitimacy and stability, the way they relate to their Diasporas, and the levels of interest shown in Diaspora development “back home”.

Jamaica has the largest population, domestically, and also has the largest numbers- although not percentage – of migrants abroad in the USA. It also has the largest number of Afro Caribbeans in its local population base. Its economy is currently not as diversified as Trinidad and Tobago's , and it is not as well economically positioned, globally, as is either Barbados or Trinidad- although much better so than is Guyana.

Forum on Public Policy

Trinidad and Tobago has been called a “Plural Society” as is Guyana in that they both have large segments of East Indians –originally brought as indentured immigrants to these nations to undercut the new, evolving economic and political viability of the emancipated Afro Caribbean slaves, many of whom had established villages and village systems from which to launch a real version of real emancipation (6). This was not to happen as the colonial power, England, used both race and ethnicity to “divide and rule” these two groups and lay deep divisions, hatred and mistrust, much of which still remains in these two nations, and which have contributed to large out migrations-especially from Guyana- and ethnically split national governments and political majorities.(7)conceptually, a Plural Society is defined by anthropologist and Caribbeanist R.T Smith thus: “The basic idea is that certain societies , among them those of the Caribbean region , appear to be made up of a number of sub –societies, each of which is an integrated entity with its own culture, while relations between these sub-societies are established and maintained solely by political dominance and force”. He continues, “No peaceful change in the social system is possible because the sections have nothing in common except involvement in economic and political relations which are essentially antagonistic” (8)

Trinidad and Tobago, with more cross cutting cultural alliances and allegiances in the form of creolization, a more astute political leadership class and, definitely, more geo politically relevant natural resources in the form of Oil, has been able to build a more robust, economical and less fractious society than has Guyana.(8)

Barbados, like Jamaica, has a sizeable majority of Afro Caribbeans; however unlike Jamaica, since political independence, it has had more political stability- the best of the four nations states under review- its economy has been vibrant and growing, has drawn many internal migrants from the other Caribbean island nations and Guyana, and has ranked the highest of the four nations on the UN Social Development Index. Barbados, however, is one of the most densely populated regions in the world and has a rigid social stratification system based on a color /class dichotomy that has been disadvantageous to Afro Caribbeans, largely. Historically, this has spurred many members of this group to migrate to first, other Caribbean islands and Guyana, then to Panama, Costa Rica, The U.K, and later to Canada and the USA. Today, even with Afro Caribbeans in Barbados firmly entrenched in control of the political elite, economic control is still vested in local whites and foreign hands, largely, and there are some commentators of the

local political landscape who argue that the local political elite still fronts as a shadow government for the “white” population segment.

In summary what has happened in these four nation states – and generally in the other micro states in the West Indies- is that the attainment of political independence did not radically improve their economic situation and this became a tremendous and formidable push factor in the migratory thrust. But why choose the USA given its long history of hostility toward people of color? Historian Calvin B. Holder puts it this way: “Why, given the long history of American hostility toward people of color, have hundreds of thousands of Blacks and other people of color voluntary emigrated to the U.S.? Economic factors have always been the major motivating factor. Simply put, the U.S., and particularly its northern states, has offered these immigrants opportunities for self improvement and material advancement that their homelands have proved incapable of providing.”(9) Because of this, Professor Holder continues, immigrants from the West Indies have generally put aside their concerns and reservations about American racism and flocked here when the opportunity has presented itself. And, once in the US, they have held steadfast to the view that racism should not be accepted as a legitimate reason for the failure of people of color- foreign native born- to succeed(10)This view , he contends, is especially entrenched among the post 1965 immigrants, now that legal segregation has been dismantled.(11)

In summary, for Afro Caribbeans – the modal ethnic grouping in what is commonly known as the West Indies- and clearly a sizeable numerical demographic proportion of the four nations (homelands) under review, poverty, and to a lesser extent political instability and class / color prejudice in their homelands, have also been instrumental ‘push’ factors for immigration to the USA (12)

West Indian Immigration to the U.S.A Post 1965: A Brief Overview

Voluntary migration to the U.S from the Caribbean began in the 19th century, primarily after the abolition of slavery in the US in 1865; by the end of the 19th centuries several thousand immigrants from the English and French West Indies resided in Boston, New York City, and

Forum on Public Policy

Miami. (13) However, it was the 20th century that witnessed the full bloom of this movement. Between 1900 and the Great Depression, well over 150,000 migrated. Migration was halted by the restrictive Immigration Act of 1924 and the subsequent economic crisis but resumed after World War 11 though it was quickly terminated with the passage of the conservative 1952 Immigration Act. The 1965 Immigration Act liberalized the nation's immigration policy, resulting in new movement, one that still continues today. (14)

As was indicated earlier the major push factors were (are) overcrowding (save for Guyana); a rigid economic stratification system leading to unequal distribution of wealth and land; limited economic opportunities; poor economic conditions; and, at times, harsh political realities or landscape that result in perceived political persecution. (15) And it is to the United States, largely, and then Canada and the U.K that West Indians have sought refuge.

Generally the term “ West Indian “ refers to, or identifies, immigrants from the Anglophone Caribbean, including Anguilla, Antigua, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, Cayman islands, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts, St. Lucia, Montserrat, Trinidad and Tobago, St Vincent and the American and British Virgin Islands. (16) The immigrants themselves use this appellation, and so do others.

Since 1965 most of the immigrants settled in the northeast corridors, creating urban communities in Miami, Boston Newark, (New Jersey), Hartford (Connecticut), and New York City. They settled in Brooklyn and Queens and formed ethnic enclaves in East Flatbush, Flatbush, Crown Heights, Canarsie , Midwood (in Brooklyn) , South Ozone , Cambria Heights, Laurelton , Richmond Hill (Queens) for example, and in the suburbs Elmont, Uniondale, Hempstead, and Baldwin on Long Island. (17)

Currently, there are two groups of West Indian communities in the US. The first has an Afro West Indian (Caribbean) majority, small numbers of Indo West Indians, who are mainly Muslim, and Christians, and an indeterminate number of persons of “some other race” or “two or more races”. This kind was first to settle and is found in Fort Lauderdale, Miami, Boston, and largely New York City. The second , which did not naturalize until the 1990s , comprise mainly Hindu and Muslim Indo West Indians, and some multi racial persons who are mainly of Indian/ Black

descent who are sometime referred to as “doughlahs”(18). Its residents have come mainly from Trinidad and Guyana- Richmond Hill in Queens is the best example of this kind of Indo West Indian ethnic enclave, as is Ozone Park. This group has not had as overwhelming a presence in the USA as has Afro Caribbeans- especially in their relations with native African Americans. However, whether skilled or unskilled, Afro or Indo West Indians, these West Indian Americans in the USA tend to place great emphasis on a few key goals: education for themselves and their children; social and economic betterment; family unity; and home ownership (19)

Many West Indian Americans have historically allied themselves with the political fight for civil and economic rights with native African Americans and other dispossessed Americans, and still play that role although their interactions over the years have not been without conflict. Many of their children –second and third generation Americans – along with the children of African immigrants have outperformed Whites, and certainly African Americans, in their entry and success into elite professional colleges (20)

I have argued elsewhere that this portrait of earlier educational exceptionalism is only part of this group’s profile, for structural shifts in the U.S. economy mean that segments of this community will suffer negative socio psychological and economic adjustments to migration, coupled with constricted assimilation to American society.(21) Pressures against full assimilation are also greater for lower-class West Indians, while typically middle and upper class professionals alternate between a more inclusive West Indian American or particularistic African- American identity, and the lower /working class choosing a more “ethnically focused, West Indian one”. (22)

West Indian immigrants have made New York state and New York City their principal destinations and sites of settlement with more than half of Barbadians, Guyanese, Trindadians, Jamaicans settling in New York especially Brooklyn and Queens. (23) Today, there are approximately 2.6 to 3 million West Indians (of all races) in the United States or about 1 percent of the population. (24). More than 72 percent of the Afro Caribbean (West Indian) are foreign – born, and they represent 4.6 percent of the Black population. Entrepreneurs continue to flourish in the community and the 2000 census shows that the median household income of Afro

Forum on Public Policy

Caribbeans is \$40,168 which is higher than the African American median household income but lower than immigrants from Africa.

In is within this context that we take a brief look at the occupational concentration of this group. Professor Calvin Holder, in a recent analysis, points out that generally West Indians have been employed in the private sector of the American economy. (25) According the the 2000 census, he states, 78.6 percent of the 352,770 employed West Indians 16 years and over were private wage and salary workers, 16.5 percent were government workers, 4.7 percent were self employed and 0.2 were unpaid family workers. By 2000, as the census shows 28.7 percent of West Indian immigrants worked in managerial, professional, and related occupations; 27.2 percent in service occupations; and 28 percent in sales and office occupations. West Indians also found work in construction and transportation; here the percentages were 9.3 and 1.3 respectively. Holder continues, “West Indians have achieved greater economic progress in New York City than elsewhere in the country. Tens of thousands of West Indian lawyers, physicians, nurses and medical technicians, teachers and middle –level managers have worked in the city since 1965. Even larger numbers have been employed in the skilled trades. A small class of entrepreneurs and business people has also developed their enterprises to cater to West Indians and to a lesser degree to African Americans and Whites. (26)The unemployment rate for this group was 7.3 percent.

An illustrative frame to provide a good insight into this group’s current socio-economic situation is by analyzing household income. The 2000 Census shows that the median household income for West Indians stand at \$40,168.(27)Holder comments on this fact by stating that...”this compares quite favorably with the median household income from the general population , \$ 41 190 . He continues, further, “A noticeably different picture emerges, however, when West Indians’ median family income is examined: it was \$44,959 as compared with a median family income of \$ 50,732 for the general, population.(28) “The larger household income, he argues ,and I concur , for West Indians is likely due to larger number of earners in their households.(29) The census also indicate that 12 percent of 184,395 West Indian families lived below the poverty line.

Before we examine the issue of “remittances sent home” I should comment on the issue of naturalization for West Indian immigrants which, is historically low, for many saw themselves as sojourners; although the rate has increased dramatically in the past decade. For example, of the 359,181 West Indians in 1990; 35 percent were naturalized American citizens; a decade later, when their population reached 550,480, 53.4 percent were naturalized, reports Professor Calvin Holder in a recent article (30). While continuing to give varied and correct reasons for this shift, Professor Holder asserts unequivocally, that evidence suggests that Afro West Indians (Caribbeans) and Indo West Indians (Caribbeans) have different attitudes toward naturalization. H states, that because racism is less problematic for Indo West Indians, they feel a less visceral opposition to becoming American citizens. In contrast, Afro West Indians have been notoriously reluctant to become naturalized citizens, because they abhor racism and the negative images it has created of African Americans and Blacks generally, but also they believe that by retaining their original citizenship, they dissociate themselves from these dehumanizing images. (31)

It is in this context that one should see the close connection of Afro Caribbeans (West Indians) with their homelands and the strong emotionally attachment it has for them. As Holder sees it ...”West Indians close and continuing ties to their homelands have also shaped their assimilation into American society. Each year tens of thousands of immigrants, many of whom have been in the U.S. for decades, regularly travel to their homelands. They go for Christmas; carnival and the Independence celebrations of their native countries; to see their relatives; to reside in their homes during the winter months; and to conduct business. Some have professional practices and businesses in both the U.S. and the West Indies (32)

Against this backdrop the following discussion on remittances to the homelands, their salience, regularity and applicability to homeland development takes on added meaning.

Remittances and Development- Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago

Writing for the World Bank in October 2004, economist Dilip Ratha, indicates that workers' remittances have become a major source of external development finance, providing a convenient angle from which to approach the complex migration agenda.(33) He continues that officially recorded remittances received by developing countries exceeded \$93 billion in 2003, with the actual size of the remittances , including both officially recorded and unrecorded transfers through informal channels , being even larger(34). Remittances are now more than double the size of net official flows (under 430 billion), and are second only to foreign direct investment (around \$133 billion) as a source of external finance for developing countries (35) In 36 out of 153 developing countries, remittances are larger than all capital flows, public and private (36) In short remittances have become a significant source of funds for some developing countries.

As one of the most important destinations of world immigration, the USA has emerged as the single largest source of reported remittances –payments sent by immigrant workers to their home countries(37)For example, remittances sent from the USA grew six fold from \$4.1 billion in 1981 to \$25.5 billion in 2003, when they accounted for about one-third of measured global remittances.(38) One of the major areas affected by the sending of remittances has been the Latin American and Caribbean nations and this a natural consequence of the large numbers of these immigrants- both first and later generations- residing in the USA. But before we examine the case of the four West Indian nationals one needs to define remittances.

Remittances are basically now seen as money transfers sent to the Caribbean by diasporic others residing abroad. In fact, remittances have always existed as part of the migratory thrust for West Indians. Internally, as immigrants left their islands – Barbadians for example who would migrate to Guyana (then British Guyana) - they would send barrels with food stuff and money back to their societies of origin. The large migration of Jamaicans, Barbadians, and other immigrants to Panama also resulted in the sending of barrels back home. However it was the migration to England, during the 1940's and later, that caused an upsurge in the analytical and scholarly treatment of remittances studies. Anthropologists Stuart Philpott and Philip Manners, for example, writing of the West Indian experience to England talked about both the “money order” economy and the barrels that were to become a pivotal part of the remittances paradigm. And Bonham Richardson describes the process and practice this way:

“Material goods from abroad sent and brought back by migrating men and women help reduce spot shortages of staple items at home but , more often, represent a quality and diversity of commodities otherwise unavailable or prohibitively expensive in the islands”. Indeed, Bonham further opines that remittances of money and gifts play a functional role for the migrants themselves, especial if external circumstances force them to return. And those men who have regularly remitted money in their absence invariably receive warmer homecomings than those who have not.” (39) So remittances are not only the money transfers but also the large number of foods and other sundry items sent by barrels to the Caribbean. Indeed there are now many West Indian businesses in the USA and other host societies which now specialize in this market niche, and are slowly challenging the multinational organizations such as Western Union for their place in the money transfer “niche” (40)

But there is another view of remittances that is more culturally geared. For although remittances are largely viewed as monetary or in kind contributions, they can be also viewed as cultural and social transfers, so argues Puerto Rican sociologist Juan Flores. Flores describes the process this way:

“Whether in the luggage of exiles or emigrants returning to visit or stays , or in stories and experiences recounted by friends and family, diasporas carry and send back more, however, than money and material goods. Ideas, values, political causes, cultural styles and preferences all make their way from Diaspora to homeland settings. In many instances, the financial remittances themselves come with political intentions attached, as in cases of community-to community monies or resources sent for civic and other benevolent projects to hometowns or regions of origin. Local political participation is often maintained, and even increased, across borders and geographical distances (41)

And this form of cultural remittance is also circular in that while hip hop and soul music flourish in Trinidad and Barbados; so do reggae, salsa, and calypso in Miami and New York, for example. Noted diasporic scholar Bryce La Porte describes it thus....

“The caribbeanization of carnival and the Calypso the internationalization of reggae, Rasta, rapping, Afro hair styles and soul music, the ghettoization of Santeria, Susu, and capoeira

(breakdance) and Salsa are outstanding cultural examples. They demonstrate how intense interpenetration and continuous cross-fertilization which have resulted principally from migration and mass media, Black people from different parts of the Diaspora have begun to share broader concepts or multiple references of “home’ which transcend both place and time.(42) “In some ways , “he continues ““home” both as a reference and reality has become so transplanted , so diffused , among Blacks that the scope of the black Diaspora may eventually take on new meanings, bring on new tensions, and point to new possibilities”(43)

We have not dealt with the costs of sending these remittances “back home” which can be prohibitively expensive, although much has been done in both the Clinton and now Bush administrations to help provide more competition from credit unions, some national banks, and the selected foreign nationals trained in the money transfer business and banking. Nor have we addressed the security concerns and new regulations designed to thwart the use of these money trails (sources) by terrorists; and supporting procedures and operations now instituted by the USA, Canada and, to a lesser extent, England. But these are the new realities of a post 9/11 era.

As indicated earlier Afro Caribbean immigrants in the USA have strong attachments to their homelands, now manifested in many ways. One of these ways is in the transmitting, both of goods through the sending of barrels, and also the remitting of money transfers. A number of scholars , Manuel Orozco(The Inter American Dialogue), Clairmont Kirton (the University of the West Indies- UWI); Debra Roberts (Bank of Guyana),Keith Nurse, (UWI), for example, have done extensive research and compiled numerous data on this process and its importance to the Caribbean and Latin American region, indicating that Latin America /Caribbean send the largest amount of dollars to their homelands – in 2000 over 17 billion U.S. dollars compared with Europe and Central Asia- over \$16 billion; and south Asia over \$15 billion.(44)For purposes of this paper I have extracted some appropriate and relevant data with specific applicability to Barbados, Guyana , Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. Here are some highlights:

- a) Remittances to Guyana totaled \$120(U.S Million) in 2002, and 201 (US million) in 2005.
- b) Remittances to Barbados totaled \$84(US million) in 2002 and \$131 million in 2005
- c) Remittances to Jamaica totaled \$1billion, two hundred million 2002; .87 billion dollars in 2005

Forum on Public Policy

- d) Remittances to Trinidad and Tobago totaled 50(U.S. million) in 2002 and \$97 million in 2005
- e) In 2003 the effects of GDP for these nations were 18.3% for Jamaica; 36.9% for Guyana; 4.3 percent for Barbados, and 0.77 percent for Trinidad and Tobago.
- f) Manuel Orozco (the senior and most prolific researcher on this topic) labels the impact of remittances on these nations as –strong for Jamaica and Guyana; moderate /medium for Barbados and low for Trinidad and Tobago.
- g) In all of these nations remittances have been used to strengthen Hometown Associations(H.T.As) although this is more pronounced in Guyana and Jamaica
- h) Remittances in all four nations have had a multiplier effect on the economy leading to an overall expansion in economic health.
- i) From a macro economic point of view , remittances have acquired as much importance as exports, traditionally considered the most important rubric of gross domestic product, (GDP)
- j) Although remittances have been used to aid the lower middle and working classes in these nations, in some- especially Guyana- it has been reported that among Afro Guyanese it has created a sense of dependency –almost as did welfare among African Americans in the USA in the 1960’s- thereby depressing initiative and stultifying the desire for seeking gainful employment
- k) Although positive in the reduction of poverty, the impact is temporary and does not replace the need for long term structural reform to reduce rampant unemployment and cognate inequality in the region.
- l) Although generally quite small and used to help finance families for their basic living expenses in the sending societies, yet small but increasing portions are used for investment purposes and development.
- m) Remittances have also been used to alleviate suffering resulting from floods, and other natural disasters which often befall these developing nations.

In summary what we have seen with the use of remittances in these nations is that Afro Caribbean nationals, in their attempts to reconnect with “home”, to reconstruct “home”, have

used their remittances to, firstly aid their less fortunate brethren and, more directly now, to aid the nation states thus formed after the granting of political independence. We should also note, here, that this concept of “home” is more linear for Afro Caribbeans than say for Indo or Asian (Chinese) Caribbeans, in that Afro Caribbeans now domiciled in the new world nations were taken from many countries in Africa (a continent) - albeit from the west coast .With Indo and Chinese born Caribbeans there are specific, and somewhat unitary, nations states outside the Caribbean to which they can refer, in their “other” or alternative construction of “home”. This becomes more complicating or enticing, recently, by the active roles of India and China in reconnecting with their overseas diasporic communities in their quest to maximize national and global development. Lacking this strong linear connection, Afro Caribbeans and creolized Indo and Asian Caribbeans focus on their new Caribbean civilization, (*sui generis*), and the new nations thus formed in this hemisphere.

How then does all this affect development in the Caribbean Diaspora?

Diaspora, Development, Remittances: Renegotiating Home

The regional organization CARICOM has been instrumental in laying the foundation for a more interconnected structural approach with the overseas Diaspora, by its Secretary General Edwin Carrington aided by Dr. Edward Greene, assistant secretary and former president of the Caribbean Studies Association, as well as a former University administrator (45). And former Jamaican Prime Minister P.J .Patterson has also played pivotal roles in charting a new, viable direction and trajectory for utilizing the overseas Diaspora, in a positive way. In short acting on the realization that there is a critical need for using the Diaspora as “development actors,” namely persons devoted to catalyze development activities, issues and events for their native homeland societies. (46)

The English speaking Caribbean has been blessed with language facility and many of its first, second and third generation “nationals” are well placed in private and public bureaucracies, in government, at state and local levels, and in American colleges and universities as Professors and administrators. Some are successful business men (women), and others handle large (at times

multi- billion dollar) portfolios for global agencies and organizations. So the challenge is how to tap this reservoir of talent, and at times goodwill, to use for the benefit of former “homelands”?

Many scholars and policy makers, including the author, have written on various modalities and paradigms that can serve the Caribbean well as that region looks to capitalize on remittances flows and untapped human and capital resources- in the face of a massive brain drain at the secondary and tertiary levels of education, and that of trained personnel such as doctors and nurses.(47) I will now highlight some of these recommendations that , in my opinion, have much merit for the national leaders in the region

- A) The creation of a ministry or sub ministry in the Prime Ministers’ or Presidents’ cabinet with primary responsibility for overseeing efforts at engaging the Diaspora. This had been advocated by the Caricom Secretary General Edwin Carrington, and by former Jamaican Prime Minister P.J. Patterson. Jamaica is the first nation government to take the lead in this regard by establishing a Minister of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In a lecture at Medgar Evers College /CUNY, in Brooklyn on October 30th 2005. (48) P.J. Patterson talked about an “engaged Diaspora” as opposed to a “passive Diaspora.” He went on to see “the connectedness of the engaged Diaspora manifesting itself through one or more of several ways, leading to what he called “an emotional attachment to sustain connectedness.” So far Guyana and Barbados have established similar ministerial “structural” arrangements and Trinidad and Tobago is set to follow suit shortly.
- B) Another key issue is strengthening the collaboration, and the maintaining of stakeholders in the Diaspora is by intertwining them via the use of dual citizenship between host and home (sending) societies. Connecting Caribbean Diasporas, I argue, in a practical way via the electorates will bring greater demands for support of political transparency in the political process and a greater level of activity. (49) In some instances this connection has led to diasporic nationals assuming political office in the home country with varying measure of success but, more importantly, it allows for collective lobbying interests between political elites here in the USA and North America ,on behalf of the homeland nations.(50)

This position has been supported by a number of scholars. Anthropologist Linda Basch has argued that dual citizenship augments the power of Caribbean politicians by providing them with a political base in both New York and the Caribbean, each buttressing the other in transnational social field. (51) Sociologist Nancy Foner supports this view also, by positing that extending dual nationality or citizenship provisions may be a way of trying to secure the role of overseas nationals as “advocates of La Patria’s interest in the USA.” And even a formidable critic of the new immigration, noted political scientist Samuel Huntington, concedes that adoption of dual citizenship by the sending country has been followed by a doubling of the naturalization rates of these individuals, with increases higher among citizens of those countries where the initiative has come from the immigrant themselves (52). These connections would not negate other political associations with the home country; they would invigorate them by giving the diasporic others a sunken cost in the consequences of the political decisions, challenges and controversies of the home societies. In the final analysis, the result would be to initiate the political integration of the Diaspora by the homeland governments and, hopefully, build a positive core attitude between host governments and diasporic populations toward vibrant, effervescent and socially aware ethnic nationalities.

It should be noted that Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago now boast dual citizenship for their diasporic nationals, however Guyana does not. One could surmise that the current Guyanese government may recall their charges that the previous PNC government, which lasted for 25 years, was reputed to have extended its political life by using the “overseas vote” to retain its tenure in office. (53) While many Indo Guyanese are migrating in hordes to the USA, Afro Guyanese are migrating proportionately in larger numbers, and it may be feared that extending this option may shift the political balance in a closely fought election in Guyana?

- C) The need for the national governments and the diasporic communities to both co sponsor and facilitate Hometown Associations (HTAs), which have worked well in the Latin American context –especially in Mexico. This concept emanates from a new development concept called “virtuous circle” introduced by Dr Patrick Mendis in 2002 as sustainable development that goes beyond per capita indexes and the calculus. (54) Professor Simon Tay , a Singaporean scholar, explicated it more when he contended that the “virtuous circle” would include an activism in development that includes the little

people –such as women, children, the undereducated and the rural poor.(55) The point here is that the development ideology and models must be tied a sort of growth equity, which brings all segments of the society together so that they interact with the various engines, and resources of development at their own levels of empowerment.(56)In short to use Caribbean scholar, the late Lloyd Best’s dicta: helping to “Make the small man, a real man.”(57) A thematic concept which later formed the basis for the national cooperative post independence banks of Trinidad/Tobago and Guyana.

It has been shown that these HTAs result from work with home governments and local participants to extend the development imperative by collaborating and agreeing on projects that benefit and bring needed relief to affected arrears, after they are identified locally, as being the most needed. This also inculcated a sense of civic involvement and participation by rewarding creativity and innovation .Many such small scale development projects-water wells for drinkable water, health centers for example-have resulted, and Guyana and Jamaica have reported much success and high use in this area , with Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago only moderately so.

D) The need to accelerate the rate of secondary and tertiary education levels in the region. Normally when one thinks of economic factors one can easily conceptualize trade relationships, remittances and banking relationships. However, education and the investment in such can also be a clear economic multiplier. One uniqueness of the Caribbean Diaspora and Guyana has been its superlative education levels at all levels given the relative size of its demographics as compared to India, China, and other land masses .Caribbean diasporic nationals (especially first, second and later generations) have generally excelled in student bodies and faculties in many elite private and public universities where meritocracy and universalistic criteria abound.(58) Much of this earlier educational success was based on the strong skills sets and knowledge base of highly competitive secondary and primary schools in the region Unfortunately this competitive edge has been lost at the primary and secondary levels with a precipitous drop in the universal completion of primary education-one of the ten Millennium Development Goals- that has not been achieved in Guyana, for example. And further illustrated with a World Bank report informing us of a diminishing quality of education in segments of the

Forum on Public Policy

primary schools in the region; the existence of “barrel children”; and a low enrollment in tertiary education- with only Barbados succeeding in continued expansion of tertiary education(59) There have been earlier arrangements with Caribbean societies such that their secondary schools could send their “best and brightest” to study at American and Canadian Universities for their undergraduate degrees primarily, with a view to returning home for some periods after their studies were completed. The Burnham regime of Guyana ,for example, enjoyed such a cozy and profitably privileged relationship in the 1960s when it was in the opposition to the U.S. feared Marxist Prime Minister Cheddi Jagan, and hundreds of USIS scholarships were offered to colleges and universities in the USA and Puerto Rico. The students who received J1 visas were supposed to return “home” to help in spreading democracy and aiding development.

Jagan, who was alternatively courted by the USSR, sent many students to eastern bloc, Cuban and Soviet Universities, as the Cold War waxed. (60) This was also true in the case of the island of St. Vincent and the Grenadines which sent, during that period of the 1960s, its best students to Yale on somewhat similar arrangements for undergraduate study. One such success is the current U.S. Ambassador to Trinidad and Tobago, the Honorable Dr. Roy Austin who attended Yale University where he met and befriended President Bush, and was tapped to join the prestigious but secret Skulls and Bones society ,which includes among its membership many top business and political elites in the world.(61)

It would be advantageous for Caribbean Diasporas experts to act as “de facto agents” for their home governments to make educational linkages with large public and private university systems in New York, Massachusetts, Florida and New Jersey for example, as well as private proprietary ones. Sure, there would have to be partnerships engendered and identification in critical areas of “felt needs”. For instance tourism students could be developed with opportunities at Florida International University (F.I.U) and Cornell .or, in the area of engineering relationships with SUNY or CUNY, Rutgers University. Indeed some of these initiatives are now being undertaken, but unfortunately they are piece meal, segmented and not well coordinated for maximum effect. (62) The point here is that Caribbean Diaspora experts, now strategically positioned, can with the correct political posture, appeal and structural affiliations, be persuaded and convinced to be interconnected

with helping the development goals of their former homelands with regard to the dangerous slippage in education. If embraced and utilized as pivotal stakeholders Caribbean and Guyanese diaspora experts can play a highly positive role in this regard. It should be noted that Barbados has done extremely well relative to its success at all levels of education, spending appreciable proportions of GDP on education. Trinidad and Tobago has also made moderate progress, but Guyana and Jamaica have not done as well, with Guyana showing the least progress in reaching its education goals as set by international organizations (63)

Conclusions

And there is much more that can be stated as the aforementioned list is not an exhaustive one. We have not discussed the family breakup and gender imbalance that I have written about and researched elsewhere, and the resulting “barrel children”; nor have we discussed extensively the growing culture of emigration, the massive brain drain and valleys of dislocation it leaves in the region. So, while remittances can bring about some levels of economic stability- often short term- it must be viewed, however, within the past historical context adumbrated earlier, and the challenges still facing the West Indies (Caribbean) including the four nations under review- Guyana, Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. Professor Neville Duncan political scientist of the University of the West Indies, in a conference in Panama in 2005 entitled: “The Challenge of the Contemporary Caribbean in the twentieth first Century.(64) put it well by “reminding us that despite some decline in the first decade, unemployment is still high in the region, with Barbados with 10.3 percent rate; Jamaica with 12.5 percent; Trinidad and Tobago with 10.8 and Guyana 17.0 or more.(65) This has negatively impacted out migration resulting in the brain drain which are collectively weakening skills and capacity in respective countries. An extreme case is Guyana which is losing nurses and teachers at high and unsustainable rates. In Jamaica 80 percent of tertiary graduates leave (migrate) as well as large numbers of secondary graduates.(66) We should note that both Guyana and Jamaica are societies with high levels of crime and political violence. It should also be noted that enrollment in tertiary education has been historically low in the Caribbean as contrasted with Latin America and this, Professor Duncan argues, is a major obstacle in the Caribbean achieving a knowledge driven economy.

(67) With only Barbados spending a high of about U.S \$860 per student on education, and Caribbean governments an average of 4.9 percent of their GDP on education during the period 1999-2002. (68) Further, the debt ratio is very high also and stands at 96 percent of GDP, with public debt in 2003 indicating Barbados with 84 percent of GDP, Trinidad and Tobago with 54 percent, Jamaica 142 percent of GDP and Guyana with 142 percent of its GDP financing debt. Guyana and Jamaica being- along with Haiti- one of the slowest growing economies in the region over the last four decades(69).It should also be noted that Guyana has, in the recent past, benefited from debt relief and is making slow progress in eliminating its public debt. It was included under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC) and a sizeable proportion of its debt forgiven. Whether this will spur development and lower the economic inequality between Afro Guyanese and Indo Guyanese, and blunt the political charges in some quarters,(especially in the Diaspora), of economic and political marginalization of Afro-Guyanese, is still an open question?(70)

So what we have reviewed, then, is a region with sending “homeland societies”-many micro states struggling to survive in an increasingly hostile and highly competitive global environment-losing many of its preferential tariffs stemming from colonialization and early political independence; ridden with high debt; unsustainable brain drain and out migration; high rates of crime and political instability; all these and more affecting the four nation under review, in varying degrees.

These are the compelling factors that push West Indians, and Afro Caribbeans especially, to attempt to reconnect with their “homelands”, not only nostalgically, but to reconstruct “home” and use their remittances- in cash and kind- and whatever other skills sets, contacts and opportunities they have, to help their less fortunate “brethren”, and aid their societies to stay anchored in a globally, hostile environment on many fronts. So, it behooves Americans and those interested in promoting democracies and thriving market economies in this region, on our doorsteps, to work for political, economic, social and ethnically inclusive diasporic communities which will catalyze development, it is hoped, in these nation states- at times at their own expense and sacrifice- thus sparing the American taxpayer the financial burden to some degree.

Forum on Public Policy

It should also be noted that at a recent three day historic Heads of Governments conference held in June, with leaders of the Caribbean national states as represented by CARICOM, President George Bush and the US State department, and the Caribbean Diaspora fora –comprised of Experts Forum, Private Sector Dialogue and the Diaspora Forum- agreement was finalized on many of the conclusionary points made in this paper. (71)

In conclusion, Stuart Hall may have been wrong: Afro Caribbeans and other West Indians can and must go “**HOME**” again; and yes, they can even **STAY**.

NOTES

Note also that the terms Afro- Caribbeans and Afro West Indians are used interchangeably as are Caribbean and West Indian

1. Grant Farred, You Can Go Home Again, You Just Can't Stay: Stuart Hall and the Caribbean Diaspora. (The Black Atlantic),Vol .27, No 1 **Research in African Literatures**, Dec. 1996,pp 28-48; Stuart Hall, also Stuart Hall, “Culture identity and Diaspora,” **Colonial Discourse and Post Colonial Theory. A Reader** ed Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman New York, Columbia University Press, 1994, pp 392-403; Camille A Nelson, “Carriers of Globalization: Loss of Home and Self within The African Diaspora, Florida Law Review, 539(2003)

2. R Bryce La Porte, Foreword, in **Emerging Perspectives on the Black Diaspora**,ed by Aubrey W. Bonnett and G.L. Watson, Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1990, p xv

3. Ibid p xv11

4. Ibid

5 Howard Dodson and Sylvania A Diouf, **In Motion The African- American Migration Experience** , Washington DC, National Geographic for The Schomburg Center For Research In Black Culture, 2004, p.166

6. It should be noted here that the author argues that the disconnect between Afro Caribbeans (also called Afro West Indians), and Indo Caribbeans with regard to “home” is much less nuanced and that the creolized Afro- Caribbeans tend to focus more strongly on Home in the Caribbean as opposed to the ancestral ‘home” in Africa. For Indo Guyanese- especially- given their nature of arrival , their numerical modal minority in the West Indies, their general lack of adaptation to Creole, hybrid culture and largely rural status , and the recent attempts by India to woo them both cultural and economically, the connection with the “Caribbean Home” is less linear. **Professor Calvin B Holder** elaborates on this point much later.

Creolization. according to Social Anthropologist and Caribbeanist **R.T. Smith** involves two processes; in the first place it involves the creation of some area of common culture corresponding to the social relations in which people of varying ethnic groups are involved and second it is an integral part of the process of creolization to stress the differences between groups identified “racial groups” in Raymond Smith, People and Change , in **New World**,

Forum on Public Policy

Guyana Independence Issue, editors George Lamming and Martin Carter, Georgetown, Guyana, May 1966 p 51; also Eric Doumerc, *Caribbean Civilization: The English – Speaking Caribbean Since Independence*, France, Presses Universitaires, Du Mirail, 2003. Finally, one of the earlier works to utilize the remittances perspectives in analyzing and developing a perspective on Caribbean societies is, William F Skinner, Klaus de Albuquerque and Roy S. Bryce-Laporte, *Return Migration and Remittances: Developing a Caribbean Perspective*, RIIES Occasional papers No 3, Research Institute on Immigration and Ethnic Studies, Smithsonian Institution, Washington D.C. 1982

7 See for example, Maurice St Pierre, **Anatomy of Resistance: anti Colonialism in Guyana 1823-1865**, (Warwick Caribbean Series) New York, MacMillan Press, 1999 and David Lowenthal, *West Indian Societies*, London, Oxford University Press, 1972; and Stephen G rabe **U.S. Intervention in British Guiana: a Cold War Story**, Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, 2005 and. Raymond Smith, *People and Change in: New World Guyana Independence Issue*, editors George Lamming and Martin Carter, Georgetown, Guyana, May 1966 ;Ivelaw Griffith, *Freedom House, Countries at The Crossroads, Country Report Guyana*, 2006

8 Although Trinidad and Tobago has not been bereft of ethnic conflict and racial incidents, I argue that the Carnival, calypso and other creolized West Indian cultural symbols have made more inroads among Indo Guyanese than in Guyana, and this has alleviated the razor sharp divisions now found in Guyana

9. Calvin B Holder, “West Indies : Antigua,Bahamas,Barbados,Grenada,Guadeloupe,Gyayna,Martinique,St.Kitts,Trinidad”, in **The New Americans: A Guide To Immigration since 1965**, edited by Mary C Waters & Reed Ueda, with Helen B Marrow, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, p.674

10. Ibid p 675

11. Ibid

12. Ibid

13. Dodson and Diouf op. cit pp 157-170

14. Holder op cit and Fiona R Barnes, “West Indian Heritage” In **The African American Encyclopedia** 2nd edition, editor Carl L Bankston 111 et al, New York, Marshall Cavendish, 2001, pp 2662-26664

15. Ibid

16 Aubrey W. Bonnett “West Indian Americans” in **Racial and Ethnic Relations in America**, Vol 111, edited by Carl L. Bankston 111, Pasadena, California, 2000, pp 1037-1039 and Holder, op cit

17. Ibid

18. Holder ibid, 676

19. Holder p. 678 and Barnes op cit

20 Holder, Ibid and Aubrey W. Bonnett, in Commentary Why Do They Hate US, in **CaribVoice** August 6, 2004, and Commentary in **Caribbean Graphic Online**, West Indian Americans : Why Do They Hate US? July 5, 2004

21. Bonnett, West Indian Americans, 1037-1039

22 Ibid

Forum on Public Policy

23 Holder op cit pp 674-686

24. Ibid

25. Ibid

26. Ibid

27. Ibid

28. Ibid

29 Ibid and Bonnett West Indian Americans, op cit

30. Holder op cit

31. Ibid

32. Ibid

33. See Dilip Ratha in “Workers’ Remittances : An Important and Stable Source of External Development Finance,” in **Global Development Finance**, Washington DC World Bank,2003 pp157-175 ; also Understanding the Importance of Remittances in, **Migration Information Source** , October 1 2004 at <http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/print .cfm? ID=256>; and Robert Shackleton et al, **Remittances: International Payments by Migrants**, A Congressional Budget Office, (CBO) Paper, Washington, D.C., May 2005.

34. Ibid

35. Ibid

36. Ibid

37. Ibid

38. Ibid

39. **Remittance Obligations, Social Networks and Choice among Montserratian Immigrants** in Britain, **MAN**, 3(3) 465-76; also Robert A Manners, Remittances and the Unit of analysis in Anthropological Research, **Southwestern Journal of Anthropology**, 1965, 21 (3) 179-195; and Bonham c Richardson,

Caribbean Migrations, in the **MODERN CARIBBEAN**, ed ., by Franklin W Knight and Colin Palmer, the University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill and London,1989,pp 224-226

40. Holder opcit

41 Juan Flores, “The Diaspora Strikes Back: Reflections on Cultural Remittances” in **NACLA Report on the Americas**, Vol 39, No 3, Nov/Dec 2005

42 .Bryce LaPorte op cit p. xv111

Forum on Public Policy

43. Ibid

44. see Keith Nurse , **Remittances and Beyond: Diaspora and Development in The Caribbean** (Forthcoming);Keith Nurse , Diaspora , Migration and Development in The Americas, Policy Paper, **FOCAL** , Canadian Foundation for the Americas September 2004;Clairmont Kirton, “Remittances : The Experiences of the English- Speaking Caribbean ,” in Donald F Terry and Steven R Wilson eds, **Beyond Small Change : Making Migrant Remittances Count**, IADB, Washington DC,2005; Debra Roberts The Development Impact of **Remittances on Caribbean Economies: The Case of Guyana**; Manuel Orozco The Impact of Migration in The Caribbean and Central America region , **FOCAL**, Policy Paper, 2003; Manuel Orozco, **Remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean: Issues and Perspectives on Development, Report commissioned by the Organization of American States**, Washington, DC, September 2004; Manuel Orozco, **Distant But Close : Guyanese Transnational Communities and Their Remittances from the United States, Report commissioned by the U.S. Agency for International Development** , January 2004;**Beyond Money: Diaspora Engagement in Development**, three case studies on Guyana(1),Jamaica(2), and Haiti(3), Harvard University,2003; for example.

45..Press release 226/2066 4 December 2006, Keynote address by H E Edwin Carrington, Secretary General of the Caribbean Community,(**CARICOM**), on the occasion of the UNFPA Media Awards , 2 December 2006,Mona , Jamaica.

46 Address by the Honorable P.J Patterson former Prime Minister of Jamaica to the Caribbean Diaspora community At the **CARICOM’S** 30th Anniversary lecture at Medgar Evers College /CUNY entitled : “**CARICOM Beyond Thirty: Connecting With The Diaspora,**” October 30 ,2204 47; Aubrey W Bonnett, “**Creating a Cohesive and Substantive Platform of the Caribbean Diaspora in North America That would Contribute to the Development of The Caribbean,** at the Caribbean Diaspora Project Experts’ Meeting , New York, UN Secretariat, December 2005

47. See for example Nurse , op cit, Roberts, op cit, Orozco op cit, Terry and Wilson op cit, Stinner, Albuquerque and LaPorte op cit all mentioned earlier

48. P.J. Patterson op cit and Bonnett, **Diasporas Experts Meeting (United Nations)**, op cit

49. Bonnett ibid

50. Ibid

51 Ibid

52. Ibid

53 See St Pierre op cit; Rabe op cit; Joy Moncrieffe, **Ethnic Diversity and State Response in The Caribbean**, Overseas Development Institute, London January 2004, Griffith, Country Report Guyana, op cit

54. See, “Achieving Sustainable Development,” in **Global Issues**, an Electronic Journal of the U.S. Department of State, April 2002, and Vol 7, No 1

55. Ibid

56. Ibid

57. Lloyd Best, Oxford and Cambridge Universities trained Trinidadian intellectual and scholar coined this phrase even as he championed micro lending/savings emanating from an African (Nigerian) cultural retention called **SUSU** and the establishment a Workers Bank funded and sponsored by the Government to help alleviate gross levels of inequality in the Trinidadian society.

Forum on Public Policy

58. See Holder op cit 678, and Bonnett, West Indian Americans, op cit

59. See, “A Time to Choose: Caribbean Development in the 21 st Century, especially chap 7 Building Skills for The Knowledge Driven Society,” **World Bank Report**, Washington, DC 2005

60. In the height of the **Cold War**, the **USA government** fostered and sponsored hundreds of **scholarships** to the opposition PNC leader, **Forbes Burnham**, in **Guyana** as an alternative to supporting the reputed communist Prime Minister **Cheddi Jagan**. Students received J1 visas for study at American and Puerto Rican Colleges and Universities and were supposed to return to their homelands to contribute to their country’s development. Of course the **Cubans**, **East Germans** and **Soviets** did the same for PM Cheddi Bharat Jagan.

61. See **Biography, US Department of State**. Other internet and books references, including the Trinidad Express, speak to the issue of Skull & Bones and his Yale days and friendship with President Bush.

62. At least in New York where many Caribbean nationals reside there have been numerous piecemeal efforts in CUNY and SUNY over the years, under Chancellors Murphy, Reynolds in CUNY and Wharton, Bartlett and King in SUNY for example, often at the behest of College and University Presidents who are looking to expand cultural and educational experiences for American students, to bring Caribbean students and faculty to American Universities. These efforts need to be streamlined and coordinated at the regional level of the sending societies to get maximum effect, in my opinion.

63. World Bank Report on Education- A Time to Change, 2005, Op cit

64. Neville Duncan, **Conference paper entitled The Challenge of the Contemporary Caribbean in the 21 st century**,” held in Panama, 2005

65. Ibid

66. Ibid

67. Ibid

68. Ibid

69. Ibid

70. **Guyana**, with a large out migration of highly skilled and unskilled individuals , growing crime rate spurred by international narcotics, and deep social and political division of a **Plural Society** seems unfortunately locked in perennial conflict.; also see Griffith, **Country Report Guyana** ,2006,op cit

71. See, Caricom Leaders Pleased with “Conference on the Caribbean” in **Caribbean Current**, June 28, 2007 in http://www.caribbeancurrent.com/Archives/2007/issue026/easterncaribbean/story_id_001.html

Published by the Forum on Public Policy

Copyright © The Forum on Public Policy. All Rights Reserved. 2006.