

## Ontological Gap: Eastern Spiritualism Western Materialism

Allen S. Clark, Instructional Assistant Professor of Arabic, The University of Mississippi

### Abstract

The epistemic underpinnings that drove the European Crusaders to cease their feudal infighting and expend their energies in ‘righteous wars,’ were, perhaps, those same underpinnings that motivated the Arab armies to unite their forces under Saladin’s call to *Jihād*. Since that time (c. 1095-1651 CE), the East and the West have gone on two very different epistemological and ontological paths. The Arab World speaks from a theological, spiritual ontology using its grammar and its rules, while the West speaks from a capitalistic, materialistic ontology. An ontological gap between the East and the West occurred over a period of centuries; thus it may be difficult to determine a singular causative historical event. One could argue, however, that its roots could be traced to the ‘Great Separation’ (i.e., the separation of church and state) of the 17<sup>th</sup> century;<sup>1</sup> a separation that never took place in the Islamic community.

Such a separation did not and effectively cannot take place in the Islamic community due to its legal system, which became a rigorous legislative codex set of laws by the 12<sup>th</sup> century known as *‘uṣūl al-fiqh*—[origins of understanding].<sup>2</sup> This was soon to become the source of “traditional dogma”; an approach to law that significantly influenced the collective Arab worldview and has forthwith imbued discourse coming out of the Arab World with spiritual and theological overtones. This paper explores how this ontological gap influences translator choices in the Arabic to English language pair as seen in published terrorist communiqués by the western international news agencies. The same spiritual/religious citations and allusions that lend authority to b. Lādin’s passages offering him a platform to convince his audience of the correctness and truthfulness of his ideas seemingly hold little to no substantial value to the western translator and are thus left to his or her whims; essentially reframing and repositioning *al-Qā‘ida*’s overarching goals, basis, and foundation altering the original meaning through translation thereby affecting the manner in which the west receives and interprets its communiqués. The results of this study indicate that not only does an East-West ontological gap exist, but its impact on international news translation is real, constituting an internal bias that ultimately influences public opinion, which in turn guides foreign policy.

### Introduction

The West and the Middle East have a history of conflict from the times of the First Crusade (c. 1096 CE)<sup>3</sup> until the era of instant and mass communication with the First and Second Gulf Wars. There can be little doubt that initial East/West clashes were rooted in spiritual misunderstandings implicating religious misconceptions exacerbated by linguistic differences. The current *War on Terror* is yet another episode in a series of Eastern/Western linguistic misunderstandings, this one brought about, in part, by poorly-worded, stilted translations of *al-Qā‘ida* communiqués published and circulated by international news agencies. The question driving this research investigates the reason(s) mismatches occur in the target text (TT) with respect to the original wording of the source text (ST).

To establish the existence of an Eastern-Western ontological gap, this paper explores of the Islamic legal system, its development regarding subsequent adherence to traditional dogma, and its influence on the collective Arab worldview, proposing that discourse coming out of the Arab World is imbued with spiritual overtones. It follows that if a secular, materialistic society, such as the modern American society, were to translate spiritually-charged discourse published or broadcast from the Arab region—in particular communiqués delivered by the *Qā‘ida* terrorist organization—a western translator would tend to devalue or debase those passages. In fact, results from this study indicate that the western translator, when translating *al-Qā‘ida*

---

<sup>1</sup> M. Lilla, “The Politics of God,” *The New York Times Magazine*, August 19, 2007, 28-35; 50.

<sup>2</sup> W. Hallaq, *The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

<sup>3</sup> M. Farah and A. B. Karls, *World History: The Human Experience* (New York: Macmillan/McGraw-Hill, 1994), 282.

communiqués, regularly traverses along the following four-point continuum: 1) relate the message with a high degree of fidelity; 2) change the message at times subtly while at other times drastically; 3) substitute an entirely different phrase/idea in place of the original; and 4) omit religious or theological references. A four-case critical discourse analysis of b. Laden's communiqués is presented, indicating that the existence of this ontological gap—in all likelihood—plays a role in distorting translation from the Arabic source text into English target text that ultimately leads to misrepresentation and by extension misunderstanding on the global stage upon which public opinion resides and foreign policy is established.

### Discourse Change over Time

An ontological shift took place in the West during the 11-15<sup>th</sup> CE century time span; theorists<sup>4</sup> support the notion that this ontological shift precipitated another shift of no less consequence in *language use* producing new discourse. Fairclough maintains, “[o]ne interesting feature of social scientific theorizations and analyses of the transformations of late modernity, from various theoretical perspectives, is that they emphasise that these transformations are to a significant degree (though certainly not exclusively) transformations in language and discourse”.<sup>5</sup> This notion is illustrated in the empirical fact that discourse shapes and is shaped by reality.<sup>6</sup>

The Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis suggests that a given language not only contains the ideas and concepts of its users, but it also excludes other ideas from being expressed. By way of example, I ask the reader to try to imagine a color that he or she has never seen. If indeed the reader can imagine a truly unique color, a follow up question would be: is it possible to describe that color to someone else? The upshot of this line of thought is that language dictates (and by extension limits) *word choices* to express notions and ideas. It is my contention that these lexical choices are bound not only by language, but a language community's accepted discourse, which changes over the course of time influencing a society's word usage. A logical question to pose at this juncture could be: on what basis does a translator make his or her word choices? One possible answer—and the one proposed here—is that one's world view, a society's meta-narrative, indeed one's ontology imparts ingrained biases and stereotypes into the very lexical choices that comprise the wording of the target text.

The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis touches upon the topic of discourse and its impact on perception proposing 1) that differences in language structures, for the most part, parallel differences in nonlinguistic cognition; and 2) that a speaker's native tongue strongly influences or completely determines one's world view (= *weltanschauung*).<sup>7</sup> This paper extends this hypothesis adding a temporal element, putting forward the notion that a society's *weltanschauung* evolves with the passage of time bringing about new discourse that, in turn, reinforces or alters societal and cultural perception. This process is, at times, cyclical in that

<sup>4</sup> Theorists such as Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999; Habermas 1984 v. 1, v. 2; Giddens 1990.


<sup>5</sup> N. Fairclough, “Global Capitalism and Critical Awareness of Language” in *The Discourse Reader: Second Edition*, ed. A. Jaworski and N. Coupland. (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 4.

<sup>6</sup> L. Chouliaraki and N. Fairclough, *Discourse in Late Modernity: Rethinking Critical Discourse Analysis*, (Cambridge: Edinburgh University Press, 1999) 4. A. Hodges and C. Nilep, “Discourse, War and Terrorism,” in *Discourse, War and Terrorism: Discourse Approaches to Politics, Society and Culture* ed. A. Hodges and C. Nilep (Amsterdam; Philadelphia: John Benjamins Press, 2007), 2.

<sup>7</sup> P. Kay and W. Kempton, “What Is the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis?,” *American Anthropologist*, 86(1), (1984): 66.

discourse reflects change that happens beyond language (i.e., a world event or phenomenon) that then produces discourse(s) which, in turn, can about non-discursive change(s).<sup>8</sup>

The theory that a cycle of discourse change initiates when events of historical proportions transpire is graphically represented below. The reader will notice that at the end of the cycle, if a given society accepts, through adaptation and integration, changes in its discourse and worldview, then with the passage of a sufficient amount of time, the discourse and *weltanschauung* will become the invisible technologies and ideologies of language that shape a society's notions of reality, Truth, and its belief system—in a word, its ontology.



**Figure 1.1 Cycle of Discourse Change<sup>9</sup>**

Putting this theory into practice, this study analyzes the language of an event of historical proportions, an event that had an immediate impact on producing new discourse—the rhetoric of the “*war on terror*” that emerged after the attacks of September 11, 2001.<sup>10</sup> Hodges and Nilep write, “[t]he “war on terror” discourse constrains and shapes public discussion and debate within the US and around the world as social actors in Europe, Asia, the Middle East and elsewhere evoke its language to explain, react to, justify or understand a broad range of political, economic and social phenomena”.<sup>11</sup> It does this, van Dijk theorized, using a polarized style of writing imbuing the text with positive ‘in-group’ attributes while attributing negative characteristics and

<sup>8</sup> L. Chouliaraki and N. Fairclough, *Discourse in Late Modernity: Rethinking Critical Discourse Analysis*, (Cambridge: Edinburgh University Press, 1999) 4.

<sup>9</sup> Adapted from ‘cycle of change’ retrieved from <http://localenterprise.files.wordpress.com/2008/07/cycle-of-change-v2.png?w=802&h=661>

<sup>10</sup> A. Hodges and C. Nilep, “Discourse, War and Terrorism,” in *Discourse, War and Terrorism: Discourse Approaches to Politics, Society and Culture* ed. A. Hodges and C. Nilep (Amsterdam; Philadelphia: John Benjamins Press, 2007), 3. R. Jackson, *Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-terrorism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), 153.

<sup>11</sup> A. Hodges and C. Nilep, “Discourse, War and Terrorism,” in *Discourse, War and Terrorism: Discourse Approaches to Politics, Society and Culture* ed. A. Hodges and C. Nilep (Amsterdam; Philadelphia: John Benjamins Press, 2007), 153.

actions to ‘the other’.<sup>12</sup> This theory takes the form of an ‘ideological square’ in which 1) the in-group’s good properties/actions are emphasized; 2) the other’s bad properties/actions are emphasized; 3) the in-group’s bad properties/actions are mitigated; and 4) the other’s good properties/actions are mitigated (ibid.).

Thus, this study not only accounts for a shift in discourse, but takes Fairclough’s lead in terms of presenting media discourse, which is not evaluated in terms of some ‘absolute truth’; rather, in terms of ‘epistemic gain’<sup>13</sup> wherein reformation of journalistic translation will yield new discourse. By extension, emergence of new discourse will allow the west to re-describe its (mis)perception of the Arab world through the construction of a new lens. Hodges and Nilep<sup>14</sup> commented on the ‘war on terror’ discourse stating that it is “a lens through which US foreign policy and domestic politics have been refracted, bent and one might even say distorted for the better part of the Bush administration’s tenure.” Jackson proposes that distorting media discourse was a necessary step to projecting large-scale violence in the Middle East in a demonizing and dehumanizing process of ‘the other’ in an effort “to overcome the natural reticence over the destruction of human life for political reasons”.<sup>15</sup>

Based on the research done on discourse change as a result of 9/11,<sup>16</sup> it can be stated with relative certainty that events which have transpired since the attacks have shaped and continue to shape America’s (developing) worldview, a concept illustrated in an applied version of the theoretical cycle of discursive change (see figure 1.2). In an application of this theoretical cycle, 2009 marks the emergence of new discourse with American President Barak Obama and his administration. It is worthy to note that President Obama is, according to his January 27, 2009 television interview on Al-Arabiya, consciously using different discourse from that of the Bush administration.

Q President Bush framed the war on terror conceptually in a way that was very broad, "war on terror," and used sometimes certain terminology that the many people -- Islamic fascism. You've always framed it in a different way, specifically against one group called al Qaeda and their collaborators. And is this one way of --

THE PRESIDENT (Obama): I think that you're making a very important point. And that is that the language we use matters. And what we need to understand is, is that there are extremist organizations—whether Muslim or any other faith in the past—that will use faith as a justification for violence. We cannot paint with a broad brush a faith as a consequence of the violence that is done in that faith's name.

<sup>12</sup> T. A. Van Dijk, “Opinions and Ideologies in the Press,” in *Approaches to Media Discourse* ed. A. Bell and P. Garrett (Oxford and Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1998), 33.

<sup>13</sup> N. Fairclough, “Global Capitalism and Critical Awareness of Language” in *The Discourse Reader: Second Edition*, ed. A. Jaworski and N. Coupland. (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 34.

<sup>14</sup> A. Hodges and C. Nilep, “Discourse, War and Terrorism,” in *Discourse, War and Terrorism: Discourse Approaches to Politics, Society and Culture* ed. A. Hodges and C. Nilep (Amsterdam; Philadelphia: John Benjamins Press, 2007), 3.

<sup>15</sup> R. Jackson, *Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-terrorism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), 60.

<sup>16</sup> A. Hodges and C. Nilep, “Discourse, War and Terrorism,” in *Discourse, War and Terrorism: Discourse Approaches to Politics, Society and Culture* ed. A. Hodges and C. Nilep (Amsterdam; Philadelphia: John Benjamins Press, 2007). R. Jackson, *Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-terrorism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005).




Figure 1.2<sup>17</sup>

If President Obama is successful in changing political rhetoric with the Arab world and in ensuring that his administration follows his lead, then the discourse coming out of Washington will ultimately impact and modify media discourse. If this theoretical cycle holds true, then a new worldview will emerge through the circulation and consumption of a normalized/leveled political, social, and media discourse. Further research might wish to study how the Obama administration discourse is translated into Arabic (in a positive or negative light) in comparison to that of the Bush administration discourse.

### History of the Ontological Gap

It could be argued that there was a time in which the western and Arab worldviews were congruent—the time of the First and Third Crusades (c. 1095-1192 CE). Pope Urban II delivered a carefully crafted speech at the Council of Clermont in 1095 in an attempt to re-center Catholicism and religion in the lives of the faithful. By granting everyone who made the trip to Jerusalem eternal and temporal rewards, Pope Urban II mobilized the European faithful to undertake a great pilgrimage to aid their Christian brethren (the Byzantine Empire) and liberate Jerusalem.<sup>18</sup> By 1099, the first crusade had met with success; Jerusalem had been recaptured from the Muslim armies, but the Christian hold on the holy city was tenuous—for once the city was taken, infighting began among the Christian ranks weakening their power.<sup>19</sup> Since that time, the two regions have gone on two very different epistemological and ontological paths.

Two personalities from the time of the Third Crusade continue to reside in the collective conscience of modern day society, Saladin and King Richard the Lionheart. Saladin, an intensely devout Sunni Muslim and the founder of the Ayyubi Dynasty (c. 1169-1260 CE), called Muslim

<sup>17</sup> Adapted from ‘cycle of change’ retrieved from <http://localenterprise.files.wordpress.com/2008/07/cycle-of-change-v2.png?w=802&h=661>

<sup>18</sup> D.C. Munro, “The Speech of Pope Urban II. At Clermont, 1095,” *The American Historical Review* 11 (2), (1906): 231-242.

<sup>19</sup> S. Lane-Poole, *Saladin: and the fall of the kingdom of Jerusalem* (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1906).

forces to take up a *Jihād*—a holy war in the name of God—to reclaim Jerusalem from the hands of the Christians.<sup>20</sup> Jerusalem fell to Saladin’s armies in 1187, the direct consequence of this, and a strong parallel to the *Jihād* as well, occurred when King Richard took up the Third Crusade—a holy war in the name of God that lasted from 1189-1192.<sup>21</sup> The religious fervor motivating European Crusaders to undertake ‘righteous wars’ parallels those motivating factors that drove the Arab armies to unite their forces under Saladin’s call to *Jihād*.

	Time Frame	Meta-narrative	Ontology	Epistemology
The West	Post-modernism (1950-Present)	Technology	Problems	Problem solving
	Enlightenment (1650-1800)	Reason and Empiricism	Fixed Laws	Scientific/experimental methods
	Renaissance (1350 – 1550)	Religion	Unfolding of God’s will	Sacred text; clergy
The Arab World	(632-Present)	Religion	Unfolding of God’s will	Sacred text; religious scholars

Figure 1.1 Ontological Table of the West and the Arab world

### Origins of Islamic Traditionalism

Islam and the Arab World have continued on their original path centered on theology and spirituality which inform their cultural and legal systems. This journey has not been without its difficulties; in fact the nascent stages of a formalized Islamic legal system witnessed judicious use of rational thought. Indeed, the first judges of Islamic jurisprudence, commonly referred to as ‘proto-*qādī*s, arrived at judicial decisions through a common sense approach to ‘fairness’ or *ra’ī* (= *sunnaic* practice or discretionary opinion) as opposed to strict adherence to a rigid set of rules that govern personal and business affairs.<sup>22</sup> This can be attributed to the fact that a collection of legal documents and their subsequent codexing in a canonized form did not take place until the 10<sup>th</sup> century with the advent of the *madāhib* (= schools of Islamic thought).<sup>23</sup> Thus, the proto-*qādī* simply had no recourse in terms of referencing prepared texts of the verses of the *Qur’ān* and the Prophetic *ḥādīth* that dealt with Islamic jurisprudence. Over the next 300 years, by the 12<sup>th</sup> century—the time of Averroes—Islamic doctrine had been formulated into a fixed set of theories known as *usūl al-fiqh* (= origins of understanding) having all but overtaken the rationalist approach to legal rulings.<sup>24</sup> No longer were *qādī*s affiliated with discretionary opinion, instead the vast majority—if not all—were affiliated with a legal school of thought, leaving Averroes the last vestige and voice of *ra’ī*.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>20</sup> S. Lane-Poole, *Saladin: and the fall of the kingdom of Jerusalem* (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1906).

<sup>21</sup> M. Farah and A. B. Karls, *World History: The Human Experience* (New York: Macmillan/McGraw-Hill, 1994), 283.

<sup>22</sup> W. Hallaq, *The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 34.

<sup>23</sup> *ibid*

<sup>24</sup> *ibid*, 122

<sup>25</sup> M. J. Thompson, “Islam, Modernity, and the Dialectic of Dogmatism,” in *Islam and the West: Critical Perspectives on Modernity*, ed. M. J. Thompson (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2003), 23.

Thompson makes the claim that Averroes (Ibn Rushd c. 1128-1198 CE) represents the pivotal point in Islamic history when rational thought was supplanted by traditional dogma. Citing both historical (e.g., Renan) and contemporary sources (e.g., Youssef Chahine) it becomes quite clear that the passing of Averroes has had profound repercussions that continue to reverberate throughout the Islamic world and in particular its legal system. Thompson describes Averroes's style of adjudicating in philosophical terms, "[r]ather than philosophizing with a hammer, Averroes develops rational philosophy within the context of Islamic thinking and emphasizes rational interpretations of religious doctrine rather than dogmatic literalist ones".<sup>26</sup> It is here within the Islamic legal system where we find documented proof of the origins of an internal struggle between rationalism and traditionalism. Any and all calls for change from Averroes's era to present has met resistance with tradition—based on the *Qur'ān*, the *Hādīth*, *ijmā'* and *Qiyās*.<sup>27</sup>

It is entirely possible, and somewhat likely, that had Islam retained its ties to rational thought, especially in terms of Islamic jurisprudence, concepts such as modernization might have been incorporated and integrated into its society, its cultural make-up, its ontology, and its *ethos*. Thompson argues that the current situation is not so much a clash of civilizations, but rather "the absence of a firm, consistent intellectual tradition that privileged reason over dogma is, I would assert, a central aspect in the continued struggle of Islamic states with the notion of modernity".<sup>28</sup> To this claim, I suggest that a society steeped in theocracy and rooted in traditional religious values which informs an overarching Arabic worldview will continue to resist modernity due to religious laws that bind the region to the past linguistically and hence mentally manifesting itself—in the end—in constituting the very fabric of life.

### **The Impact of Traditionalism on Arab Development**

"The past [the time of the Prophet] is better than everything after" (*as-salaf khayrun mina l-xalaf*) is the motto of the *Salafiyūn* movement and a statement that many Arab intellectuals hold true. From the period of Jamāl ad-dīn al-Afgāni (1838-1897), when his intellectual legacy began to take root in the minds of his disciples the likes of Muḥammad 'Abdu (1849-1905) and Raṣīd Ridwā (1865-1935), until now two epistemological forces have been and are currently actively vying for control of the future of the Arab World. The traditionalist movement that believes in spiritual reform and revival, and the modernist movement that calls for a break with Islamic history, and the idea of a separate religion and state.

The notion of Arab tradition (*taqlīd*) holds a strong bond with the *Qur'ān* and Islamic jurisprudence (*ṣarī'a*). The very language that traditionalists—such as b. Lādin—use in their discourse is Classical Arabic, a variety of Arabic considered to epitomize eloquence. Classical Arabic in structure and content is as it was at the advent of Islam. Having been frozen in time by virtue of its sacred properties, Classical Arabic is not amenable to accepting new ideas, new verbiage, new words, or new phrases, thus it resists 'normal' language development and evolution according to scholars like Abdallah Laroui. A Moroccan intellectual, Laroui stated, "Who can fail to see that the fossilization of language and the promotion of traditional culture as a badge of nationality constitute the most decisive means of keeping medieval thought alive, as

---

<sup>26</sup> *ibid*, 29.

<sup>27</sup> See Appendix D for definitions of these terms

<sup>28</sup> *ibid*, 33.

well as an effective ruse to obliterate from general consciousness the very experience of historical positivity?”<sup>29</sup>

An opposing point of view on the topic of the Arabic language’s inability to accept modern concepts takes into consideration its flexibility and dexterity in accepting foreign notions, concepts, and movements using its root-based derivational system.<sup>30</sup> ‘abd al-Ḥamīd Fallāḥ the General Secretary of the Arabic Language Assembly, explains that during the early years of the Islamic Empire, linguistic scholars were tasked to transfer great works from the Persian, Greek, Syriac, and Indian civilizations into the Arabic language.<sup>31</sup> To accommodate this influx of foreign terms into the language, these scholars established three basic rules to guide them: 1) if a term had an Arabic equivalent, then the Arabic term was used; 2) if no equivalent Arabic term existed, the word was Arabicized by imbuing it with certain morphological characteristics; and 3) if neither of these two options proved effective, then the term was transliterated and left with its foreign attributes. Thus, these very properties that allowed Arabic to integrate the cutting edge technologies of ancient civilizations, would, in theory, permit it to accept, integrate, and express ideas of modernization.

### A Pivotal Time in the Modernist Movement

At the beginning of the 1930’s, literary rhetoric, according to al-Sakūt, supported, quite unconditionally, the notion that anything western was both positive and beneficial. By the end of the 1930’s, however, this notion began to meet with resistance moving toward a noticeably different orientation—a departure from the secular system of the west to the religious underpinning of Islam, deriving from it “the moral foundation and theoretical concepts upon which a political system can be based that is suitable for Egypt”.<sup>32</sup> It was during this transitional period in which Tāhā Hussein penned his seminal work *The Future of Culture in Egypt*,<sup>33</sup> which centered on introducing Greco-Roman classics, works whose culture, Ḥusayn claimed, was directly tied to Egypt’s historical past. Ḥusayn advocated that these links bound Egypt historically and culturally to the Mediterranean Basin “[in] effect, Tāhā was rejecting both the Islamic and African civilizational orbit for Egypt in favour of an older—and closer to Europe—southwest Asian and eastern Mediterranean cultural heritage”.<sup>34</sup>

Ḥusayn’s treatise is dedicated to the practical exercise of developing a specifically Egyptian education system based on European models, effectively advocating a break with traditional Islamic education. Husayn’s work is tantamount to, as al-Sakūt surmised, determining “The Egyptian Identity” through the establishment of a viable education system the roots of which are western; not eastern. This call was met with resistance by the traditionalist intellectual elite of that era from the likes of Sayyid Qutūb (intellectual founder of *al-Qā’ida*),

<sup>29</sup> As cited in N. Rejwan, *Arabs Face the Modern World: Religious, Cultural, and Political Responses to the West* (Gainesville, Florida: University Press of Florida, 1998), 178.

<sup>30</sup> Abu-Rabia, S. (2002) Reading in a root-based-morphology language: the case of Arabic. *Journal of Research in Reading*, 25, 299-309.

<sup>31</sup> Interview with Dr. Fallāḥ on Amman Radio at <http://ammannet.net/look/techno/archive.tpl?IdLanguage=18&IdPublication=3&NrIssue=5&NrSection=43>

<sup>32</sup> H. Sakkout, and M. Jones, *‘alām al-Adab al-Mu‘āsir fī Misr: Tāhā Ḥusayn* [Leaders of Contemporary Arabic Literature: Tāhā Husayn]. (Cairo: Dār al-Kitāb al-Misrī, 1982), 69.

<sup>33</sup> T. Ḥusayn, *The Future of Culture in Egypt*, trans. S. Glazer, (Washington D.C., American Council of Learned Societies, 1954a). (Original work published in 1938).

<sup>34</sup> P. J. Vatikiotis, *History of Modern Egypt* (London : Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1991), 313.

Hāsan al-Bannā (founder of the Muslim Brotherhood) as well as various newspaper editors and anonymous writers.

### Religious Authority

The *Qur'ān*, the Holy Book of Islam, as El Fadl points out, is, in fact, a text that occupies “a central role in constructing the basic frame of reference for religious and legal authority in Islam”.<sup>35</sup> Authority that is ascribed to an extended discourse such as the *Qur'ān* can—and often is—problematic due to a variety of reasons, not the least of which is who is citing the text as authoritative, and how the text is being cited.<sup>36</sup> Just as film and television directors ultimately bear the responsibility of what the camera captures in a scene, and, just as importantly, what is left out, the person citing the *Qur'ān* possesses the power to include those verses that offer support to one’s main point/argument, as well as wielding the power to omit those verses that may weaken or undermine one’s position. In the end, as El Fadl states, “quotations and anecdotes do not make an argument; they simply illustrate it. It is the speaker who makes the argument and it is the speaker who chooses the illustrative quotations or anecdotes”.<sup>37</sup>

### Stages of Western Ontology

In contrast, the West, whose earliest theocratic traditions can be traced back to Constantine (c. 312 CE) and Augustine (c. 354 CE),<sup>38</sup> has undergone changes in its ontology and epistemology; changes brought about, initially, in 17<sup>th</sup> century England—a country and time rife with civil upheaval.<sup>39</sup> The religious wars of the mid-1600s were sparked by a struggle over authority and power in a debate over who had the right to rule: an absolute monarch, the parliament, or the people. Thomas Hobbes entered into this discussion penning his treatise *Leviathan* (1651), in which he “planted a seed, a thought that it might be possible to build legitimate political institutions without grounding them on divine revelations”.<sup>40</sup>

*Leviathan* was a conscious attempt to escape the cycle of religious conflict between and among the various Christian sects by replacing western “political theology centered on God with a political philosophy centered on man. This was the Great Separation”<sup>41</sup> José Casanova<sup>42</sup> argues that “[s]ociologically speaking at least, the “great separation” was a long-term historical process that began with the Papal Revolution and the Investitures conflicts of the 11th-12th centuries and attained its modern institutionalization first with the American and French revolutions.”

The timing of when the separation took place is not of concern to this study to the degree that the separation itself has effectively resulted in a gap, an ontological break with a past that prevents most modern westerners from fully-appreciating the political-theological rhetoric coming out of the modern Middle East. The ontological gap appears when examining empirical evidence from the ongoing conflict between the East and the West as a befuddled American public searches for answers to the attacks on 9/11 (c.f., Bernard Lewis *What Went Wrong* and

<sup>35</sup> A. El Fadl, *And God Knows the Soldiers* (Boston: University Press of America, 2001), 38.

<sup>36</sup> *ibid*

<sup>37</sup> *ibid*, 41.

<sup>38</sup> M. Farah and A. B. Karls, *World History: The Human Experience* (New York: Macmillan/McGraw-Hill, 1994), 159.

<sup>39</sup> *ibid*, 473.

<sup>40</sup> M. Lilla, “The Politics of God,” *The New York Times Magazine*, August 19, 2007, 33; 50.

<sup>41</sup> *ibid*.

<sup>42</sup> J. Casanova, “The Immanent Frame: Secularism, religion, and the public sphere,” December 12, 2007 [http://www.ssrc.org/blogs/immanent\\_frame/2007/12/07/the-great-separation/](http://www.ssrc.org/blogs/immanent_frame/2007/12/07/the-great-separation/)

Thomas Friedman *Longitudes and Attitudes*) and has reached a point where the two regions can no longer identify each other's value system. The Arab world speaks from a theological, spiritual ontology using its grammar and its rules, while the West speaks from a capitalistic, materialistic ontology. The paradigm or meta-narrative that acts as the over-arching belief system in both regions does not overlap, preventing one from understanding the other; in fact, when talks are held between the two cultures, one 'talks past' the other.

### The Impact of the two Worldviews on Translation

What follows is no more than a cursory look into some communiqués delivered by b. Laden that have been translated into English by two major news agencies: the Associated Press (AP) and the British Broadcast Company (BBC). I have chosen to use excerpts of published translations from these two international news agencies based on the credibility of the AP and BBC along with their substantial readership (in essence, their ability to influence the views and opinions of their readership through their versions of the source text).

It seems highly likely, given the circumstances and b. Lādin's discourse,<sup>43</sup> that he is attempting to unite the Arab armies once again under the banner of *Jihād* against what he perceives as the most recent crusade: the attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq; attacks that he claims, were accepted by the international community under the pretense that they were part of 'the war against terrorism' (see bin Lādin 19May08 communiqué third point, Appendix A). Ibn Lādin frequently reiterates *al-Qā'ida's* overarching goal of ridding the Arabian Peninsula of foreign armies,<sup>44</sup> a foreign presence on Arab soil he opposes so vehemently—indeed, religiously—he and four other signatories<sup>45</sup> issued an edict (= *fatwā*)<sup>46</sup> proclaiming that it was an individual duty (*farḍ 'ayn*)<sup>47</sup> for every pious Muslim to kill Americans and Jews wherever and whenever it is possible to do so.

<sup>43</sup> b. Lādin regularly refers to the American armies as *el-quwātu l-ṣalībiyya* (the crusader forces) in his communiqués.

<sup>44</sup> December 15, 2004 communiqué Bin Lādin cited two credible prophetic transmitters as authoritarian sources that support his call to *Jihād*: al-Buxārī who transmitted the following: “expel the polytheists from the Arabian Peninsula” and, “two religions will not assemble in the Arabian Peninsula,” and, “May God fight against Jews and Christians. They took the graves of their prophets as places of prostration. Surely no two religions will coexist in the Land of the Arabs” and Muslim who related, “I will expel the Jews and Christians from the land of the Arabs until none remain to summon save Muslims”. Prophetic *sunna*, such as those cited here, were collected and canonized in the form of *ḥ□adīṭ* shortly after the Prophet's passing (circa 632 CE), and with the passage of time acquired legislative prestige second only to the *Qur'ān* (W Hallaq, *The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 119). The corpus of *ḥ□adīṭ* is currently well over a 500,000, out of which some five to six thousand are considered sound (*EI*<sup>2</sup> - Encyclopaedia of Islam (Brill online version))—those mentioned here by bin Lādin are of the 'sound' or 'reliable' *ḥ□adīṭ*.

<sup>45</sup> 1) Osama bin Laden “currently Head of al-Qaida”; 2) Ayman al-Zawahiri “Emir of the Jihad Group in Egypt”; 3) Ahmed Refai Taha, of al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (in Egypt); 4) Mir Hamzah, “Secretary of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan,”; and 5) Fazul Rahman, “Emir of the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh”.

<sup>45</sup> See Appendix C for entire *fatwā*

<sup>46</sup> See Appendix C for entire *fatwā*

<sup>47</sup> *EI*<sup>2</sup> defines *farḍ* as, “a religious duty or obligation, the omission of which will be punished and the performance of which will be rewarded.” *EI* distinguishes between individual duty and collective duty stating, “Islamic law distinguishes the individual duty (*farḍ 'ayn*), such as ritual prayer, fasting, etc., and the collective duty (*farḍ kifāya*), the fulfilment of which by a sufficient number of individuals excuses the other individuals from fulfilling

Ibn Lādin's messages were delivered to the internationally renowned Arabic news agency *Aljazeera* on the date indicated in the title of each excerpt that I present here. The communiqués aired on the same dates or subsequent dates, followed by the appearance of an English translation of the message in the western media anywhere from two days to a week later. Various western sources translated these messages, but for the most part—at least the first five years of the messages (2001-2005)—the AP and the BBC translations were those quoted and disseminated by virtually every western media outlet.

### Discourse Analysis Key

The following key describes types of translation distortion that emerged via a critical discourse analysis of b. Lādin's communiqués in this study. Each of these factors has a distinct type of font effect to highlight the places in which the TT translation deviated from the ST.

- 1) Stilted wording – (underlined) Translation that does not follow the idiomatic structures of the target language. Literal word-for-word translations are an instance of this type of distortion.
- 2) **Word Choice** – (bolded) The task of the translator is to select a word parallel in terms of its connotation and denotation.
- 3) *Addition* – (italicized) Including ideas in the target text that simply do not exist in the source text.
- 4) Omission – (#w = number of words missing, #s = number of sentences missing) Censoring pertinent information and details found in the source text
- 5) Tense – (double underline) Changing the verb tense from the source text to the target text.
- 6) Format – (dashed underline) The sentence/idea order of the source text; if the *format* is rearranged, then the target audience's perception of the points that the source text author intended to emphasize or de-emphasize will be altered. Format also pertains to instances in which punctuation marks are incorrectly used in the target text that 'destroy' the 'rhythm' of the source text, and mislead the reader.

### Case 1/Exerpt A: Prayer Introducing the October 7, 2001 Communiqué<sup>48</sup>

الحمد لله نحمده ونستعينه ونستغفره ، ونعوذ بالله من شرور أنفسنا ومن سيئات أعمالنا من يهده الله فلا مضل له ومن يضلل فلا هادي له وأشهد أن لا إله إلا الله وحده لا شريك له وأشهد أن محمد عبده ورسوله أما بعد:

---

it” (*EI* electronic resource). It should be noted that this fatwā clearly specifies that killing Americans is *farḍ ‘ayn* in § II.

<sup>48</sup> Ladin, B. (2001).

The October 7, 2001 video: [http://www.aljazeera.net/mritems/streams/video/2001/10/7/1\\_59233\\_1\\_12.ASF](http://www.aljazeera.net/mritems/streams/video/2001/10/7/1_59233_1_12.ASF)

AP translation of October 7, 2001 communiqué found at:

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/afghanistan/story/0,1284,565070,00.html>

BBC translation of October 7, 2001 communiqué found at: [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south\\_asia/1585636.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1585636.stm)

Arabic transcription of October 7, 2001 communiqué found at: Transcription found on:

<http://www.islam-online.net/arabic/america/2001/10/laden.shtml>

**AP:** (omitted invocation) I bear witness that there is no **God** but **Allah** and that Mohammed is **his** messenger.

**BBC:** Praise be to God and we beseech Him for help and forgiveness. We seek refuge with **the Lord** of our bad and evildoing. He whom God guides **is rightly guided** but he whom God leaves to stray, **for him wilt thou find no protector to lead him to the right way**. I witness that there is no God but God and Mohammed is His slave and **Prophet**.

**AT:** Praise is God's. We beseech Him for help and forgiveness. We seek refuge with God from our corruptness and our wrongful deeds. He whom God guides, there is no misleading, and he who God leaves to stray, there is no guide. I bear witness that there is no deity but God Himself, having no equal, and I bear witness that Muhammad is His servant and messenger.

### **Critical Discourse Analysis Case 1/Excerpt A:**

Ibn Laden begins each and every communiqué that he delivers with a prayer—a type of audio stamp that frames the discourse in a spiritual context. It is through this religious/spiritual context that b. Laden derives his authority and establishes his power base. In fact, his ability to convince his intended audience of the correctness of his message is in direct proportion to the extent he knows, understands, and appropriately cites Islamic authoritarian sources.

*AP:* The only portion of the invocation that the AP translator has left is the *ṣahāda*, which *EF*<sup>2</sup> defines as:

A third usage (not directly Qurānic but implicit in III, 19, VI, 19 and LXIII, 1) is the religious sense, in which *ṣahāda* denotes the Islamic profession of faith, the act of declaring “There is no god but God, and Muḥammad is the Messenger of God”. Sometimes, one speaks in this case of *al-ṣahādatān*<sup>1</sup> “the two *ṣahādas*” [see *tashahhud* ]. Finally, by extension of this third sense, *ṣahāda* can refer to the supreme manner of affirming the Islamic faith, that of the martyr in the cause of Islam [see *mashhad* and *shahīd* ].

It is the third usage that concerns the AP translation in that the word ‘*ilāh*, which means ‘god, deity, godhead’<sup>49</sup> has been rendered with an upper-case ‘g’. Thus, the meaning is changed to mean ‘God’ the one-and-true God of the three monotheistic religions. The result indicates to the reader that b. Lādin and all Muslims believe the God of the Torah and the Bible to be 1) non-existent; and 2) different from Allah. By extension, one would read that it is Allah, not God, who is the one and true God. This translation problem is followed by the use of a lower-case ‘h’ when ‘his’ was translated. If Allah is to be given the same status as the Judeo-Christian ‘God’, then the word ‘his’ would need to be capitalized. As is, the lower-case ‘his’ indicates that ‘Allah’ is not ‘God’, but a spiritual deity of lower status.

*BBC:* There is no ST equivalent of the words ‘the Lord’; rather, b. Lādin mentions ‘God’ in the phrase *bi-Allāh* = ‘with God’. It would seem that the BBC translator has a strong biblical background that influences not only the style of translation (i.e., similar to the King James version of the Bible), but word choice as well. The second sentence is comprised of two

---

<sup>49</sup> H. Wehr, *A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1979), 30.

conditional phrases followed by their apodoses. The first apodosis is set up by the negative particle *lā nāfiyatu al-jins* (= the *lā* that denies the whole genus).<sup>50</sup> Thus, the first apodosis should be negated as in ‘there is no misleading’, not in the affirmative ‘is rightly guided’. The second apodosis parallels the first in that it uses the exact same formula with the same number of words creating a balanced equational sentence. The BBC translation relates the religious passages in a manner similar to the writing style of the King James Bible. This type of domesticizing religious passages from the *Qur’ān* to make its style fit that of a known religious western style at the expense of balance and clarity is dubious (religious distortion).

### Case 2/Excerpt B: Poetic Devices and a Prophetic Eulogy

فينبغي على كل مسلم أن يهب لنصرة دينه وقد هبت رياح الإيمان وهبت رياح التغيير لإزالة الباطل  
من جزيرة محمد صلى الله عليه وسلم ..

**AP:** Every Muslim **has to** rush to make his religion victorious. The winds of faith have come. The winds of change have come to eradicate **oppression** from the **island** of Muhammad, peace be upon him.

**BBC:** (1s: ‘every Muslim should rush to champion his religion’). The winds of **faith and change** have blown to remove falsehood from the [Arabian] peninsula of *Prophet* Mohammed, may God’s prayers be upon him.

**AT:** Every Muslim should rush to champion his religion. The winds of faith have blown, and the winds of change have blown to remove unTruth from Muhammad’s peninsula, God’s prayers and blessings upon him.

### Critical Discourse Analysis for Case 1/Excerpt B

*AP:* Ibn Laden uses alliteration in this excerpt in a manner similar to and characteristic of the great poet warriors of the *al-Jāhilyya* era. A reader might dismiss the power of poetry; possibly considering it a form of art and somewhat out of place within the context of an argumentative or political speech. But, Arabic poetry has a history of being used in battle. The poet’s “poems were valued, it seems, for their effectiveness in defending the tribe’s honor, enhancing its prestige, or shaming its adversaries, more than for their artistry *per se*”.<sup>51</sup> In fact, there are recorded accounts of rival Arab tribes “when confronting one another prior to a pitched battle (usually in a blood feud or other kind of duel military encounter, rather than a camel raid or similar sorties), might each send out its poet(s) to launch poetic invectives (= *hijā*’) against the opposing tribe. Some reports suggest that groups verbally ‘attacked’ in this way might throw themselves to the ground so that the powerful barbed words would fly past above them, doing them no harm”.<sup>52</sup>

<sup>50</sup> W. Wright, *A Grammar of the Arabic Language* (Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1996), 98, v. ii.

<sup>51</sup> M. Zwettler, *The Oral Tradition of Classical Arabic Poetry* (Columbus, Ohio State University Press, 1978), 201.

<sup>52</sup> Zwettler, personal transmission.

Tapping into poetry's historical status as a respected weapon used on the battlefield, its inherent ability to penetrate into the Arab psyche, and its intrinsic spiritual value, b. Laden reaches the hearts and minds of his audience in a convincing manner. The AP translation reflects some of the eloquence of the source text, but fails to convey the poem's main point—removing the western armies from the Arabian peninsula—an allusion made by using the phrase *li-izālati l-bātīl*. The verbal noun *izāla* is commonly associated with wiping dust off of an object following the allusion of 'blowing sands,' while the second word is generally used in opposition to *ḥaqq* meaning 'Truth.' Translating this phrase as 'eradicate oppression' removes the poetic element from the discourse, not to mention rendering the exact meaning unclear. The vagueness of this translation may be due to the fact that many types of oppression exist in the Arab World, but b. Lādin is specifically referring to the western oppression of the Islamic community—a challenging translation task in this particular instance.

*BBC*: The first sentence of this passage is omitted eliminating b. Lādin's direct call to 'champion his religion'. This request is a direct call to *jihād*—a seemingly vital piece of information since calls to *jihād* could result in renewed fervor for fighting the West through this type of recruiting technique. A literary technique such as this uses the power of language that emulates poetry to appeal to the hearts and minds of the Muslim youth—an unsettled youth who are all too ready to take up arms against what they perceive as a western invasion that is slowly impinging on their Islamic heritage. The ST reads like a balanced poem in that the word describing 'rush to' and the words describing 'blowing wind' are homonyms setting up a type of alliteration. The power of poetic rhetoric is all but lost in the translation because the BBC translator chose to combine the two ideas into one short sentence. This inattention to poetic rhetoric debases historical authority as garnered through the tradition of Arabic oral prosody resulting in a TT that reads as simple (i.e., not-well-thought-out and unconvincing) prose.

### Case 3/Excerpt A: Invoking God's Name when Introducing the December 2, 2003 Communiqué<sup>53</sup>

فعلیکم بکثرة الخنادق كما جاء في الأثر عن عمر رضي الله عنه قال : "إدروعوا بالأرض". أي اتخذوا الأرض درعة فإن ذلك كفيل بإذن الله وفضله باستنزاف كامل المخزون من قذائف العدو خلال بضعة أشهر.

**AP**: So go and dig many trenches as *it was mentioned before in the holy book*, "Take the earth as your **shelter**." Such a way will deplete all your enemy reserves (2w: 'of bombs) in a few months.

<sup>53</sup> Ladin, B. (2003).

December 2, 2003 AP Translation at: <http://www.hvk.org/articles/0203/162.html>

December 2, 2003 BBC Translation at: [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle\\_east/2751019.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2751019.stm)

**BBC:** Dig many trenches. The [early Muslim caliph] Umar, may God be pleased with him, stated (3w: according to tradition): "Take the ground as a shield **because this will ensure the exhaustion of all the stored enemy missiles within months.**"

**AT:** So you must increase the number of trenches, as was related in tradition by Omar (may God be pleased with him) when he stated, "Use the ground as armor". That is to say, take the ground as a piece of armor, for in doing so it guarantees, with God's permission and grace, completely depleting the enemy's storehouse of bombs over the course of a few months.

### **Critical Discourse Analysis for Case 3/Excerpt A**

**AP:** Umar bin al-Xaṭṭāb reined over the nascent Islamic Empire as the second caliph (634-644 CE) and has since then become a prominent figure in Islamic history providing the reason for b. Lādin quoting him in this passage. The AP translator would have the reader believe that this quote came from the *Qur'ān*, the holy book of Islam, and not from the source b. Lādin cited. The importance of the change of authoritative source is certainly not lost on the western reader; for most everyone in the west has heard of the *Qur'ān*, while few may be familiar with the second Caliph or his importance in Islamic tradition. For the informed reader, this change is tantamount to the difference between citing God's word as compared to that of a mere mortal, granting the citation the ultimate Islamic authority.

**BBC:** It would be very interesting if Umar did indeed talk about stored enemy missiles at a time when Arabs were using bows and arrows while fighting on horseback and camels. The actual quote is really just two words, "Take the ground as armor", and not the entire phrase that the BBC would have the reader believe it to be. By extending the quote to include b. Lādin's qualification, could lead the reader to believe that 1) the second Caliph had the foresight of a prophet; or 2) the translator was an Islamic apologist who made Umar's quote fit modern-day circumstances. A careless punctuation error such as the one committed here creates a ST-TT semantic mismatch resulting in a quoted citation that could not possibly be attributed to anyone who lived in the seventh century. This translation would result in undermining the believability and validity of b. Lādin's statement(s) due to an achronological distortion.

### **Case 4/Excerpt B: Partial Qur'ānic Verse Cited in the December 02, 2003 Communiqué**

فحسبنا الله ونعم الوكيل . ونرغب أن نؤكد بين يدي هذه الحرب الظالمة ,حرب الفخار الكفار التي تخوضها أمريكا بحلفائها وعملائها على عدد من المعاني المهمة:

**AP:** (Qur'anic verse 3: 173 missing) We **need to reassure** -- while we are close to the unjust war, the war of the **bawds**, America is leading with its allies and agents -- on a number of important **lessons**:

**BBC:** Allah is sufficient for us and He is the best disposer of affairs. Amid this unjust war, the war of infidels and debauchees led by America along with its allies and agents, we would like to stress a number of important values:

**AT:** “God is sufficient for us; an excellent guardian is He.” [3: 173]. We wish to highlight—in the presence of this unjust war, the war of the shameless unbelievers; a war in which America has plunged along with her allies, and her agents—a number of important concepts.

### **Critical Discourse Analysis for Case 4/Excerpt B**

**AP:** This excerpt begins with a direct quote from the Qur’ān: *sūra* 3; verse 173. Omitting the verse has a significant impact on the rest of the sentence as the sentence no longer draws its authority from the most widely respected authoritarian source in the Islamic World. Here, as one may see elsewhere in AP translations of b. Laden communiqués, the translation is so poorly worded it renders the speaker a stumbling idiot. The rhymed phrase *el-fuxāri l-kufāri* can be translated as ‘shameless unbelievers;’ a phrase possibly coined by b. Laden creating the word *fuxār* from the singular adjectival form *faxīr*, which takes several different plurals, this being one of them. This rhymed phrase, an obvious attempt to use a poetic device to make a point and to reach the listener by harkening the power of prosody, is rendered as ‘bawds’ (singular ‘bawd’) meaning: 1) a woman who runs a brothel; or in an archaic usage 2) a prostitute. This translation has a zero percent correlation with the ST and frames b. Lādin as an individual who is not taking responsibility for what he is saying; when in fact, it seems very likely, that b. Lādin is attempting to liken his life to that of the Prophet Muḥammad, who is revered for having great oratory skills. Thus, not only is the purport of the literal message altered, but the hidden message of b. Lādin following, respecting, and adhering to the great oral history of Arab civilization is lost.

**BBC:** The latter half of the direct quote from the *Qur’ānic sūra* 3; verse 173 contains the phrase *wa ni‘amu l-wakīl*, which has been translated as ‘the best disposer of affairs.’ Understanding that international news agencies are under some pressure to meet deadlines, translating any section of the *Qur’ān* should pose no time constraints on a translation team at all. For, the *Qur’ān* has been translated multiple times into English. It would seem, then, that all a translator would have to do would be to reference one such translation and then copy the concerned section into the evolving translation. Providing a poor translation of the *Qur’ān* is illustrative of a lack of respect for the spiritual basis formed by quoting the Holy Book of Islam. It could be argued, however, that the translator did not recognize this phrase to be a verse from the *Qur’ān*, a possibility that would allude to the need for studying the *Qur’ān* and training in translating *Qur’ānic* passages.

### **Conclusion**

The translations presented in this paper involve a high degree of tendentious elements caused, it is asserted here, not because English and Arabic are languages so different in their nature that translations of high fidelity cannot be achieved, but because the ontology of the West (= problems) and that of the Middle East (= the unfolding of God’s will) use a vocabulary that is mutually incommensurable. While the East uses a spiritual basis comprised of its grammar, its rules, and its vocabulary from which it draws its authority; the West processes such spiritually involved texts with an eye toward problems and problem solving. Meaning is distorted because one side literally talks past the other while neither side realizes that the problem is anything other than linguistic. The air the West breathes, those elements of life that are understood to be True,

the scale of priorities, and, indeed, the ultimate goals in life operate in concert framing a translator's mindset when attempting to relate a text comprised of different set of constituent factors. The end result is a translation whose distortion results, not from linguistic factors; rather from an 'ontological gap' that exists between the eastern and western regions. Political scientists argue that the problems that arise between the Arab world and the West can be solved with politics, economists claim that the economy should be the main driving force for any reconciliation between the two regions, and military scientists maintain that force should be used to solve these problems. For each intellectual field, advocates exist asserting that theirs is the panacea that should form the focal point of our collective efforts to settle these long-standing conflicts.

Consider, for instance, the fact that tensions naturally arise from an 'ontological gap' (i.e., the Palestinian question, the war in Iraq, the war on terror), and that those tensions that have no viable resolution—any resolution would necessitate relinquishing those very things that each side holds 'True.' What I am stating is that not all paths through the forest lead to the mountain summit, meaning a pluralistic worldview exists and is in effect at this stage in human history. It is not, however, the intention of this paper, nor is it in our collective ability to procure a means of reducing the eastern and western worldviews into a singular view of the world/cosmos to facilitate communication or enhance translation fidelity. If anything is gained from this research is the need for international wire services and the translation teams that they employ to sensitize themselves to this sociolinguistic phenomenon in order to achieve translations higher quality.

## Appendix A

Selections from bin Lādin 's May 19, 2008 communiqué<sup>54</sup>:

My fellow Muslim Community, isn't it time that you exit this labyrinth? Wounds have weakened you and the circumstances have exhausted you, but you obey every stubborn tyrant. Isn't it time that you think about the Arab and foreign despots from Indonesia to Mauritania? The path to honor, nobility, sovereignty, and reclaiming Palestine is clear and obvious: it is the religion of God Almighty. The heroic leader Saladin al-Ayubbi adhered to this path. By comparing some of his deeds to some deeds Arab rulers undertook during these past few decades, the path to reclaiming Palestine becomes clear to us, God permitting.

First, Saladin adhered to the teachings of Islam by reciting God Almighty's words: "So do thou fight in the way of God; thou art charged only with thyself. And urge on the believers; haply God will restrain the unbelievers' might; God is stronger in might, more terrible in punishing" (Women: 84).

Be assured that the path to restraining the unbeliever's power is by fighting in the path of God. As for the Arab rulers, they have abandoned the teachings of Islam and in looking to the teachings of America, they have found her instructing them to remove the verses of fighting and *jihād* from the educational curriculum; instructing them to surrender in the name of peace. Thus, they unanimously decided that peace with the Zionist entity was their strategic choice; what an evil choice they made.

Second, Saladin was accompanied by master scholars so that he may procure knowledge even on the fields of *jihād* to work with it and to help them incite the Islamic Community to take up the *jihād* against the crusaders. As for the Arab rulers, they have shackled the scholars to their jobs to silence them and whosoever resists, they incarcerate. They open the media air waves up to corrupt scholars to keep the young generation from taking up a *jihād* against America and her agents wherein they have defamed the *mujāhidīn*, and have bore false witness that agent rulers are legal leaders.

Third, Saladin fought the (Arab) princes and their vassals who fought side by side with the crusaders against the Muslims even though they were reciting 'there is no god but God'; because he knew that those people had violated this great saying with their actions. As for the Arab rulers, they stand underneath the great crusader banner lead by Bush to fight Islam and its people under the umbrella phrase 'the war on terror', or so they claim. This is obvious apostasy; for when the *mujāhidīn* fight (other Arab Muslims), they cry out that (the *mujāhidīn*) are dissidents charging them with infidelity.

Forth, Saladin used to accept young volunteers to undertake the *jihād* without stipulating Richard's—the King of England—approval, or his representative to begin a *jihād* against (the crusaders). Whereas, the Grand Mufti and a group of official and semi -official scholars in the lands of the two sacred mosques , previously headed by Sheik el-Şahwa, stipulated that in order to fight the Americans, permission has to be granted from America's representative in Riyadh. The Prophet—may God bless him and grant him salvation—stated: ((one of the first statements of prophecy the people realized: "if you aren't ashamed, then do as you please"))

---

<sup>54</sup> Ladin, B. (2008).

Transcription at:

<http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/9922C617-C1BA-46B0-9487-DFB0FA67BB27.htm>

## Appendix B (The Transliteration System)

The transliteration system employed here is—for the most part—derived from Zwettler’s transliteration system presented on page xi of his book, “The Oral Tradition of Classical Arabic Poetry”. The following letters correspond with the Arabic alphabet:

‘	b	t	ṭ	j	h□	x	d	ḍ	r	z	s	š	s□
d□	t□	z□	a	g	f	q	k	l	m	n	h	w	y

Vowels and diphthongs duplicate those suggested by Zwettler:

a	i	u
ā	ī	ū
aw	ay	

## Appendix C 1998 *Fatwā*

- I. All of those injustices and crimes from the Americans are an obvious declaration of war on God, his Prophet, and Muslims. Scholars, from the time of the Prophet and following, throughout the ages of Islam, have unanimously agreed that *jihād* is an individual duty if the enemy destroys Muslim lands. Among those who transmitted this are: Imam ibn Qadāma in (*el-muġnī*), Imam el-Kisā’ī in (*el-badā’ī*), el-Qurṭubī in his interpretation, and šayx l-‘islām<sup>55</sup> in his selections stating: “As for repellent fighting, it is the most intense type of repelling the assailant from sanctity and religion—it is a unanimously agreed upon duty. Therefore, the assailing enemy who is corrupting religion and the world, there is nothing more obligatory after faith than repelling him”. On that basis, and in compliance with God's decree, we issue the following *fatwā* to all Muslims:
  
- II. The judgment to kill Americans and their allies, military and civilian, is an individual duty prescribed on every Muslim able to do so in every land in which it is possible. This is until al-‘Aqsa mosque and the Holy Mosque in Mecca are liberated from their grasp, until their armies leave from every bit of Islamic land—toppled, broken winged, and unable to threaten any Muslim. [This is done] in compliance with His Almighty’s words, “fight the pagans totally just as they fight you totally,”<sup>56</sup> and His Almighty’s words, “fight them until there is no more tumult and religion is God’s,”<sup>57</sup>
  
- III. And His Almighty’s words, “How is it with you, that you do not fight in the way of God, and for the [men, (sic)], women, and children who, being abased, say, ‘Our Lord, bring us forth from this city whose people are evildoers, and appoint to us a protector from Thee, and appoint to us from Thee a helper’?”<sup>58</sup>
  
- IV. We, with God’s permission, call on every Muslim who believes in God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God’s decree by killing Americans and plundering their money in any place one finds them, and at any time one is able to do so. We also call on the Muslim scholars, their leaders, and their youth to launch an attack on the American soldiers of the devil, and whosoever allies with them among the minions of Satan, and to displace the ones behind them; perhaps they will remember.

---

<sup>55</sup> Three of the four Imams mentioned are from the Ḥanbalī school of thought: Ibn-Qudamah, al-Kisa’i, and *Sheikh al-Islam* Ibn Taymiyyah, while Imam al-Qurtubi was from the al-Mālakī school of thought.

<sup>56</sup> The chapter of Repentance in the Qur’an: verse 36

<sup>57</sup> The chapter of The Cow in the Qur’an: verse 193

<sup>58</sup> The chapter of Women in the Qur’an: very 75

## Appendix D

### Sources of Islamic Law

**The *Qur'ān*:** “In substantive legal terms and in comparison with the full corpus of the *ṣarīʿa*, the *Qur'ān* provides a relatively minor body of legal subject matter” (*EI*); it does, however, act as the primary resource for all legal matters, it holds the greatest sway in legal arguments, and it is universally recognized (in the Islamic World at least) as enjoying unrivaled authority with unchallenged prestige.

**The *Sunna*:** In its indefinite state the word means ‘a way, course, rule, mode, or manner, of acting or conduct or life or the like;’ when made definite *al-sunna* “means only what the Prophet [Muḥammad] has commanded, and what has been handed down from him by tradition, or [what he forbade,] and what he has invited to do, by word or deed, of such things as are not mentioned in the *Qur'ān*” (Lane, 1968, p. 1438). In the earliest days of Islam until well into the middle of the ninth century the *sunna* of the Prophet—known at that time as *sīra*—gained great prestige almost immediately after his death in 632 CE; it was not, however, referenced in legal cases any more than the *sunna* of the Companions of the Prophet (Hallaq, 2007). These prophetic *sunna* were collected and canonized in the form of *ḥadīth* shortly after the Prophet’s passing (circa 632 CE), and with the passage of time acquired legislative prestige second only to the *Qur'ān*. The corpus of *ḥadīth* is currently well over a 500,000, out of which some five to six thousand are considered sound (*EI*). If these numbers are indicative of anything, they indicate the number of false *ḥadīth* that were created in order to establish a legal point, justify a certain act, or find reasonable cause to enforce a punishment.

***idjmaʿ*** - A *ḥadīth* ascribed to the Prophet is related as, “My community will never agree upon an error,” lends credence and credibility to the concept of *ijmāʿ*, or ‘consensus’ of a certain community of Muslims on a certain matter. According to Gazālī, *ijmāʿ* consists of the convergence of Prophetic sayings and the authenticity of the chain of authority with the addition of faith (*EI*). *ijmāʿ* is viewed by Muslims, according to Hallaq (2007), as being infallible because, “any acknowledgment that *sunnaic* practice was fallible would have cast the entire edifice of legal doctrine into doubt” (110). *ijmāʿ* comes in direct conflict with *raʾī* or *ijtihād*, which are arrived at on an individual basis and thus can cause plurality of opinion (*ixtilāf*) in the Islamic community. A *qādi* must have thorough knowledge of *ijmāʿ* to ensure that his legal reasoning does not offer an opinion different than one that has already reached consensus—an act that would cast doubt on the Islamic legal process.

***Qiyās*:** Reasoning by analogy. The fourth and final source of Islamic Jurisprudence finds its roots in legal cases involving issues that are not directly addressed in the *Qur'ān*, the *sunna*, or by *ijmāʿ*, thus an analogy must be made from similarities drawn between an unprecedented, unique case and a case with precedence. The explanation reached in the new case must draw from an exegesis of cases that have been solved or reached some sort of legal or judicial resolution. This form of judicial decree or judicial ruling is treated with the utmost caution by Islamic Judges because of the inherent possibility of fallibility in the reasoning process.