

The Empire of God and Evolution

John Wickham, Department of Earth & Environmental Sciences, University of Texas at Arlington, Arlington, TX

ABSTRACT

Charles Darwin, Albert Einstein, Niels Bohr, Erwin Schrodinger, Werner Heisenberg and their scientific descendants have undermined a master of the universe, creator God because it has become an unnecessary assumption.

Christians should consider agreeing with that assessment and base their theology on a moral, loving God advocated by a “historical” Jesus. This has greater philosophical appeal if there is such a thing as the naturalistic fallacy.

Natural morality produced by evolution conflicts with Jesus’ Empire of God. For example, genetically facilitated emotions and instincts induce humans to: promote self survival at the expense of others if necessary; give preference to kin and be altruistic and forgiving toward relatives and in-group members; expect reciprocity; and punish cheaters.

In contrast, Jesus’ morality is based on a radical, egalitarian interpretation of the love command and discounts the moral value of: preferring self, kin and in-group members over others; expecting reciprocity; punishing cheaters and enemies; and being evolutionarily fit (wealthy) as opposed to being un-fit (poor).

Jesus’ Empire of God is concerned with how I love my neighbor. That God would probably not have produced this universe. Assuming mental causation and memes are real, a moral God could interact with the universe through organisms that have consciousness and can act on intentions.

INTRODUCTION

The God that underlies much of Christian theology has been defined as “a superhuman, supernatural intelligence that deliberately designed and created the universe and everything in it, including us” (Dawkins, 2006, p. 31). A corollary is that “[God] does have a power to create, conserve, or annihilate anything, big or small. And he can also make objects move or do anything else. ...God is not limited by the laws of nature; he makes them and he can change or suspend them—if he chooses. To use the technical term, God is *omnipotent*: he can do anything” (Swinburne, 1996, p. 5-6).

As Richard Dawkins points out, this God has been invented in part ‘to explain how the complex, improbable appearance of design in the universe arises’ (2006, p. 157). He argues that a supernatural designer “raises the larger problem of who designed the designer” (2006, p. 158).

Ever since Copernicus, science has undermined the need of a supernatural God to explain the complex appearance of design, especially after Darwin. Although there are still extremely difficult explanatory issues in science (origin of life, origin of the physical constants), it is becoming increasingly clear that Occam’s razor should be applied: a supernatural creator God who willfully meddles with the universe is an unnecessary assumption.

I am suggesting that Christians agree that such a creator God is an illusion¹, an artifact of an old world-view. I am under no delusion that Christians will abandon their creator God any time soon; after all, the idea that the God of Jesus did not create the universe is part of the ancient Gnostic heresy among others (Ehrman, 2005, Ch. 6). Unlike some of those ancient

¹ I prefer “illusion” to Dawkins’s “delusion” (2006); the latter implies that mental illness is involved.

heresies, however, I do not suggest that the universe is evil—it is merely amoral. Just as evolution can produce complexity and the appearance of design, so it can produce appearances of morality in order to take advantage of cooperative, social in-groups that promote the survival of their members.

My definition of “Christian” is extremely broad and would include people who do not normally think of themselves as Christian. A “Christian” is anyone who thinks that Jesus had something profound to say about God and how humans ought to relate to each other and who has chosen to follow that path. This definition seems to be closest to a historical Jesus who asked people to merely follow his lead; the definition does not include the requirement to believe in doctrines summarized by the various creeds.

If Christians give up their creator God, is there anything left? Do we need to abandon theism and become atheists? I will argue that the answer seems to be yes to the first question and no to the second. Christians can return to their founder who imagined a remarkable empire ruled by a moral and just God who at the same time loves and forgives. Although Jesus probably thought of his God as a creator because he grew up in a religion with that world view, his God’s empire was more like an invasion or infection of the universe. To rephrase a Jesus metaphor, the empire is like a mustard seed that blows into the evolutionary moral landscape, takes root and eventually dominates the scenery. Thinking of this God as a just, forgiving invader, not a creator, will do little damage to the essence of Jesus teaching, and preserves the part of Christianity that is most appealing anyway.

Because I am describing the morality of an Empire of God imagined by Jesus, one has to ask which Jesus we are talking about. Because the historical Jesus was turned into Christ by Paul; because the canonical gospels represent the interpretation of some of Jesus followers two or three generations after his death (Price,2003); and because the early documents were massaged for theological “clarity” one or two centuries after his death (Ehrman 2005), the historical Jesus is difficult to decipher.

In 1985, the Jesus Seminar was founded at the Westar Institute. For the past 25 years, this group of approximately 150 historians and other scholars has expressed their consensus on the historical reliability of Jesus’ sayings and acts reported in the early Christian manuscripts. The group uses four color coded categories: authentic (red), probably authentic (pink), probably not authentic (grey) and fiction (black); (see The Jesus Seminar, 1999). The group has had a lot of criticism from conservative Christians, and from some within the group who claim that it is nearly impossible to infer anything about a historical Jesus from the early Christian manuscripts (Price, 2003).

J.D. Crossan (1991), one of the founders of the Jesus Seminar, has published a well received description of a historical Jesus with a list of sayings and events that he and others in the Jesus Seminar attribute to a historical Jesus using their well defined methodology. It is from that list of sayings and parables that I infer the morality Jesus attributes to his Empire of God.

This article addresses two questions:

- 1) Is the morality of Jesus' Empire of God any different than the natural morality produced by evolution?
- 2) If Jesus morality is different, what are the implications?

The meaning of morality as it is used here is consistent with that of K.W. Appiah (2008, 37):

I'll generally follow Aristotle in using "ethics" to refer to questions about human flourishing, about what it means for a life to be well lived. I'll use "morality" to designate something narrower, the constraints that govern how we should and should not treat other people.

Virtue ethics became distorted when it was repurposed for the narrower conception of morality ... that is the subject of mainstream moral philosophy. Virtue ethics isn't best considered a rival to deontological approaches at all. What are our duties to others?—Kant's question, by convention—underlies the deontological approach. How should one live one's life?—Aristotle's question—underlies the *eudaimonist*² approach (2008, 63).

Others have considered whether Jesus' morality is compatible with evolution. James Ralston, Michael Ruse and Jonathan Haidt probably represent the range of views among moral philosophers, sociobiologists and psychologists.

Ralston (2004, 250) argues that the love command and the morality of the Good Samaritan parable cannot be explained by evolution.

Ruse (2004, 197-202) suggests that John Rawls' (2001) social contract system of a just or fair society is consistent with evolutionary human morality. In addition, Rawls' system of justice "fits well with Christian prescriptive morality. The morality of the Ten Commandments is right in line with commonsense morality, and the love commandment lays the way for direct reciprocation." (Ruse 2004, 199). But Ruse recognizes that Jesus' viewpoints often conflicted with Darwinian evolution: "A naturalistic account of morality like that of the sociobiologist may go so far, but ultimately it cannot go as far as the Christian demands in the name of the Lord. This is a serious objection, and it should not be minimized" (Ruse 2004, 199).

Jonathan Haidt (2006, 130-131) suggests that Jesus meant that "we should *value* others as much as we value ourselves." Haidt goes on to point out that Christians have (mistakenly?) focused on the Greek concepts of *caritas* and *agape* love, the later referring "to a kind of selfless, spiritual love with no sexuality, no clinging to a particular other person. ... Caritas and agape are beautiful, but they are not related to or derived from the kinds of love that people *need*."

Defining love as valuing others has a long history in philosophy (Helm, 2005), but the question here is whether Jesus thought of love in that way. Also, Haidt and Ralston seem to agree that agape love cannot be derived from the attachment loves produced by evolution.

² *Eudaimonia*, Aristotle's word for flourishing or that which makes one's life a good one, is a consequence of being virtuous.

The next section describes what is meant by normal human morality and how evolution explains it. The third section describes Jesus morality and points out ways it is similar to or different from normal human morality. And the last section discusses the implications.

NORMAL HUMAN MORALITY

Normal human morality as used here is similar to that summarized by Haidt and Bjorlund (2007) and Appiah (2008, Ch. 4). Humans have a moral intuition that provides an almost instant sense of whether a behavior is obligatory, prohibited or optional. In addition, humans may make cognitive evaluations of those intuitions after the intuitive judgment occurs. Haidt and Bjorlund (2006, 2) have come to two general conclusions about human morality:

1) Moral beliefs and motivations come from a small set of intuitions that evolution has prepared the human mind to develop; these intuitions then enable and constrain the social construction of virtues and values, and 2) moral judgment is a product of quick and automatic intuitions that then give rise to slow, conscious moral reasoning. Our approach is therefore some kind of intuitionism. But there is more: moral reasoning done by an individual is usually devoted to finding reasons to support the individual's intuitions, but moral reasons passed between people have a causal force. Moral discussion is a kind of distributed reasoning, and moral claims and justifications have important effects on individuals and societies. We believe that moral judgment is best understood as a social process, not as a private act of cognition. We therefore call our model the "Social Intuitionist Model."

Furthermore, that "small set of intuitions", sometimes described as "modules", can be determined by analyzing and grouping evaluative judgments from a wide range of cultures (Haidt and Bjorlund 2006, 19-20). The grouping consists of intuitions related to 1) avoidance and alleviation of harm; 2) Fairness, reciprocity, retribution, altruism and forgiveness; 3) hierarchy, honor and shame; 4) Purity and pollution; 5) in-group and out-group boundaries, including special consideration for the family group and for the self as the core in-group; and 6) awe and elevation which may inspire us to do better (summarized by Appiah 2008, 126-127).

People argue about how many modules there might be, how they are best described, whether there are regions in the brain that correspond to the modules, and whether reasons given justifying an intuitive action are just confabulations explaining those intuitions, or whether there are some real, normative values independent of those intuitions (Appiah, 2008)

Marc Hauser (2006) endorses the hypothesis that humans have the ability to learn a normative morality much like they have the ability to learn a language. Just like communication through language gives humans a powerful survival skill, so do moral intuitions give humans a powerful survival skill to live together more or less harmoniously in social groups that support their members through reciprocity and a sense of fairness. Just as all languages have a similar syntax or elementary structure, so does all human morality have an elementary structure (i.e. the intuitive groups or modules). Just as the particular language a person speaks depends on the cultural environment, so also the particular morality a person follows depends on her cultural

environment (see also Haidt and Bjorlund 2006). Similarities exist among all languages and moralities because of a common genetically mediated facility.

This section describes several of those intuitions in terms of their evolutionary origin.

In-groups and out-groups, reciprocity, fairness, retribution, altruism and forgiveness.

These moral intuitions are grouped together because they are all related and it is hard to imagine an evolutionary stable strategy based only on one or a few of those intuitions.

Theoretical models of evolution have shown that individuals cooperating with each other in a group have a fitness advantage over uncooperative individuals maximizing their self interests (Skryms, 1996). But living in a cooperative group necessitates compromise and biological altruism; individuals incur some reproductive cost if they cooperate with others because in part, the profit from the cooperative enterprise has to be shared with others (Skryms, 1996). Extreme cases of biological altruism and cooperation occur in the social insects where the workers have no reproductive capability.

In order for cooperative groups to work, individuals in the group must get a payback in excess of a solitary go-it-alone strategy for their altruistic cooperative behavior to evolve. Because evolution tends to produce individuals who try to maximize their own individual survival, the problem for evolution is how the existence of altruism, compromise and cooperation in the biological world comes about? As Richard Dawkins points out:

If you look at the way natural selection works, it seems to follow that anything that has evolved by natural selection should be selfish. Therefore we must expect that if we go and look at the behavior of baboons, humans, and all other living creatures, we shall find it to be selfish. If we find that our expectation is wrong, if we observe that human behavior is truly altruistic, then we shall be faced with something puzzling, something that needs explaining. (1989, 4.)

There have been three explanations for altruistic, cooperative behavior in nature: 1) reciprocity; 2) inclusive fitness; and 3) group selection. None of the mechanisms exclude the other and together they are called multilevel selection (Wilson & Wilson, 2007).

Reciprocity occurs when one altruistic individual makes a sacrifice with the expectation that another will return the favor when needed (Trivers 1971).³ A problem arises when an individual sacrifices her life for another because presumably there is no payback after death. But as Hamilton (1963) pointed out, evolution is not just about an individual's genome but also that of her kin whose genes are similar. For example suicide bombers from the Middle East seem to be altruists with no expectation of reciprocal return. But the bomber's family is usually rewarded

³ In discussing altruism, psychological and biological altruism must be distinguished. Biological altruism is behavior by any organism that at least temporarily reduces its reproductive fitness while at the same time enhancing the reproductive fitness of one or more other individuals. Psychological altruism, on the other hand, concerns "the motives that people have for doing what they do". The act of helping others at the helper's expense does not count as psychologically altruistic unless the "actor thinks of the welfare of others as an ultimate goal." (Quotes from Sober and Wilson 1999, 6.)

with money and respect, not to mention the reward in the afterlife. From an evolutionary point of view, it is reciprocity that benefits the bomber's genes in her kin.

In order for cooperative altruism to evolve through multilevel selection, mechanisms to identify, punish and/or exclude freeloaders must co-evolve or the biological altruists will become extinct (Skyrms, B. 1996). In humans, and perhaps other rational animals too, one such mechanism is the moral intuition of fairness (Hauser 2006; Haidt and Bjorlund 2006, 19-20), together with the emotional impulse for revenge (McCullough, 2008, 49). If a freeloader is not playing fair, not returning favors or taking something away for personal benefit, the victim feels morally indignant, incensed or angry and is ready to punish. For example, Jewish moral law permits retribution for unfair behavior involving violence or lying (Deut. 19:16-21; Lev. 24:17-21). Another related mechanism that can co-evolve with reciprocal biological altruism is the ability of the more altruistic individuals to recognize each other, form relationships with other altruists and ignore the freeloaders (Sober and Wilson 1999, 29; Skyrms 1996, 60-62). Thus the moral intuitions of fairness and reciprocity have a synergic relationship with the formation of in-groups and out-groups, and the emotion of revenge; and those intuitions probably had to evolve together for individuals to form social groups and receive the benefits.

Inclusive fitness (Hamilton, 1963) is sometimes called 'kin selection', but it can include not only family and kin, but also ones in-group. The reproductive sacrifice of an individual for her relatives can evolve because many of the sacrificial individual's genes are in her relatives, so if her relatives survive, so do her genes. The idea is that the sacrifice of one genome for many similar ones will be an evolutionary stable strategy. Because the in-group is important for the survival of family and relatives, sacrifice for the in-group can be an evolutionary stable strategy as well. Partiality and preference for family is not only a moral intuition, but is also part of reflective, cognitive morality (Appiah 2008, 142-143; Novak 2008).

Forgiveness, a form of altruism, is also a human intuition (McCullough, 2008, Ch. 1), and particular parts of the brain have been identified with the capacity for forgiveness (Tancredi, 2005). Forgiveness may also had to evolve (along with retribution) to make reciprocity viable. Just as cheaters and those who fail to reciprocate understand that there may be retribution, valuable cooperative partners must be given a little slack if the important relationship is to continue. The game tit-for-tat, widely considered a model for reciprocity, descends into constant retribution if one of the players makes a mistake or doesn't return a favor for some reason. The evolutionary fitness of both players declines unless one player forgives and the retribution cycle is stopped. This is the valuable relationship hypothesis (McCullough, 2008, 124; de Waal and Prkorny, 2005). "... organisms that were willing to forgive their cooperation partners were better at gleaning the benefits of cooperation. ... natural selection leads self-interested organisms toward the acquisition of behavioral process that allow them to forgive so that they can benefit from cooperative friendships and family relationships." McCullough, 2008, 125).

Because psychological altruism is defined by intent, as a practical matter it is almost impossible to detect in any objective way (Sober and Wilson 1999, Ch. 8). As a result, many doubt that it exists, or if so, believe it is very rare (Ghiselin 1974, 274).

Sober and Wilson (1999) believe that some people some of the time are psychologically altruistic; namely, the well being of the other is their ultimate motive in at least some interactions.⁴ Sober and Wilson (1999) revive an old, discredited theory of group selection and give it new life to explain the evolution of altruistic behavior (see also Wilson and Wilson, 2007).

Their group selection model “...requires altruistic and selfish types to become concentrated into different groups” (Sober and Wilson 1999, 29). In other words, there must be some mechanism that sorts the psychologically altruistic progeny from the selfish progeny when they form new groups—new in-groups and out-groups. This constraint is identical to the one required for reciprocal altruism mentioned above—the only difference is that Sober and Wilson’s altruists have no expectation of reciprocity. Exactly why a group of psychological altruists would have an evolutionary advantage over a group of biological altruists relying on reciprocity, a sense of fairness and retribution is not clear.

However, assuming Sober and Wilson’s evolutionary group selection model does produce psychological altruists, they are altruists only with respect to those within their in-group:

However, if selection promotes an altruistic concern for the welfare of one’s near and dear, it also may promote indifference or malevolence toward outsiders. Within-group selection is a competitive process, but so is between group selection; it promotes both within-group niceness and between-group nastiness. We mentioned ... that people tend to empathize more with those whom they perceive as similar to themselves If empathy elicits altruistic motives with respect to those whom we take to be similar, its absence means that we are less inclined to be altruistically motivated toward those whom we take to be different. (Sober and Wilson 1999, 327).

The self. As Richard Dawkins pointed out, Natural selection produces individuals who maximize their self interest (1989, 4). But individuals who have an inborn moral sense to be cooperative, fair, and even “altruistic” within their own group will always be evolutionary more fit than purely selfish individuals if the moral ones can live together in groups with other fair and cooperative individuals (Skyrms 1996, 2004; Sober and Wilson 1999). However, the fair and cooperative groups are always subject to cheaters who can take advantage of the cooperative and altruistic individuals. The cheaters will drive the cooperative individuals to extinction if enough of the cheaters/freeloaders are allowed to survive or operate in the group.

The problem is that those individuals, who intuitively know the moral rules that are required to obtain the advantages of living in a cooperative group, also intuitively know that there can be even bigger payoffs for themselves if they cheat. And given the opportunity, most will cheat, because they have self survival instincts, imposed by Dawkins’ “selfish genes”. As Wilson and Sober (1999) conclude, humans have egoistic and altruistic motivations produced by

⁴ Many identify psychological altruism with Christian agape love (e.g. JayOord 2005). Although the command to love neighbor as self may involve altruism, the command implies I am to give my neighbor’s interests equal consideration with mine. Altruistic behavior may or may not be warranted.

evolution. But given the opportunity, the selfish, egoistic motivations almost always win, except for perhaps a few mutants. Marc Hauser (2006, 85) claims:

Our moral faculty outputs principled intuitions about distributive justice. But there will undoubtedly be differences between our intuitive judgments about a just transaction and our behavior in the same situation. Many may have the intuition that a particular action is unfair, but when it comes to making a decision, ignore the intuition and feed the self-interest. We should not, however, assume that because people act unfairly or give incoherent justifications for their actions, that the idea of a moral faculty is mere fiction. What we know and how we choose to act will often occupy separate universes.

Cheating among humans is probably close to universal, and it depends on the situation, on environmental factors that may not even be relevant to the moral decision. Psychologists claim

That a lot of what people do is best explained not by traits of character but by systematic human tendencies to respond to features of their situation that nobody previously thought to be crucial at all. ... Someone who is reliably honest in one kind of situation will often be reliably dishonest in another (Appiah 2008, 39).

Furthermore, most humans don't understand why they do what they do:

And that ... seems consistent with our broader explanatory habits—with the observation that much of what we say when we're explaining what we've done is confabulation: stories we've made up (though quite sincerely) for ourselves.... Because people don't really know why they do what they do, they give explanations of their own behavior that are about as reliable as anyone else's, and in many circumstances less so (Appiah 2008, 43-44).

The fact that people confabulate when explaining behavior suggests that evolution has introduced heuristics at the unconscious level to cheat if the situation is right. Although humans have these intuitive moral “modules” that allows them to reap the benefits of living in fair, cooperative groups, they also seem to have another intuitive instinct that can override the moral sense because cheating gives an individual a better chance of survival if she is not caught. Confabulation, especially when sincere, allows the individual to believe that she is moral, and is also advantageous because it reduces the risk of being punished by convincing others that there was really no cheating or it was inadvertent.

Most of the studies on cheating relate to adultery and examinations. The latter directly impacts the ethic of fairness, not only toward the others taking the exam, but also to the group that relies on competent members.

Statistics on exam cheating rely on anonymous self reporting. The percentage of students reporting that they cheated on at least one exam ranges from 60% to 76% (Davis et. al. 1992; Baird 1980; Davis and Ludvigson 1995) and we can probably assume that is a minimum percentage. Confabulations explaining cheating include things like time pressures, peer pressure, unfair teachers, parental expectations etc. (Bramucci 2003).

Moreover, anecdotal evidence suggests that most people expect that others will cheat if the stakes are high and precautions are not taken. Politicians negotiating nuclear disarmament repeated the oxymoron “trust but verify”. We “get it in writing” not only for clarity’s sake, but to make sure the parties involved do not later claim “I never said that” when it is inconvenient to follow through on the agreement. We spend billions on auditors to make sure no one is pilfering the accounts or making fraudulent statements. We clearly expect others to cheat and take precautions to ensure fair play, probably because we project our own self-understanding on others. Most humans secretly know that they will cheat if the stakes are high, if no one is watching and if the cost/benefit ratio is right.

Avoidance and alleviation of harm. Most humans want to avoid harm for themselves, and feel compassion when harm happens to others. This fits well with the reciprocity moral intuition: if I am compassionate, others will probably extend compassion to me. In most human cultures, harming, like indiscriminately killing, stealing, or intercourse with another’s spouse, is prohibited. But cultures each set different parameters that permit such behavior, or even make it obligatory, depending on the circumstances and who is involved.

Faced with a suffering person ... our natural response is an emotion—compassion let’s call it—that gives us a ... reason to express sympathy and offer aid. Compassion of this sort is not inevitable ... but when it fails, it’s often because it’s trumped by a distinction between an in-group and an out-group ... or because the suffering is otherwise seen as merited. ... Both the psychological mechanisms that generate the psychological distinction between in-group and out-group members and the instinct to punish norm breakers are themselves universal too, though culture fixes what classifications of people as insiders and outsiders are possible and shapes what norms we recognize, and so determines what we will be disposed to punish (Appiah 2008, 130).

So children growing up in a particular culture learn the moral parameters intuitively - who they can harm and who they cannot - just as they learn the local language. Most people are aware of cultures that permit killing, stealing and even rape. It just depends on who the victim is and what can trigger the normally forbidden behavior.

Hierarchy and duty, patron and client, honor and shame, respect and disrespect. Humans and their primate cousins live in hierarchical societies. Political, social, economic, and family relationships are all hierarchical despite a few centuries of western liberal democracy. We all have intuitive feelings of honor, awe and perhaps fear toward those higher in status. We know that those individuals can influence our survival, well being and reproductive success, so evolution has tended to select those who can exhibit the proper signs of honor and respect. Children start learning this in the family.

We intuitively feel a moral obligation to honor those higher in status. Most people would disapprove of someone disrespecting a U.S. president to his face, even while being amused by comedians’ disrespect on national television. Disrespect (shaming) also generates emotions of

anger and revenge in the one being shamed and at one time could lead to sanctioned killing (dueling) in western society; disrespect is still grounds for permissible killing in many cultures today.

But higher status people are also patrons: they have a moral duty to protect their clients. We disapprove of politicians who sell out their constituents; CEO's who mismanage when they should know better; a boss who blames employees for her own mistakes. When exposed, the patrons are shamed and the hierarchical order may be altered.

So shaming and disrespect are also methods of changing the hierarchy—it's like losing a fight among hierarchical, social animals. Evolution has produced this intuitive morality because high status individuals are usually more evolutionary fit than low status individuals, so lower status individuals tend to be double agents: they openly respect the "boss" but may secretly seek to shame and topple her, or get her transferred so they can move up. Political elections are sometimes open but often sneaky examples of this shaming process.

While it seems intuitively obvious that those with status, wealth and power will have greater evolutionary fitness and raise more offspring to maturity than those with less status, there is little correlation of status and wealth with fertility. Those with high status have no more children today than those with low status and in some cases fewer children. In a large meta study involving 879 samples from 129 sources, Vegard Skirbekk (2008) has shown that worldwide, the fertility of high status individuals has been declining at least since 1300 C.E., the earliest information in his data set. High status was measured by wealth, occupation, social class and education. This shift to relatively low fertility among the wealthy accelerated in the late 19th century and continues today. This demographic transition has been a puzzle for evolutionists because it is counterintuitive—why would people voluntarily limit their fertility when they have the resources to produce more children and expand their genome (Mulder, 1998)? There have been many cultural explanations for this demographic transition, but evolutionary explanations have been elusive.

Recently, an evolutionary model has been proposed by Boone (2003) that makes sense in terms of long term fitness, rather than fitness measured from one generation to the next. In this model wealthy, high status individuals with fewer children will survive environmental, economic and political crises that the poor will not because they have the resources to avoid or wait out the crisis; so over the long term, wealthy genomes tend to be preserved over many generations in spite of lower fertility while poor, low status genomes tend to be eliminated in crises.

While it will take a while before the model is tested thoroughly, this trend to lower fertility among wealthy, high status people is fairly recent. In the fourteenth century, the wealthy had over 50% more children than poor, low status individuals (Boone 2003, 153), and this pattern is common in stratified social groupings especially where social/political despots control many resources (Kaplan and Lancaster, 2003). Therefore it seems very likely that wealth and social status were highly correlated with fertility and greater short term biological fitness in the first century when Jesus lived, even if they may not be at present.

Summary. Natural selection has discovered that individuals living in a cooperative group will produce more offspring. This requires a moral sense or intuitions based on:

- 1) Reciprocity, biological altruism and forgiveness - reciprocity usually requires a temporary sacrifice that runs the risk of not being returned; and reciprocity requires some forgiveness to keep cooperative arrangements from breaking up.
- 2) An in-group—like minded individuals who can more or less trust each other to reciprocate.
- 3) Avoidance and alleviation of harm—avoidance of doing harm is like negative reciprocity: don't harm others in your group because harm might be returned. Alleviate harm and be compassionate to others so they will return the favor if needed.
- 4) A sense of fairness - a corollary of reciprocity. Fairness is the ability to judge the value of the favor that needs to be paid, or to be received.
- 5) Retribution—punishing cheaters/freeloaders who do not reciprocate or play fair. Otherwise freeloaders can destroy the group.
- 6) Awareness of the hierarchy and ones place in it—know who your patrons and clients are. Violation of duties to patrons and clients can lead to a lower position and shame.
- 7) Confabulation—the ability to rationalize personal cheating to the satisfaction of yourself and others.
- 8) Cheating—While individuals intuitively know the morality associated with living in a cooperative group, they also intuitively know that cheating can produce an even larger benefit, and will do so if the situation is right.

JESUS' MORALITY AND THE EMPIRE OF GOD

In this section, I want to describe Jesus' morality and compare and contrast it with the normal human morality described in the previous section, in particular the evolutionary intuitions of 1) fairness, reciprocity and retribution; 2) hierarchy, honor and shame; and 3) in-group and out-group boundaries including special consideration for the family group and for the self.

Jesus morality is inseparable from his Empire of God and should not be confused with "Christian" theology. Harold Bloom (2005, 93) points out several times that Jesus would not recognize Christianity as something he started. Bloom goes on to point out that Jesus the Christ, as theologically conceived by St. Paul, the tradition of John's Gospel and the development of Christian theology in the early centuries of Christianity is quite different than the Jesus of Nazareth depicted in the synoptic gospels, especially Mark, the earliest one. The same point is made in a more nuanced way by Amy-Jill Levine (2006). This was apparently true from the beginnings of Christianity: "... the earliest Christians did say things about Jesus that Jesus himself did not say. Christian preaching was indeed something different, not a repetition of what Jesus said." (Patterson, 1998, p. 46).

To write about Jesus' morality is to descend into a quagmire of debate about the historical Jesus over 200 years deep. However, J.D. Crossan (1991, 1994), E.P. Sanders (1995), S.J. Patterson (1998) and many of those in the Jesus Seminar (1999) all suggest that we can

decipher quite a lot about the historical Jesus: what he probably said and did as distinct from metaphorical, interpretive descriptions. The methodology needed to decipher the historical Jesus is demanding and requires an understanding of the political, economic, cultural, religious and social environment of that time and place; and undertaking a critical literary comparison of all the texts written about Jesus, giving more weight to those descriptions that are duplicated from more than one source and that were written closer to the time Jesus lived. By inferring Jesus' morality I have tried to be consistent with the historical inferences of Crossan (1991, 1994), Sanders (1995) and Patterson (1998). In particular, I use pericopes that Crossan believes come from a historical Jesus (Crossan 1991, xii—xxvi) and try to distinguish between Jesus' sayings and his early followers' interpretations.

Jesus was from the lower classes; in terms of our modern economic structure, he or his family were at best minimum wage workers and perhaps more like day laborers in terms of social status. He lived in a polarized economy of the wealthy few and the poverty stricken many. It was a hierarchical culture dominated by patrons and clients and a deep sense of honor and shame. The patriarchal family mimicked the social/political hierarchical structure and Jesus may have been illiterate. Jesus was “a nobody” (Crossan, 1995) and a “shameless fool” (Patterson, 1998).

Jesus did not develop a moral ethic in any formal sense (Ruse 2004, 199-202). He described his morality as the Empire of God, a term perhaps deliberately chosen to contrast with the Empire of Rome (Patterson, 1998, ch 2). Like his Jewish contemporaries, he must have assumed that the Great Commandments to love God and neighbor was a revelation from God, and that it defined the essence of God's Empire; but he didn't justify that assumption, or establish laws and rules that were logical consequences of the Great Commandment. He probably assumed that the laws and rules that could be derived from the Great Commandments were already codified in Jewish Religious Law (Herzoc, 2000, p. 211). With some exceptions, Jesus would be quite at home in the Jewish moral ethics recently outlined by David Novak (2008). However, Jesus felt free to interpret some rules and laws differently than his contemporaries and criticized other laws. For Jesus, the laws seemed to be interpretations of the great commandments that were valid in many but not all circumstances. Indeed, he thought that one or two had missed the point of the Great Commandments (for example, divorce was permitted by Moses but not by Jesus in his culture).

The Foundation of Jesus' Morality. In all three synoptic gospels Jesus affirms the “Great Commandments” of Deut. 6:5 and Lev. 19:18 as the essence of the law and all moral behavior. This point of view was apparently not unusual among his contemporaries and is consistent with modern Jewish Ethics (Novak 2008). Crossan does not have his historical Jesus actually quoting the Torah but saying something like “Love your neighbor like your soul; guard your neighbor like the pupil of your eye” (1991, xxi), and telling the Good Samaritan Parable (1991, xxiii). However, the synoptic traditions probably accurately reflect Jesus' views

concerning the great commandments, especially because they were central to 1st century Jewish belief and observant Jews repeated them twice daily (Sanders 1995, 224).

While the Good Samaritan Parable occurs only in Luke (10:25-37), most historians attribute the story to Jesus (Patterson, 1998 148). Luke connects the parable to the love command, so Jesus' early followers thought the story illustrated Jesus' apparently unique, radical and egalitarian interpretation of the love command and the Empire of God.

The synoptic traditions believed that Jesus' claimed, along with his contemporaries, that obedience to the great commandments was necessary for eternal life, or for being part of God's Empire, and the Good Samaritan parable describes how those who participate in the Empire behave and relate to others. For example,

Jews and Samaritans were mortal foes. ... So what does it mean when a hated, feared Samaritan saves the day? Does it mean that the Empire of God is that place where we find ourselves in a relationship with someone with whom we would never be caught dead? Does it mean that the Empire of God happens when we realize that we need our enemy just to survive? Does it mean that the Empire of God is experienced when we find help and relief from someone from whom we have no right to expect it? Does it mean that in the Empire of God those things which give identity and mark community boundaries no longer stand in the way of human care ...? (Patterson, 1998, 151).

In other words, the boundaries so essential to evolutionary cooperative groups are torn down in the Empire of God

The love command is described as the Great, or Chief command on which "hang the whole law and the prophets also" (Matt. 22:40). The different gospels have slightly different renderings of the great commandments, but Victor Furnish (1972, 200) concludes that:

... It [the great commandment] is clearly regarded within the synoptic traditions as the criterion and measure by which the law itself, with all its various commandments, is to be judged. This criticism of the law is already at work precisely within those materials (for example, the exhortations about non-retaliation and love of enemies) which take us closest to Jesus' own teaching.

Furnish (1972, 205) emphasizes that love as a command may be an "unqualifiedly general ethical [moral] principle", but it must be distinguished from "the various 'subsidiary' principles, norms and rules to which it leads". The commandment cannot be reduced to such rules, or the rules cannot be used "as if, collectively, they exhausted the meaning of the love command itself". "As a command, then, love stands over every particular requirement or set of requirements." One might add that the love command also stands over natural morality and judges it as well.

What does Agape Love mean? C.S. Lewis (1960), in an anecdotal and literary analysis from a Christian perspective, describes 4 kinds of love: affection, friendship, sexual or erotic, and agape. This classical description tends to be replaced by modern theories of love as an

attitude, which can be grouped into the following types: “love as union, love as robust concern, love as valuing, and love as an emotion” (Helm 2005). The classical descriptions lose their distinctions when viewed from this newer perspective. However here I will use the classical description because it explicitly includes *agape* love, the word used in the Greek manuscripts to describe what Jesus was talking about.

Lewis points out that the source of most of these loves comes from needs: a need to survive, and to be socially acceptable; a need for emotional and intellectual support; companionship; a child’s need for care and protection and an adult’s need to have sex and offspring. These needs produce psychological attachments to particular people (Haidt 2006, Ch. 6) and are Kierkegaard’s preferential loves (Krishek, 2008).

Affection and friendship are easily explained by evolution (Lampert 1997). Those emotions tie people together in a group of mutual cooperators. Friendship is one way people recognize others who can be relied on to provide help when needed—one-sided friendships do not last very long, affection is usually replaced by disdain.

Sexual love can also be explained by evolution (Haidt 2006, Ch. 6; Lampert 1997, Ch. 10-12), because it is the mechanism that keeps men and women together long enough to produce children and raise them to maturity (Fisher 2004, Ch. 6).

Jesus’ concept of *agape* love can be described as a desire for the good⁵ in a particular situation (Outka, 1992, 1996). I love myself in the sense that I desire the good for myself in a particular context and behave in a way to achieve it (Ferreira, 2001, 35; Krishek, 2008, 598-599). I love another in the sense that I desire the good for her and if possible behave in a way to bring it about for her. *Agape* love is “independent of the loved individual’s fundamental characteristics” (Badhwar 2003) and I cannot limit love to those I like or are attached to.

In acting to achieve a good for myself, I must balance my good with another’s good if there is a conflict (Outka, 1992). This kind of love is not necessarily altruistic (Outka, 1996, 35)—in a situation where my good conflicts with another’s, I am not obligated to defer to the other, only to make a balanced judgment—perhaps along utilitarian lines—or negotiate something that will benefit both of us, or use an objective mediator.

This interpretation of *agape* love is not consistent with views that it must be altruistic (Tillman 2008) and must always involve self-denial (Kierkegaard 1995, 55). The Love Command demands equality between my self and the other. The love command does entail self denial in the limited sense that I cannot subjugate the other to my interests. But it does not require self denial in the broad sense that I must always subjugate my interests to those of the other.

In order to love in this way, it is necessary to have most of the virtues: wisdom, self control, courage, humility, kindness etc. In other words, I need to be the kind of person advocated by Virtue Ethics (Appiah 2008). If the Great Commandment has ultimate significance,

⁵ I don’t want to define “good” – I’ll leave that up to the reader other than to say it cannot be limited to happiness or pleasure. In a sense, it doesn’t matter how “good” is defined by an individual because whatever it is, love demands that that another’s need for that good has a claim on it too.

then the virtues are not ends in themselves, but the means that enable love. If I am not virtuous, I can't love very well.

The egalitarianism and rationality of agape Love. The reason it is so difficult, if not impossible, to obey the agape Love of the Great Commandment is not because it demands altruism or self denial, but because it demands equality, it demands that I make a disinterested judgment balancing my needs/good with those of my neighbor's. This is an intensely rational process and involves de-centering (Hurley and Nudds 2006, 3), looking at the situation through the eyes of my neighbor as well as my own, and using the "knowledge Instinct" (Levine and Perlovsky, 2008, 801). For example the Good Samaritan seemed to be able to put himself in the position of the wounded man, weigh his own need to be somewhere else, his need for oil and wine, and his need for cash against the need of the half-dead man. In this case, a disinterested judgment required altruism and sacrifice. An example in which the opposite occurred was Jesus' response to needs/requests made by his family: he judged that his own interests in his mission outweighed his family's interests (Lk. 12:51-53).

It is probably safe to say that humans are seldom able to make a disinterested moral judgment when they have a conflict of interest: and that is why agape love is so difficult. Evolution has produced powerful emotions and intuitions that drive us to give preference to self, romantic partner, children, other relatives, friends and in-group members. Kierkegaard was right to be suspicious of those attachment loves because they usually get in the way of the demands of agape love: de-centering and making rational disinterested judgments.

V.P. Furnish describes agape love this way:

...the summons to love arises not from within the natural affections of the one commanded, nor from within the natural attractiveness (lovability) of the one to be loved, but from a source outside the parties to the relationship itself. In Biblical terms, the source of the commandment is God, and that means that the commandment remains even when the natural inclinations or attractiveness of the parties involved are changed. ... It is man's will which is claimed by love, not his 'emotions' or 'affections'. Love in the Christian sense is not to be confused with filial or familial affection. ... Love which can be commanded can only be ... 'practical love'. This is in keeping with the New Testament insistence that love is present where it is 'active' in deeds of mercy and kindness, in the actuality of caring for and serving the neighbor. So love is an act of the will, not just some vague and generalized 'disposition of the soul', feeling, or attitude. (1972, 200-202).

The following sections compare Jesus' articulation of agape love with the intuitive morality of evolution.

Reciprocity, Fairness, Cheaters and Retribution, Shame and Honor. Jesus' criticism of parts of Jewish law in Matt. 5-7 is exemplified in Lk. 6:27-35 where he censures the law that prohibited escalating retaliation. This perfectionism is surely based on a revolutionary

interpretation of the command to love neighbor. Sayings that Crossan attributes to Jesus in Luke 6:27-35 are in italics; the rest may have been added as explanatory material:

But I say to you who are listening: Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you, bless those who curse you, pray for those who treat you badly. To the man who slaps you on one cheek, present to other cheek too; to the man who takes your cloak from you, do not refuse your tunic. Give to everyone who asks you, and do not ask for your property back from the man who robs you. Treat others as you would like them to treat you. If you love those who love you, what thanks can you expect? Even sinners love those who love them. And if you do good to those who do good to you, what thanks can you expect? For even sinners do that much. And if you lend to those from whom you hope to receive, what thanks can you expect? Even sinners lend to sinners to get back the same amount. Instead, love your enemies and do good, and lend without any hope of return. You will have a great reward, and you will be sons of the Most High, for he himself is kind to the ungrateful and wicked.

In a culture in which honor (respect) and shame (disrespect) were endemic (Crossan 1992, 9-15; Patterson 1998, 73-80), to be slapped and robbed without retaliation, meant losing face in your group, losing a sense of who you were, and being at the bottom of the pecking order if not ostracized.⁶ “Shame is a powerful emotion. ... Shame is not necessarily a moral category [like guilt]. ... Shame is an existential category. It has to do with self worth, with one’s internal image of oneself, with one’s sense of belonging and kinship.” (Patterson, 1998, 74). Retaliation was permitted under Jewish Law, but one could not escalate (an eye for an eye, not an eye for a verbal insult). Jesus seems to be saying that those who are part of God’s Kingdom get their identity, a sense of who they are, not from their family or social hierarchy, but from God’s Empire and its Great Commandments. In the context of Matthew and Luke, Jesus seems to be contrasting the Great Commandments and the nature of God’s Empire with these intuitive feelings of honor and shame. He was also criticizing the Jewish law that permitted limited retribution probably because it condoned hatred, not love for neighbor. If I love the other as myself, I will look for the good that can be obtained in that situation. Retaliation is seldom it.

But retribution (including ostracism) is evolutionarily necessary if cooperative individuals are to leverage their individual fitness by living with other cooperators in a group. Otherwise cheaters will destroy the cooperators (Skyrms 1996). Perhaps treating enemies/cheaters nicely may occasionally convert them to altruists, but I know of no society that functions that way. It is not an evolutionary stable strategy.

⁶ In the late 1980’s I was a mentor to several young black and Hispanic teenagers in the “projects” of West Dallas. One had been robbed, and he vowed to get his baseball bat and go after the culprits. I pointed out that this escalation would only lead to jail. While he admitted that this might be true, he pointed out that if he did not retaliate in this way, his enemies (and friends) would not respect him, and his enemies would only return to prey on him, and his friends would abandon him. Living in a Dallas suburb with sympathetic police only a phone call away, I was in no position to judge him—he couldn’t trust the police and had to retaliate himself; I could do it through the criminal justice system.

Jesus could not have articulated these concepts of honor and shame; they are modern constructs, and he was not a psychologist. But he did specifically attack reciprocity and, like all of us, understood honor and shame viscerally because they are emotional reactions produced by evolution that allow me to survive by punishing those who mess with me and mine.

The rest of Lk. 6:27-35 discounts reciprocity using lending as the model. I lend expecting the money to be returned; I do a favor, expecting the other to return it if needed. Retribution and reciprocity are critical elements of evolution that are necessary for social cooperation and biological altruism. For cooperation to evolve, individuals need to be assured that the other person in the relationship will return the favor when needed (Skyrms 1996). In other words, gifts have strings attached (Haidt 2006, 45-47). For cooperation or biological altruism to evolve, altruists need to recognize each other and form groups of interactive altruists (Sober and Wilson 1999). If I treat everyone as I would like to be treated, whether they return the favor or not, I risk letting cheaters send me to biological extinction by eventually taking away all my resources; Jesus was penniless, and as far as we know, he did not pass on any of his genes - probably because he could not support a family living a life without demanding reciprocity.

Jesus' comments about lending and giving without expectation of reciprocity, like all of his moral comments, should be understood as his interpretation of the love commands in that particular context. In order to love, I must put myself in the position of the other, ask how I would like to be treated in that circumstance, make a balanced judgment of my need for the resources versus the other's need, and act accordingly. Loving is an intensely rational process. Humans need heuristics like "lend without any hope of return". Most of the time, that aphorism probably gets it right.

FamilyTies and Inclusive Fitness. As J.D. Crossan points out: "There is ... an almost savage attack [by Jesus] on family values, and it happens very, very often" (1994). Sayings below in italics are attributed to a historical Jesus by Crossan (1991, xvi and xviii).

Do not suppose that I have come to bring peace to the Earth: it is not peace I have come to bring, but a sword. For I have come to set a man against his father, a daughter against her mother, a daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law. A man's enemies will be those of his own household. (Matt. 10:34-36)

His mother and brothers now arrived and, standing outside, sent in a message asking for him. A crowd was sitting around him at the time and the message was passed to him, '*your mother and brothers and sisters are outside asking for you*'. He replied, '*who are my mother and my brothers?*' And looking around at those sitting in a circle around him, he said '*Here are my mother and my brothers. Anyone who does the will of God, that person is my brother and sister and mother.*' (Lk. 12:51-53)

Hearing this, a modern person might say Jesus had unresolved family issues. First century nuclear families usually consisted father/patriarch, mother; unmarried daughters and sons; married sons, their wives and children. The family power structure mirrored the political/class power structure, and the patriarch could dominate his family through patronage and/or force.

The key to understanding Jesus' rant, according to J.D. Crossan, is the first quote above from Matthew about coming with a sword and dividing family members:

The usual explanation is that families will be divided as some accept and others refuse faith in Jesus. But notice where and how emphatically the axis of separation is located. It is precisely *between the generations*. But why should faith split along that axis? Why might faith not separate, say, the women from the men or even operate in ways far more random? *The attack has nothing to do with faith but with power*. The attack is on the Mediterranean family's axis of power, which set father and mother over son, daughter and daughter-in-law. That helps us to understand all of those examples. The family is society in miniature, the place where we first and most deeply learn how to love and be loved, hate and be hated, help and be helped, abuse and be abused. It is not just a center of domestic serenity; since it involved power it invites the abuse of power, and it is at that precise point that Jesus attacks it. His ideal group is, contrary to Mediterranean and indeed most human familial reality, open and equally accessible to all under God. It is the Kingdom of God, and it negates that terrible abuse of power that is power's dark specter and lethal shadow (Crossan 1994, 60).

Family is where we learn attachment loves (Haidt 2006, Ch. 6) and obedience to the patriarchal power structure. Parents commonly see their children as possessions and fulfillment of themselves; this does not produce the kind of love the great commandment demands. The Empire of God represents a new kind of family, a new patriarch who loves and demands the same kind of love for neighbor and family alike (Patterson, 1998, 109-112). This Empire tears apart the old, natural family ties that are the foundation of most evolutionary behaviors.

In terms of evolution, Jesus' comments about family ties are not aimed at just patriarchal power over the younger generation, but also at the emotional attachment loves that drive us to give preference to family members over others and that promote kin selection, and inclusive fitness. The love command demands that I give the same consideration to my neighbor as my kin. Jesus' and his family were attached to each other and the family may have wanted special consideration and were making demands based on those attachment loves. Surely Jesus had those same emotional attachments and felt compelled to point out rather harshly that his family was no longer limited biologically: "Anyone who does the will of God, that person is my brother and sister and mother."

Jesus seems to claim in modern terms that the love command demands that other genomes be given equal consideration. It is possible to interpret this comment by Jesus as suggesting that all the preferences we give to family are transferred to those in the Empire of God. But this still undermines the intuitive morality of evolutionary inclusive fitness. Either way,

this claim by Jesus was not only at odds with his contemporary Jewish culture, but also with many modern ethical systems including Jewish ones (Novak 2008).

Economic Power and Evolutionary Fitness

How happy are you who are poor [destitute]: yours is the Kingdom of God.

Happy you who are hungry now: you shall be satisfied.

Happy you who weep now: you shall laugh (Lk.6:20-21)

But alas for you who are rich: you are having your consolation now.

Alas for you who have your fill now: you shall go hungry.

Alas for you who laugh now: you shall mourn and weep. (Lk. 6:24-25)

These aphorisms from Jesus are well known, but only the first three can be attributed to a historical Jesus (Crossan 1991, viii-xx). Their antitheses may have been added as a literary style. In any case, pericopes that can be attributed to Jesus suggest that those antitheses are not far off the mark. For example “*Where your treasure is, there will your heart be also*”; “*It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the Kingdom of God*”; and finally, the parable of the rich man and a destitute Lazarus which can be summed up by saying “*alas for you who are rich: you are having your consolation now.*”

In modern cultures, the rich and powerful are honored because they have the “right stuff”: good genes, good education, good sense, good values, good choices and discipline. The poor and destitute don’t have the right stuff: at most, they have little sense, poor values, make poor choices and have little discipline, all of which is generally their fault. The poor could become richer if they acquired the right stuff through self improvement. In the first century, the “right stuff” was God’s favor and the rich and powerful had it; they were virtuous, while the poor and destitute were unclean, did not have God’s favor, most likely because they were secret, if not public sinners.

... In keeping with the traditional conjunction of Biblical prophecy and imperial history, whatever happens to the Jews in the contemporary world empire is interpreted in terms of God’s punitive and salvific designs. That applies to the Romans, just as it had earlier to the Egyptians, Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians Greeks and Syrians. Thus, concerning the Roman Empire in general and the Flavian dynasty in particular, Josephus’s theological position is absolutely clear, as in War 5.367, 378 and 412:

Fortune indeed, had from all quarters passed over to them [the Romans], and God who went the round of nations, bringing to each in turn the rod of empire, now rested over Italy. ... You [the Jews] are warring not against the Romans only, but also against God. ... The deity has fled from the [Jewish] holy places and taken His stand on the side of those with whom you are now at war.

God, according to Josephus, wants the Jews to be politically obedient to Rome; thus those in revolt during that First Roman-Jewish War are actually revolting against God. (Crossan 1995, 31).

So in the first century culture (as in ours), nations/empires that were successful in terms of wealth and power had the “right stuff” like democracy or capitalism or God’s favor. Those that were destroyed or consumed were inferior and being punished. The same was true for individuals: the rich and powerful had God’s favor and authority while the poor and destitute did not.

In Jesus’ culture, the huge economic disparity between the powerful and the poor was supported by force as well as the theological notion that wealth and honor signified God’s favor. Jesus’ beatitudes turn this perception of wealth and power upside down. Again, the gospel writers do not have Jesus citing the great commandments to justify the meaning of his parable, but his radical interpretation of the great commandments is implicit: the rich and powerful have an obligation to love neighbor as themselves. If the rich consider their wealth a right for themselves but not for the poor, if the rich obtain their wealth by manipulating the religious, social, economic, class, and legal systems in their favor, then their condemnation of the poor will be used to judge them in God’s Empire: Lazarus is part of the Empire, the rich man is not because he ignored the destitute man at his door.

If wealth is correlated with biological fitness in the first century, then Jesus seems to be making a moral judgment on evolution itself when he blesses the poor and mourns the fate of the wealthy. Most of us desire wealth and status because we intuitively know that it will help our family (and its genome) survive. Jesus seems to be saying that following the evolutionary imperative is misguided. Spending time acquiring wealth, high status and evolutionary fitness at the expense of others is apparently antithetical to God’s Empire and loving the neighbor.

An understanding of evolutionary processes suggests that hierarchical social structure and wealth disparity can be explained in part by the almost unconscious drive to preserve ones genome in future generations. Those who play the evolutionary game best in their cultural environment achieve social and biological success, high status, and honor, and can rig the game in their favor.

In-groups, Out-groups, Radical Equality and Association with Cheaters/Sinners. With whom I eat broadcasts to others my economic and social status, my clients and patrons, and my associates; it identifies my in-group/out-group boundaries and reciprocal relationships.

Sharing food is a transaction which involves a series of mutual obligations and which initiates an interconnected complex of mutuality and reciprocity. Also, that ability of food to symbolize these relationships, as well as define group boundaries, surfaced as one of its unique properties. ... Food exchanges are basic to human interaction. Implicit in them is a series of obligations to give, receive and repay. ... Eating is a behavior which symbolizes feelings and relationships,

mediates social status and power, and expresses the boundaries of group identity. (Klosinski 1988, 56).

In all societies, both simple and complex, eating is the primary way of initiating and maintaining human relationships. ... Once an anthropologist finds out where, when, and with whom the food is eaten, just about everything else can be inferred about the relations among the society's members. (Farb and Armelagos 1980, 211).

Eating together (commensality) consists of “miniature models for the rules of association and socialization. It means table fellowship as a map of economic discrimination, social hierarchy, and political differentiation.”(Crossan 1995, 68).

There is a lot of information in the synoptic gospels about Jesus' eating companions, and there are some interesting stories about dinner and banquet guests. Many are probably designed to make a point rather than to report historical events, and Crossan does not include many of those dinner parables in his pericopes from the historical Jesus.

In the synoptic traditions, Jesus seemed to eat and drink with anyone who invited him no matter who they or their guests were. In one story, he went to dinner at a Pharisee's house, but the host apparently wanted to make it clear to his other guests that Jesus was not in his in-group or social class because the Pharisee did not offer Jesus the common courtesies of water to wash his feet or oil for his hair. Moreover Jesus allowed a woman, who was apparently a prostitute, to touch him making Jesus unclean and thereby insulting his host. (Lk. 7:36-50). One has to wonder how a prostitute showed up at a Pharisee's dinner party—did Jesus bring her?

Jesus also ate with tax collectors (cheaters) and sinners - a report considered historically accurate by Crossan (1991, xix). The term sinner probably included some women forced into prostitution by divorce or poverty. These were outcasts in Jewish society and Mark (2: 13-17) notes that many “sinners” followed him; there is also a similar story in Matt. 9: 9-13.

Although the synoptic gospels do not have Jesus ever hosting a dinner party, there is a parable, which apparently does go back to a historical Jesus, about a patron who invites clients to a banquet (Lk 14: 15-24; Crossan 1991, xviii). The patron's clients all make excuses and do not show up, so he has his servants go out and indiscriminately invite the street people. Crossan comments:

What Jesus' parable advocates, therefore, is an open commensality, an eating together without using table as a miniature map of society's vertical discriminations and lateral separations. The social challenge of such equal or egalitarian commensality is the parable's most fundamental danger and most radical threat. ...

The Kingdom [Empire] of God as a process of open commensality, of a non-discriminating table depicting in miniature a non-discriminating society, clashes fundamentally with honor and shame, those basic values of ancient Mediterranean culture and society. ...

We might see Jesus' message and program as quaintly eccentric or charmingly iconoclastic ... but for those who take their identity from the eyes of their peers, the idea of eating together without any distinctions, differences, discriminations or hierarchies is close to the irrational and the absurd. And the one who advocates or does it is close to the deviant and the perverted. He has no honor. He has no shame. ...

The open commensality and radical egalitarianism of Jesus' Kingdom [Empire] of God are more terrifying than anything we have ever imagined, and even if we cannot accept it, we should not explain it away as something else. (Crossan 1995, 69-74).

Open commensality destroys the in-group/out-group and hierarchical patron-client distinctions of intuitive morality. It destroys the intuitive morality of reciprocity which relies on the formation of an in-group.

Of course Jesus wasn't suggesting that one should not return a favor when an in-group friend needs it. Only that one should not discriminate: love demands giving favors to all who need them, whether or not they can reciprocate or are part of my in-group. That is why the radical egalitarianism of the Empire of God is more terrifying than anything we have ever imagined. Not only does radical equality go against our intuitive morality, but also that kind of behavior leads to evolutionary extinction. A historical Jesus seems to have understood this: "To save your life is to lose it; to lose your life is to save it" (Crossan 1991, xvi).

Love and Justice in the Empire of God. There is at least one similarity between the Empire of God and evolutionary in-groups: both have out-groups. For evolutionary groups, out-groups are those who cannot be trusted to reciprocate: cheaters, enemies and dangerous competitors. While the Empire of God emphasizes equality and an inclusive group, hypocrites who refuse to forgive are excluded. Justice in the empire consists of hypocrites receiving the same judgment they assess on others. Here is Jesus describing the Empire's justice:

And so the kingdom of heaven may be compared to a king who decided to settle his accounts with his servants. When the reckoning began, they brought him a man who owed ten thousand talents, but he had no means of paying, so his master gave orders that he should be sold, together with his wife and children and all his possessions, to meet the debt. At this, the servant threw himself down at his master's feet. "Give me time" he said, "and I will pay the whole sum". And the servant's master felt so sorry for him that he let him go and cancelled the debt. Now as the servant went out, he happened to meet a fellow servant who owed him 100 denarii; and he seized him by the throat and began to throttle him. "Pay what you owe me" he said. His fellow servant fell at his feet and implored him saying, "Give me time and I will pay you". But the other would not agree; on the contrary, he had him thrown into prison till he should pay the debt. His fellow servants were deeply distressed when they saw what had happened, and they went to their master and reported the whole affair to him. Then the master sent for him. "You wicked servant", he said, "I cancelled all that debt of yours when you

appealed to me. Were you not bound, then, to have pity on your fellow servant just as I had pity on you?” And in his anger the master handed him over to the torturers till he should pay all his debt. And that is how my heavenly father will deal with you unless you each forgive your brother from your heart. (Matt. 18: 23-35; also from Crossan’s historical Jesus 1991, xxii)

The forgiven servant violated the command to love neighbor as self; not necessarily because he refused to forgive his fellow servant’s debt, but because he refused *after having accepted the forgiveness of his own debt*. In other words he established what it meant to love himself in that circumstance by accepting the cancellation of his debt, and therefore he was “bound, then, to have pity on [his] fellow servant”.

Here is the same thing in another way:

Do not judge and you will not be judged; because the judgments you give are the judgments you will get, and the amount you measure out is the amount you will be given. *Why do you observe the splinter in your brother’s eye and never notice the plank in your own? How dare you say to your brother, “Let me take the splinter out of your eye”, when all the time there is a plank in your own? Hypocrite! Take the plank out of your own eye first, and then you will see clearly enough to take the splinter out of your brother’s eye.* (Matt. 7: 1-5, italics are sayings from Crossan’s historical Jesus, 1991, xvi)

Furthermore, a historical Jesus emphasized forgiveness “*Forgive and you will be forgiven*” (Luke 6:37 & Crossan 1991, xiv); “*Peter came up and said to him “Lord, how often shall my brother sin against me, and I forgive him? As many as seven times?” Jesus said to him, “I do not say to you seven times, but seventy times seven”* (Matt 18: 21-22 & Crossan 1991 xx).

Justice in the Kingdom of God means that I will receive that same judgment I pronounce on others when I do the same things they do. Judgment here is used in the sense of condemnation (Pettigrove 2007). Those who make hypocritical judgments of others and refuse to forgive are the Empire’s out-group.

The devastating thing about Jesus’ vision of God’s justice is that hypocrisy is endemic among humans—it seems to be part of our nature: “One of the most universal pieces of advice from across cultures and eras is that we are all hypocrites, and in our condemnation of other’s hypocrisy we only compound our own.” (Haidt 2006, 60). In addition, we are experts at rationalization and confabulation (Appiah 2008, 43-44). This is easy to see from an evolutionary perspective; I need to give the impression to other members of my group, who I rely on for help when needed, that I am a good citizen even if I cheat occasionally. That often means that I must condemn others, who do the same things I do, in order to maintain either a public or private façade. This hypocritical maintenance of a false image may have its roots in the evolution of mating strategies where human males and females deceive each other about their qualities (Lampert 1997, Ch. 11) and refuse to forgive when the “real” partner appears.

Jesus seems to be claiming that God’s justice has nothing to do with whether I obey prescriptive, deontological rules that God establishes, but whether I follow the same moral

expectations that I have for others. The parable suggests that I exclude myself from the Empire by hypocritically refusing to forgive.

Because most humans are psychologically hypocrites (Haidt 2006, 60), humans are perhaps incapable of being moral in Jesus' sense. This raises the question Appiah (2008, 22) poses:

What would be the point of norms that human beings were psychologically incapable of obeying? After all, normative reflection suggests ... that "ought" implies "can". ... And even if impossible norms had some sort of ideal force, how should we actual humans respond to them?

Jesus' answer to that question was forgiveness, something humans can do and receive; those who recognize their own hypocrisy may find it easier to forgive.

Summary. The morality of Empire of God seems to be based on a radical interpretation of the command to love neighbor as self. It is almost the antithesis of natural morality produced by evolution. Love is not limited by whether the other reciprocates; by whether the other is part of my in-group; or even by whether the other is my enemy. This love is not necessarily altruistic in the sense that I must always subjugate myself to the other, only that I abide by a balanced judgment of the interests of all involved. Those who make hypocritical judgments exclude themselves from the Empire, but those who forgive are automatically included.

IMPLICATIONS AND DISCUSSION

Moral Egoism and Consequentialism. Natural morality is a form of Egoism: Psychological egoism, the most famous descriptive position, claims that each person has but one ultimate aim: her own welfare. Normative forms of egoism make claims about what one ought to do, rather than describe what one does do. Ethical egoism claims that it is necessary and sufficient for an action to be morally right that it maximize one's self-interest. Rational egoism claims that it is necessary and sufficient for an action to be rational that it maximize one's self-interest. (Shaver, 2002)

Natural morality and egoism, whether descriptive or normative, maximizes the good of the self. It is not about equality, or maximizing the good/happiness of others unless the self might benefit in some way. An egoist may be altruistic, empathetic, helpful, cooperative and forgiving, but these feelings, emotions behaviors are driven by natural selection because individuals usually fare better and maximize their interests if they live in cooperative groups practicing reciprocity.

The morality of the Empire of God is closer to Consequentialism, the modern form of utilitarianism, than it is to deontological morality.

For deontologists, what makes a choice right is its conformity with a moral norm. Such norms are to be simply obeyed by each moral agent; In this sense, for deontologists, the Right has priority over the Good. If an act is not in accord with the Right, it may not be undertaken, no matter the Good that it might produce

Consequentialists hold that choices — acts and/or intentions — are to be morally assessed solely by the states of affairs they bring about. Consequentialists thus must specify initially the states of affairs that are intrinsically valuable — the Good. They then are in a position to assert that whatever choices increase the Good, that is, bring about more of it, are the choices that it is morally right to make and to execute. (Alexander and Moore, 2008)

Gene Outka (1972) points out many similarities between Utilitarianism (Consequentialism) and agape love and that John Stuart Mill made specific references to the Golden Rule and the love command (p. 298). Although there are many issues, problems and versions of both consequentialism and the agape love of the Empire of God, the following are consistent with at least some versions of both (Outka, 1972, ch. 8):

- 1) A moral agent ought to act in a way that promotes the greatest good (love of neighbor);
- 2) The moral agent must be impartial; each stakeholder, including the moral agent, is weighted equally although their interests (goods, happiness) may vary. “One must contend that under the characteristics of welfare or need, for example, resources are sometimes to be distributed unequally when needs are unequal in order to equalize benefits.” (Outka, 1972, p. 310).
- 3) The stakeholders may be in the agent’s group, outside of it, or even enemies.
- 4) Impartiality requires a rational agent who is able to see the situation from the other’s perspective. “... agape enjoins one to identify with the neighbor’s point of view, to try imaginatively to see what it is for him to live the life he does, to occupy the position he holds. Clearly, the other’s right to assume a point of view different from one’s own is also affirmed.” (Outka, 1972, p. 311)
- 5) “Moral judgments can be universalizable without always requiring the agent to ask: what would happen if *everyone* did this? ... In some instances the agent ought consciously to refrain from legislating for everyone. To press for the blanket adoption of certain personal judgments may sometimes seem a form of moral arrogance.” (Outka, 1972, p. 302-303). How the agent loves herself in a particular situation may not be appropriate for others in that, or in other, situations.

The purpose here is not to go into details about the various versions of egoism and Consequentialism (agape love), but to point out that they are fundamentally different.

Can something like agape love and Consequentialism arise in an evolutionary process?

That question is usually posed as: how can altruism arise in an evolutionary process? Psychological altruism is demanded on occasion by Consequentialism and agape love because of the normative nature of equality and because a rational choice is required. Neither Consequentialism nor agape love is based on emotions and feelings as in natural morality.

Evolutionary group selection (or more precisely multilevel selection) has been advocated as a way to explain altruism and equality (Sober and Wilson, 1999; Wilson and Wilson, 2007).

Cultural and social mores do affect natural morality (Haidt and Bjorlund, 2006, 2) and altruism of some form is a moral intuition; so group selection may well be operating on human groups.

But even if multilevel selection plays some role in human evolution there are several problems using it to explain something like the agape love of the Empire of God:

- 1) Reciprocity (rejected by the Empire of God) remains an important, if not essential, natural moral intuition. Even if between-group selection has produced the altruistic tendencies necessary to form cooperative groups, within-group selection and the self interest of individuals maintains reciprocity. Altruism and reciprocity surely evolved synergistically in a multilevel evolutionary process.
- 2) Even Sober and Wilson (1999, ch 8) think the jury is still out on whether group selection has in fact produced psychological altruism—the requirement that the altruist’s intent and motive is for the ultimate good of another who has no kin connection or ability to reciprocate.
- 3) Even if group selection does produce some psychological altruism and equality, it applies only to the in-group, and interactions between groups are no different than egoism practiced at the group level (Sober and Wilson 1999, 327). In the Empire, the obligation to love transcends group boundaries.
- 4) Groups (whether nation-states, religions, or tribes) are almost always hierarchical in nature and many have a wide distribution of wealth with the leaders at the top end. While equality may be a human cultural ideal, it is the essence of the Empire.
- 5) Groups, even altruistic ones, are subject to sabotage (cheating) by their members. In order to survive, groups must promote retribution and weed out cheaters. Group selection may promote altruism, but it should also promote groups that can control cheaters. In the Empire, retribution must not take the place of love.

Multilevel selection (Wilson & Wilson, 2007) certainly promotes biological altruism, but it also promotes individual moral egoists who need reciprocity to survive, retribution to maintain the group, and competition between groups that often leads to violence.

Physicalism, Emergent Properties and Christianity. Not only does Occam’s razor suggest that a creator God is an unnecessary assumption, but the morality of the God depicted by Jesus also suggests that his God would not have produced the universe and the morality associated with it anyway. The latter is not a new observation, but was advocated by many of Jesus’ followers shortly after his death.

But if Christians give up a creator God, can there still be room for a moral God and his Empire?

The claim that there is no supernatural creator God is usually associated with Physicalism, the metaphysical idea that everything supervenes on the physical. If a physical state changes, then so do mental, social, psychological and conscious states (Stoljar, 2001).

The scientific method has provided overwhelming evidence for many aspects of physicalism; in particular that certain mental and psychological states depend on the physical

state of the brain and body. Science has also shown that the natural morality described earlier is dependent on physical states: DNA molecules and the ecological/cultural environment.

If Christians give up a supernatural creator God, they could still maintain, along with some philosophers, that there are entities that can function independently of the physical, and that those entities may interact with the physical by altering it. Ideas, consciousness, and intent, have been suggested as entities that function independently of the physical.

Some physicalists have tried to account for these entities as emergent properties:

Emergent entities (properties or substances) ‘arise’ out of more fundamental entities and yet are ‘novel’ or ‘irreducible’ with respect to them. (For example, it is sometimes said that consciousness is an emergent property of the brain). ... There has been renewed interest in emergence within discussions of the behavior of complex systems and debates over the reconcilability of mental causation, intentionality, or consciousness with physicalism” (O’Connor and Wong, 2006).

Christians could maintain that their God interacts with the physical universe through emergent entities that are mental in character and that can produce effects in the physical realm. This form of physicalism, which accounts for mental causation, could be compatible with a Christianity based on a moral God.

The philosophical significance of mental causation goes beyond general concerns about the nature of mind. Some philosophers... insist that the very notion of psychological explanation turns on the intelligibility of mental causation. If your mind and its states, such as your beliefs and desires, were causally isolated from your bodily behavior, then what goes on in your mind could not explain what you do....

If psychological explanation goes, so do the closely related notions of agency and moral responsibility.... If your body's behavior is not explained by your mind's activities—its deliberations, decisions, and the like—what sense could it make to hold you responsible for what your body does? You would appear to be a mere passive observer of your body's activities. Such a picture would apparently require abandoning ... our “reactive attitudes”, the moral attitudes and feelings (e.g., gratitude, resentment) so central to our interpersonal lives. (Robb, D. and Heil, J. 2008).

Therefore, Christians would assume that mental causation is real, and that it may be an emergent entity from complex physical systems. And furthermore, God can interact with the universe through mental activity anywhere in the universe such conscious entities have emerged. The difference between natural morality and the empire of God outlined in the previous sections would be an example of God interacting with the universe through mental causation.

The Empire of God and memes. Finally, consequentialism and the agape love of the Empire of God can be considered a meme—a mental replicator that consist of tunes, ideas, catch-phrases, clothes fashions, ways of making pots or ways of building arches. Just as genes

propagate themselves in the gene pool by leaping from body to body via sperm or eggs, so memes propagate themselves in the meme pool by leaping from brain to brain via a process which, in the broad sense, can be called imitation. ... As my colleague N.K. Humphrey neatly summed up an earlier draft of this chapter: ‘ ... When you plant a fertile meme in my mind you literally parasitize my brain, turning it into a vehicle for the meme’s propagation in just the way a virus may parasitize the genetic mechanism of a host cell. And this isn’t just a way of talking—the meme for, say, “belief in life after death” is actually realized physically, millions of times over, as a structure in the nervous systems of individual men the world over.’” (Dawkins, 1989, 192).

This is one of the best descriptions of mental causation I have ever read; it even includes a description of the way ideas interact with the physical world: ideas change “the structure of the nervous system”, not the other way around. This is a point of view a strict Physicalist could never agree with.

In any case, the morality of Jesus’ Empire of God can be considered a meme, a fertile idea that once implanted in the brain can change the physical world.

SUMMARY

Christians who follow a historical Jesus and the morality of the Empire of God can abandon the notion of a supernatural, omnipotent, creator God. The moral God who values agape love described by Jesus would probably not have created a universe that produces sentient beings with an egoistic morality anyway.

If there is such a thing as memes and mental causation, if ideas and intent can change the physical world, then an assertion by Christians that their God interacts with the physical universe through mental processes with rational, conscious, physical beings with a moral sense seems plausible at least. That the morality of this God is so different from the egoistic morality we are born with makes the idea even more compelling.

Richard Dawkins (2006), in his chapter on The “Good” Book and the Changing Moral *Zeitgeist*, describes moral progress and shows how the Bible has often described with approbation what many modern people consider to be immoral and offensive.⁷ Leaving aside the question “how do we know what moral progress is?”, Dawkins cites things such as outlawing slavery, accepting racial and sexual equality, and an increased understanding that we share a common humanity.

Some of us lag behind the advancing wave of the changing moral *Zeitgeist* and some of us are slightly ahead. But most of us in the twenty-first century are bunched together and way ahead of our counterparts in the middle ages, or in the time of Abraham, or even as recently as the 1920’s.(Dawkins, 2006, 270-271).
And,

⁷ Many Christians would agree with that assessment, including Dawkin’s belief that Jesus “was surely one of the great ethical innovators of history”.

Whatever its cause, the manifest phenomenon of Zeitgeist progression is more than enough to undermine the claim that we need God in order to be good, or to decide what is good. (Dawkins, 2006, 272)

Instead of moral *Zeitgeist*, most Christians would attribute the phenomenon of moral progression to the *Heilige Geist* and disagree with the conclusion that we don't need a God to describe what is morally good.

References

- Alexander, L and M. Moore. 2008. "Deontological Ethics", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition)*, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/ethics-deontological/>.
- Appiah, K.A. 2008. *Experiments in Ethics*. Cambridge, MA. Harvard University Press.
- Badhwar, N.K. 2003. "Love". In *Practical Ethics*, ed. H. LaFollette, 42–69. Oxford U.K.: Oxford University Press.
- Baird, H.S. 1980. "Current Trends in College Cheating." *Psychology in Schools* 17: 515-522.
- Barbour, I. 2008. "Remembering Aurthur Peacocke: A Personal Reflection." *Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science* 43: 89-102.
- Bloom, H. 2005. *Jesus and Yahweh, the Names Devine*. New York: Riverhead Books.
- Boone, J. 2003. "More Status or More Children? Social Status, Fertility Reduction, and Long-Term Fitness." *Evolution & Human Behavior* 20: 145-180.
- Bramucci, R.S. 2003. "Incidence and Prevalence of Cheating." http://teachopolis.org/justice/cheating/cheating_incidence.htm.
- Browning, D. 2008. "Love as Sacrifice, Love as Mutuality: Response to Jeffrey Tillman". *Zygon: Journal of Science and Religion* 43: 557-562.
- Clayton, P. 2008. "Hierarchies: the Core Argument for a Naturalistic Christian Faith." *Zygon: Journal of Science and Religion* 43: 27-42.
- Crossan, J.D. 1991. *The Historical Jesus, the Life of a Mediterranean Jewish Peasant*. 1991, New York: HarperCollins.
- _____. 1995. *Jesus, a Revolutionary Biography*. New York: HarperCollins.
- Davis, S.F., C.A. Grover, A.H. Becker and L.N. McGregor. 1992. "Academic Dishonesty: Prevalence, Determinants, Techniques, and Punishment." *Teaching of Psychology* 19: 16-20.
- Davis, H.S. and H.W. Ludvigson. 1995. "Additional data on academic dishonesty and a proposal for remediation." *Faculty Forum* 22: 119-120.
- Dawkins, R. 1989. *The Selfish Gene*. 2nd edition (paperback). Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press.
- _____. 2006. *The God Delusion*. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company.
- de Wall, F.B.M. and J.J. Pokorny 1995. Primate conflict and its relation to human forgiveness. In *Handbook of Forgiveness*, ed. E.L. Worthington, 17-32. New York: Routledge.
- Ehrman, B. 2005. *Misquoting Jesus*. New York: HarperCollins.
- Farb, P. and G. Armelagos. 1980. *Consuming Passions: The Anthropology of Eating*. Boston, MA.: Houghton Mifflin.

- Ferreira, M.J. 2001. *Love's Grateful Striving: A Commentary on Kierkegaard's Works of Love*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Fisher, H. 2004. *Why we Love*. New York: Henry Holt.
- Furnish, V.P. 1972. *The Love Command in the New Testament*. Nashville, TN.: Abingdon Press.
- Ghiselin, M. 1974. *The Economy of Nature and the Evolution of Sex*. Berkeley, CA.: University of California Press.
- Haidt, J. 2006. *The Happiness Hypothesis*. New York: Basic Books.
- Haidt, J. and F. Bjorklund, 2006. "Social intuitionists answer six questions about morality". <http://www.faculty.virginia.edu/haidtlab/articles/haidt.bjorklund.social-intuitionists-answer-6-questions.doc>
- Haidt, J. and F. Bjorklund, 2007. "Social intuitionists answer six questions about morality". In *Moral psychology, Vol. 2: The cognitive science of morality*, ed. W. Sinnott-Armstrong, 181-217. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Hamilton, W.D. 1963. "The Evolution of Altruistic Behavior." *American Naturalist* 97: 354-356
- Haught, J.F. 2003. *Deeper than Darwin*. Boulder, CO.: Westview Press.
- Hauser, M.D. 2006. *Moral Minds*. New York: HarperCollins.
- Helm, B. 2005. "Love." *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2005 Edition)*, ed. Edward N. Zalta, URL = <<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2005/entries/love/>>.
- Herzog, W.R. 2000. *Jesus, Justice and the Reign of God*. Louisville, KY. Westminster John Knox Press.
- Horgan, T. 2007. "Mental Causation and the Agent-Exclusion Problem", *Erkenntnis* 67: 183-200.
- Hurley, S and M. Nudds. 2006. "The Questions of Animal Rationality: Theory and Evidence". In *Rational Animals?*, eds S. Hurley and M. Nudds, 1-83. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Jacklen, A. 2008. "An Intellectually Honest Theology." *Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science* 43: 43-56.
- JayOord, T. 2005. "The Love Racket: Defining Love and Agape for the Love-and-Science Research Program." *Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science* 40: 919-938
- Jesus Seminar. 1999. *The Gospel of Jesus: According to the Jesus Seminar*. Polebridge Press (Macmillan).
- Kaplan, H.S. and J.B. Lancaster. 2003. "An Evolutionary and Ecological Analysis of Human Fertility, Mating Patterns, and Parental Investment." In *Offspring: Human Fertility Behavior in Biodemographic Perspective*, eds. K. W. Wachter and R. A. Bulatao. Committee on Population, National Research Council. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. 192-194.
- Kierkegaard, S. 1995. *Works of Love*. Translated by H.V. Hong and E. H. Hong. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Klosinski, L. E. 1988. *The Meals in Mark*. Ann Arbor, MI.: University Microfilms.
- Krishek, S., 2008. "The Problem of Preferential Love in Kierkegaard's *Works of Love*". *Journal of Religious Ethics* 36: 595-617.
- Lampert, A. 1997. *The Evolution of Love*. Westport, CT.: Praeger.
- Lenski, G.E. 1966. *Power and Privilege: A Theory of Social Stratification*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Levine, A.-J. 2006. *The Misunderstood Jew*. San Francisco: Harper Collins.
- Levine, D.S. and L.I. Perlovsky, 2008. Simplifying heuristics versus Careful Thinking: Scientific Analysis of Millennial Spiritual Issues. *Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science* 43: 797-822.

- Lewis, C.S. 1960. *The Four Loves*. New York: Harcourt, Brace.
- McCullough, M.E. 2008. *Beyond Revenge; the Evolution of the Forgiveness Instinct*. San Francisco: Josey-Bass.
- Mulder, M.B. 1998. "The demographic Transition: are we any closer to an evolutionary Explanation?" *Trends in Ecology & Evolution* 13: 266-270.
- Novak, D. 2008. "The Universality of Jewish Ethics; A Rejoinder to Secularist Critics." *Journal of Religious Ethics* 36: 181-211
- O'Connor, T. and H. Y. Wong, 2006. "Emergent Properties". In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2006 Edition)*, ed. Edward N. Zalta. URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2006/entries/properties-emergent/>.
- Outka, G. 1972. *Agape, an Ethical Analysis*. New Haven CT: Yale University Press.
- Outka, G. 1992. "Universal Love and Impartiality". In *The Love Commandments: Essays in Christian Ethics and Moral Philosophy*, ed. E.N. Santurri and W. Werpehowski, 6-91. Washington, D.C. Georgetown Univ. Press.
- Outka, G. 1996. "Theocentric Agape and the Self: An Assymetrical Affirmation in Response to Colin Grant's Either/Or". *Journal of Religious Ethics*, 24 (Spring): 34-41.
- Patterson, Stephen J. 1998. *The God of Jesus*. Harrisburg, PA.: Trinity Press International.
- Peacocke, A. 2007. "A Naturalistic Faith for the 21st Century: an essay in interpretation." In *All that is: A Naturalistic Faith for the 21st Century*, ed. Phillip Clayton, 3-56. Minneapolis: Fortress.
- Pettigrove, G. 2007. "Forgiveness and Interpretation." *Journal of Religious Ethics*, 35: 435
- Price, R.M. 2003. *The Incredible Shrinking Son of Man*. Amherst, NY.: Prometheus Books
- Rawls, J. 1971. *A theory of Justice*. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University press.
- _____. 2001. *Justice as Fairness*. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University press.
- Robb, D. and Heil, J. 2008. Mental Causation. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2008 Edition)*, ed. Edward N. Zalta, URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mental-causation/#DavRes>
- Rolston, H. 2004. "The Good Samaritan and His Genes." In *Evolution and Ethics*, eds. P. Clayton, and J. Schloss, 238-252. Grand Rapids: William B. Erdmans.
- Ruse, M. 2004. *Can a Darwinian be a Christian?* Paperback edition. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
- Sanders, E.P. 1995. *The Historical Figure of Jesus*, New York: Penguin Books
- Schaab, G. 2008. "Evolutionary Theory and Theology: A Mutually Illuminative Dialogue". *Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science*, 43: 9-18
- Shaver, R. 2002. "Egoism", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2002 Edition)*, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/egoism/>
- Skirbekk, V. 2008. "Fertility Trends by Social Status." *Demographic Research* 18: 145-180 (<http://www.demographic-research.org/Volumes/Vol18/5/>).
- Skyrms, B. 1996. *Evolution of the Social Contract*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
- _____. 2004. *The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
- Sober, E. and D.S. Wilson. 1999. *Unto Others*. Paperback edition. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press.
- Stoljar, D. 2001. "Physicalism", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2001 Edition)*, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/#1>.

- Swinburne, R. 1996. *Is There a God?* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Tancredi, L.R., 2005. *Hardwired Behavior: What Neuroscience Reveals about Morality*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Tillman, J.J. 2008. *Sacrificial Agape and Group Selection in Contemporary American Christianity*. *Zygon* 43: 541-556.
- Trivers, R.L. 1971. The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism. *Quarterly Review of Biology* 46: 35-57.
- Wikipedia. 2008. "Rules by which Early Jewish Law was Derived".
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Halakhah#Rules_by_which_early_Jewish_law_was_derived.
- Wilson, D.S. and E.O. Wilson. 2007. Rethinking the Theoretical Foundation of Sociobiology. *Quarterly Review of Biology* 82: 327-348

Published by the Forum on Public Policy

Copyright © The Forum on Public Policy. All Rights Reserved. 2009.