

VALUES ACQUISITION AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT: AN
INTEGRATION OF FREUDIAN, ERIKSONIAN, KOHLBERGIAN AND
GILLIGANIAN VIEWPOINTS

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INTRODUCTION

Consider the following important questions: Should values be transmitted or developed? As children grow up, what, if anything, should change in values acquisition? How important are locus of control issues in moral development? and Why might process versus product elements be crucial in the development of values? One key element missing in the values literature is a model that integrates major theoretical viewpoints and has the potential to guide teachers, parents, and others who work with children and adolescents. This paper will offer a synthesis of the theories offered by Sigmund Freud (personality elements of the id, ego, and superego), Erik Erikson (identity formation), Lawrence Kohlberg (moral development), and Carol Gilligan (female versus male moral development) in order to explain how values are acquired and maintained, moral decisions are made, and mental health is established and perpetuated. This two-stage model will highlight how the powerful socialization process initially claims a powerful influence upon children and then around adolescence an entirely new cognitive developmental moral decision-making process is theoretically available to be used to sustain the individual throughout adulthood. It is crucial to understand that this new state is not inevitable or guaranteed in any way, since many adults continue to function upon values established during childhood with little or no reflection upon or modification of these values.

The psychological topics of values and moral development in children as they grow into adulthood have long captured the interest of parents, educators, religious leaders, politicians, youth group workers, and concerned citizens. Such topics have attracted the serious interest of prominent theorists, researchers, scholars, and practitioners. Lapsley (1996) suggested that "the study of moral functioning has been one of the most enduring and central of all the various research enterprises to be found within the scholarly psychological literature" (p.xiii). Wynne (1986) suggested that "the transmission of moral values has been the dominant educational concern of most cultures throughout

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history” (p.4). More recently, the escalation of school violence in America has caused many to suggest that young people are suffering from problems of character (see Smagorinsky & Taxel, 2005).

This paper will take the seemingly disparate theoretical perspectives of Sigmund Freud, Erik Erikson, Lawrence Kohlberg, and Carol Gilligan on the topic of moral development and offer a two-stage theoretical model that incorporates key ideas from all of these viewpoints. The proposed model employs existing research findings in the clinical, quantitative, and qualitative research of Freud, Erikson, Kohlberg, Gilligan, and others in an attempt to find concordance rather than distinctiveness in these viewpoints.

Briefly stated the theory looks like this: Stage 1 (transmission approach to values) begins at birth, extends through childhood, and focuses upon socialization within the contexts of home, school, and society. and Stage 2 (developmental approach to values) is first readily and fully accessible around adolescence and extends on into adulthood and focuses upon cognition and individuation. The author will offer theoretical evidence for this two-stage theory and behavioral examples that will demonstrate why such a paradigm demands a profound change in teaching and imparting human values. This approach to understanding values and moral development has important implications for teachers, parents, and others who work with children and adolescents.

It is important at the onset to understand the complex inter-relationship that exists between values and moral development in American society. Some values such as taste in music, food, or clothing style are often thought to be a personal choice in a free society where differences can be accepted or even appreciated. These are in stark contrast to more universal values such as honesty, respect for property and the law, compassion, loyalty, contributing to society, etc. that are so crucial to living in a democracy. Kohlberg (1975) suggested that while cheating is a moral issue in school—tidiness in schoolwork is a value, but not a moral value. While this example may highlight the bi-polar extremes here, it is also important to recognize that many of the subjectively chosen values such as music, food choices, or attire are used by some as outward signs of deeper, hidden values that do have a moral basis. For example, consider today how profiling leads us to be suspicious of one’s patriotism and benign intentions if a person is dressed in traditional Middle Eastern garb. Is a behavioral rule in the classroom or home unfair or unjustified? It is in this light where the lines between morals and values so often blur that I wish to merge together so much written and researched on the topics of moral and values development while knowing full well that focusing on different value/moral elements might lead to different conclusions and insights.

VALUES/MORAL HISTORICAL BENCHMARKS

A few benchmarks in the historical development of values and moral development will be offered to the reader in order to set the stage for the integrative model proposed by this paper. The author readily acknowledges that this is not an extensive nor formal in-depth review of these psychological topics, since such work is well beyond the length available for such a treatment in this paper. Readers should be forewarned that while philosophy offers valuable insights to this topic, this paper will primarily focus on psychological contributions to values development. The following perspectives highlight the theoretical and philosophical depth and breadth that exists among several prominent thinkers on the topics of values and moral development.

Over 70 years ago, John Dewey (1933) reminded us that even when moral education is not explicitly taught in the classroom, the school setting offers a moral milieu he referred to as the "hidden curriculum." Dewey (1964) suggested that: "The aim of education is growth or *development*, both intellectual and moral. Ethical and psychological principles can aid the school in the *greatest of all constructions—the building of a free and powerful character* (p.197). As an outgrowth of such thinking, Dewey postulated three distinct levels of moral development: 1) pre-moral, 2) conventional (accepting group standards with little personal reflection), and 3) autonomous (where "conduct is guided by the individual thinking and judging for himself whether a purpose is good, and does not accept the standard of the group without reflection" (p.38).

Jean Piaget (1932/1965) proposed a two-stage theory of moral development in addition to his more well-known four-stage theory of cognitive development. Piaget's first stage (called moral realism, morality of constraint, or heteronomous morality) suggested that the young child views rules as sacred and unalterable structures and egocentrically believes others view such rules in the same way. There is a tendency for the child to judge actions here based upon the magnitude of consequences for such actions. In Piaget's second stage (moral relativism, morality of cooperation, autonomous morality) that coincides with early adolescence, rules are viewed as being important, but also open to modifications based upon intentionality, consequences, and situational variables. The older child now possesses more advanced cognitive skills and is capable of placing himself/herself in the role of another person that results in a distinctive viewing point unavailable earlier in development. Personal change is encouraged through cognitive disequilibrium that challenges our existing mental beliefs. In theory, such a mental state motivates us toward crisis resolution through eventually establishing cognitive equilibrium where modified schema allow us to more accurately and effectively act the world (Inhelder & Piaget, 1955/1958).

Values clarification approaches have also had a significant influence on the field of moral/values development (Simon, Howe, & Kirschenbaum, 1972; Kirschenbaum, 1977). This non-indoctrination approach offered rational/ethical/value

dilemmas that were relatively brief for classroom use. The primary goal was to create cognitive disequilibrium whereby students would question their own values, judgments, and behavioral actions. It was assumed that the engaging nature of the dilemmas allowed students to project themselves into the scenes and these situations were realistic dilemmas that students might one day face in life. Such classroom exercises were hoped to lead to a greater student awareness of values, moral judgments, and actions while promoting the view that oftentimes there would be no “right” or “correct” solution to these dilemmas. Often this led to relativistic thinking through the assumption that people could hold different values and thus might think and act differently in the same circumstance.

Wynne (1986) offered the suggestion that "on the whole, school is and should and must be inherently indoctrinative" (p.9), since "without effective moral formation the human propensity for selfishness-or simply the advancement of self-interest-can destructively affect adult institutions" (p.5). He spoke of the need for the deliberate transmission of moral values through the "Great Tradition in Education" in terms of such learning tools as the Ten Commandments. Wynne (1986) suggested that children must learn a certain body of “doctrine” to function on a day-to-day basis in society and “it is ridiculous to believe children are capable of objectively assessing most of the beliefs and values they must absorb to be effective adults” (p.9). Here we have a system where good moral conduct acts need to be rewarded, wrongful conduct acts need to be punished, and life only “occasionally generates dilemmas” (p.7).

Former Secretary of Education, William Bennett (1993), a proponent of character education, suggested that “unlike courses in moral reasoning this approach employs stories, poems, essays, and other writings that illustrate right and wrong and good and bad” (p.11). Virtues and vices are presented to the student for comparison and contrast and Bennett emphasized that education involves "the training of heart and mind toward the good" (p.11). His literary examples draw heavily upon historical examples and deal with value-laden topics such as honesty, compassion, courage, work, perseverance, faith, loyalty, friendship, responsibility, and self-discipline. Well worth noting here is that values need to be directly transmitted to children, adolescents, and adults and such values seem rarely to come into conflict in our daily lives.

The nexus for me to organize my thinking more deeply on this topic was the thought provoking topical question: "Should values be developed rather than transmitted?" contained in the book *Taking Sides: Clashing Views on Controversial Educational Issues* (Noll, 1993). The exploration of this crucial issue over several years led to an article that outlined the bipolar distinctions and developmental sequencing of the transmission and developmental approaches to values acquisition (Herman, 1997). Healthy values acquisition moves from infancy to childhood where conditioning, social learning, and unconscious processes have much more powerful influences than the cognitive abilities that are still under developmental construction. The child also

gradually adopts more than a familial view through exposure to school and social situations. In adolescence and adulthood, it is cognitive-developmental approach that holds the potential to override and re-shape the values previously incorporated into the personality of the child. The current paper attempts to further advance this integrative model; clarify the theoretical connections in the works of Sigmund Freud, Erik Erikson, Lawrence Kohlberg, and Carol Gilligan; and offer a two-stage personality theory model of values and moral development.

FREUD'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO MORAL DEVELOPMENT

It should not surprise us that when considering the connections between psychoanalytic theory and moral/values development readers immediately think of Sigmund Freud's superego element of the personality. Freud (1933/1965) suggested that conscience and morality were embodied in the superego dimension of the human personality as a result of "identification-that is to say, the assimilation of one ego to another, as a result of which the first ego behaves like the second in certain respects, imitates it and in a sense takes it up into itself" (p.63). Nye (1981) clarified this process in an example of a boy's identification with his father by suggesting that "This means that he incorporates his father's values and standards within himself" (p.23) and this also provides a social function in that familial and cultural norms are passed on from one generation to another through this process. In a similar way, a young girl might unconsciously incorporate her mother's value system. Note that identification employs powerful unconscious processes.

In adolescence and even later in adulthood we sometimes find more of our parents in our heads and behaviors than we had earlier come to realize. The realization that we are not exactly the person we had previously come to know (unconscious processes are at work here) can be a shocking and disconcerting discovery. Hope for the future rests in the possibility of becoming more than we currently are and more like we consciously wish to be at this pivotal point in the lifespan. Only by finding which artifacts (identifications) of childhood hold personal meaning can we hope for a reorganized personality at adolescence to successfully confront adulthood.

Less obvious for some readers is the Freudian importance of the ego personality structure in cognitive moral judgment functioning and values acquisition.. Allen (2000) reminded us that the ego has the capacity to delay satisfaction of the id's demands until an appropriate object is found that will allow gratification without harmful side effects" (p.24) and this is accomplished through secondary (more conscious than unconscious) process including intellectual functioning such as thinking, evaluation, planning, and decision making. The addition of this more cognitive, conscious, and flexible mechanism for making moral judgments more fully represents Freud's reality-oriented (ego) arm of the human personality and the crucial relationship between ego and superego functioning.

It is unfortunate that the full richness and complexity of Freud's personality theory is not more fully appreciated. For example, note the lack of any mention of ego functioning by the following writers. Lapsley (1996) suggested that in the psychoanalytic view "moral motivation springs from unconscious guilt or from a desire to avoid the harsh actions of the punitive superego" (p.55). Kohlberg (1970) highlighted alternative theoretical moral teaching and learning viewpoints when he proposed that "a Skinnerian will speak of proper schedules of reinforcement, a Freudian will speak of the importance of the balance (1957). The oversimplification of Freudian theory (often done for highlighting/advancing contrasting viewpoints) has led to some confusion regarding these ideas. Psychoanalytic theory therefore offers us dual components of moral development: 1) superego (where the harsh and rigid set of expectations guide us in terms of unconscious childhood identifications) and 2) ego (where cognitive flexibility and problem solving can lead to wrestling with moral issues in a logical or defensive manner and counterbalancing the id drives and the societal restraints of the superego).

A Neo-Freudian (Blos, 1962; 1967; 1979) highlighted two important themes in adolescent development: 1) de-idealization of the parent and 2) individuation (where a person strives to become a distinct individual). Peter Blos (1979) proposed that "Individuation implies that the growing person takes increasing responsibility for what he does and what he is, rather than depositing this responsibility on the shoulders of those under whose influence and tutelage he has grown up" (p.148). The adolescent developmental task of individuation sets the stage for a discussion of the well known and important work of Erik Erikson on identity formation.

ERIKSON'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO MORAL DEVELOPMENT

Equally unclear in the general professional literature are the ideas of Erik Erikson regarding the process of identity formation. Josselson (1980) seemed to concur when she stated "Erikson's concept of ego identity has been widely misused and misunderstood" (p.202). One common limitation is the tendency to oversimplify the concept of identity in the quest to answer questions such as: "Who am I?" "Where am I going in life?" and "Who do I wish to become?" While such a view of identity might be a worthy intellectual connection for novice readers, it is only a beginning and hardly sufficient for more critical readers who desire to grasp more fully what Erikson had in mind when he wrote about identity formation. Fortunately, we can easily delve into primary sources to solve this problem and more deeply understand Erikson's ideas.

When an adolescent is confronting the personal crisis element of identity formation he/she is asking questions like those stated earlier—"Who am I?" Such a crisis element extends over a considerable period of time and demands reflection, analytical thinking, and an awareness of cultural alternatives. As a psychoanalyst, Erikson (1964) proposed that "identity ...is not the sum of childhood identifications, but rather a new combination of old

and new identification fragments" (p.90). In another source, Erikson (1963) clarified the process elements by stating that ego identity "is the accrued experience of the ego's ability to integrate all identifications with the vicissitudes of the libido, with the aptitudes developed out of endowment, and with the opportunities offered in social roles" (p.261).

Identity is therefore often more of a process than an end-product, since Erikson (1959) stated, "A sense of identity is never gained nor maintained once and for all" (p.118). The commitment elements can be seen in decisions made regarding career, relationships with significant others, religious practices, acting on values, etc. As anyone who works with adolescents knows, the human personality is flexible and this is a period of the lifespan where exploration can lead to sudden and rapid changes in commitments and new personal crisis events. Healthy identity formation is also best thought of as an integrative process as can be seen by the following statement: "Identity means an integration of all previous identifications and self-images, including negative ones" (Erikson quoted in Evans, 1976, p.297). Fidelity is one of the primary goals during the adolescent period where "the opportunity to fulfill personal potentialities ...in a context which permits the young person to be true to himself and true to significant others...[and to] sustain loyalties ...in spite of inevitable contradictions of value systems" (Erikson, 1968, p.290) promotes ego identity formation. Erikson (1970) also wrote more specifically on the topic of moral development and identity formation:

Adolescence has always been seen as an interim stage with an alternately invigorating and confusing sense of an over defined past that must be left behind and of a future as yet to be identified—and identified with....A majority of young people, then see no reason to question 'the system' seriously, if only because they have never visualized another. (p.12) The identity process was clarified by Erikson (1970) when he suggested the importance of "reviving and recapitulating the fragmentary experiences of childhood for the sake of recombining them actively in a new wholeness or experience. Such unification must obviously count on the workings of the ego" (p.16). Adolescence then ideally becomes a life-review or reflective point in time where the individual can to some degree critically examine past learning and re-shape oneself before entry into adulthood. It is equally important to note that Erikson recognized that many youth would derive great comfort in their childhood identifications and be unmotivated to take the risks needed to re-invent themselves at this point in the lifespan.

KOHLBERG'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO MORAL DEVELOPMENT

Lawrence Kohlberg (1975) offers an excellent summary of his cognitive-developmental moral stage theory (3 levels and 6 stages) where moral dilemmas were used to research this topic and could be employed to elevate moral reasoning. His most advanced and idealistic universal ethical principle stage (Stage 6) included allowing personal conscience and cognitively

sophisticated abstract principles to guide moral behavior. The problem of moral behavior not always matching moral reasoning offers us a clue that other internal processes and external contextual issues might be at work. Kohlberg suggested that in childhood moral reasoning was situational and based upon rewards and punishments while later a justice and legal emphasis was found based upon a more mature cognitive skills and an internalized moral standard.

One key to understanding Kohlberg's theory is to understand that he focused upon dilemmas that involve a moral choice: "choosing between two (or more) of these values as they *conflict* in concrete situations of choice" (1975, p.672). His contention appears to be that such events in life are pervasive, stress producing, and crucial benchmarks in living healthy lives.

Kohlberg (1975) suggested that his cognitive developmental approach was not indoctrinative and that changes could occur in reasoning rather than beliefs. He also contrasted his view with values clarification approaches that offer students no "right" answers. Links between moral development and participating in a democracy as originating from Dewey's earlier work and the influence of Piaget on Kohlberg's theory are both well documented.

GILLIGAN'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO MORAL DEVELOPMENT

Carol Gilligan (1982) offered a critique of Freud, Piaget, Erikson, and Kohlberg based upon a masculine bias in these viewpoints and proposed that gender identity for males is tied to separation and individuation while gender identity for females is tied to attachment and intimacy. The underlying premise is that males and females grow up in a gender stereotyped society where boys are taught to value independence, assertiveness, achievement, and individuation while girls are taught to value connectedness, caring, sensitiveness, and the concern for others (Kaplan, 2004). Gilligan (1982) clarified that "The different voice I describe is characterized not by gender but theme" (p.2). Unfortunately, many have found it tempting to view Gilligan's work as a distinctive and alternative view to Kohlberg's theory.

Extreme caution is urged here, since Gilligan and Attanucci (1988) summarized the gender issues in moral development as follows:

- (a) Concerns about both justice and care are represented in people's thinking about real-life dilemmas, but people tend to focus on one set of concerns and minimally represent the other. And
- (b) There is an association between moral orientation and gender such that men and women use both orientations, but Care Focus dilemmas are most likely to be presented by women and Justice Focus dilemmas by men (p. 223).

Lyons (1990) pointed out that stereotypical gender differences found in females being more caring and males more justice oriented means that these gender differences are not absolute and the two orientations are not mutually

exclusive. This idea is further supported when we juxtapose moral development with research on androgynous individuals where extreme versions of stereotypical masculine and feminine traits were not found to be as mentally healthy or flexible as androgynous women and men (see Bem, 1977; Stake, 2000). Healthy human beings need a moral repertoire whereby they can function in nurturing *or* justice-oriented modes to be most flexible and adaptive in life. The author of this paper views Gilligan's developmental sequence for male/female moral development as complementing and extending the work of Kohlberg rather than an alternative theoretical view.

A TWO-STAGE PRAGMATIC MODEL

How can the reader make sense of all the different approaches to values/moral development mentioned thus far? When so many prominent theorists and research findings lead us to a similar conclusion, a model that can synthesize and incorporate these views rather than attempt to pit one view against another seems long overdue. The ideas presented in this paper thus far lend themselves quite nicely to fitting into the following two-stage paradigm.

STAGE 1: SOCIAL TRANSMISSION APPROACH

Major Theorists/Proponents: (Wynne and Bennett [character education], Freud and Erikson [superego and childhood identifications], Bandura [modeling and social learning], Skinner [conditioning], Gilligan [gender role stereotypes]) Society (parents, teachers, etc.) has the first and therefore most powerful opportunity to influence the character of children. Several different psychological ideas discussed so far might be at work here such as imitation, modeling, identification (recall this is unconscious), rewarding rule following, punishing rule breaking, etc. This external locus of control process of socialization offers children simplistic guidance in terms of what to do and what not to do. As the child later grows more cognitively mature the explanation for why such rules exist also seems important, but this approach virtually ignores such an emphasis. Kirschenbaum (1992), an early proponent of the values clarification approach, alluded to a dual system of values acquisition when he stated "the traditional approaches of inculcating and modeling values always were, and always will be, the predominant means of values education" (p.772).

The social-cognitive approach of Albert Bandura (1977, 1986) offers us a clue to the transmission processes at work during modeling or observational learning. For example, the observation of a father's aggressive behavior and fighting amongst peers might encourage a young boy to act aggressively. A young girl might play with dolls and observe her caring mother resulting in later nurturing acts. Such environmental influences are similar to those important factors considered by behaviorists such as Skinner, but the social

cognitive approach also adds personal cognitive factors to the equation that will be covered in the next section.

B.F. Skinner (1948) provided us with keen insights related to the behavioral conditioning and external locus of control power of society:

Each of us has interests which conflict with the interests of everybody else. That's our original sin, and it can't be helped. Now, "everybody else" we call "society." It's a powerful opponent, and it always wins. Oh, here and there an individual prevails for a while and gets what he wants. Sometimes he storms the culture of a society and changes it slightly to his own advantage. But society wins in the long run, for it has the advantage of numbers and age. Many prevail against one, and men against a baby. Society attacks early, when the individual is helpless. It enslaves him almost before he has tasted freedom. (p.104).

The transmission approach hedonistically strives to keep tradition and links with the past intact in a self-serving way to perpetuate its own influence through the superego. Process features are considered far less important than the end product outcomes. The principle of the end justifying the means can be seen in this indoctrination approach. It seeks adherence to the behavioral and moral end product without consideration of the motivational reasons for compliance. The slow and constant building of internal cognitive control mechanisms is seen as a societal threat in terms of disrespect for the past and a fear that the societal value system might be replaced. The questioning of the relevancy or applicability of rules is met with disdain and guilt is one primary weapon used to keep an individual's behavior under proper social control. It rejects relativism (right and wrong are not always clear due to contextual circumstances or competing values) and instead opts for absolutism on the basis that personal cognitions threaten its influential power and a fear of being superseded by an alternative or competing value system.

Values acquisition by way of the transmission approach provides a necessary, but not sufficient condition for mental health. It is entirely possible that a person might not move on to the developmental values approach during the life-span. Marcia (1980) captured the essence of this circumstance in his description of foreclosure individuals who "are committed to occupational and ideological positions that are parentally chosen rather than self chosen" (p. 161). Mental health requires the ability to recreate these conscious/unconscious lessons of childhood for the cognitive/emotional scrutiny of a more advanced and sophisticated process.

Gender roles (what it means to be male and female) are socialized ideals transmitted to vulnerable children when they first learn what gender they are and that this fact is irreversible. Lupetow, Garovich-Szabo, and Lupetow (2001) in a meta-analysis of many previous studies presented findings that for the years between 1974 and 1997 gender stereotypes "are not decreasing, if anything they are intensifying" (p.23). Such results downplay the impact of the

sociocultural change model and more strongly support an evolutionary model of sex-dimorphism resulting from biological predispositions. It seems most important to note that for the model proposed in this paper sex typing is still powerfully transmitted perhaps through a complex interaction of biological and sociocultural factors.

STAGE 2: COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH

Major Theorists/Proponents: (Dewey, Piaget, Bandura [self-efficacy], Kirschenbaum [values clarification], Freud [ego strength], Erikson [ego identity formation], Blos [individuation], Kohlberg, and Gilligan)

The process of individuation is seen as one way to conceptualize the adolescent striving for individual uniqueness, self-control, self-responsibility, and finding one's own way in life. Such adult maturity demands ego strength and dramatic changes in confronting life as compared with childhood experiences. A parallel psychoanalytic interpretation of such a transition can be seen in Erikson's theory where the adolescent is striving for ego identity through primarily the use of conscious integration of childhood identifications into a new view of self and the world.

Around adolescence the individual is first capable of conducting a reflective examination of his/her childhood learning in the values, beliefs, and morals domain. New cognitive skills such as those described by Piaget and others and well over a decade of social experiences in and out of the family setting set the stage for this life-review process. Since some values are transmitted through unconscious (primary) processes, it is likely that getting a handle on this transmitted value content can be very difficult. Of course, values which have been transmitted, but cannot be dredged up for analysis maintain a behavioral grip on us and make it theoretically impossible to understand or modify. Any attempt to accomplish this task must rely upon making the unconscious conscious, reflection, thinking, and conscious (secondary) integrative processes.

One approach that holds reflective promise has emerged from family therapy in the form of having youth and adults create a detailed list of rituals, myths, and customs from their family of origin (see Wolin, Bennett, & Noonan, 1976; Wamboldt & Wolin, 1988). This process leads a person to write down in some detail his/her family rituals (topics might include issues of membership, boundaries, habits, gender roles, and positions) and influential myths (stories, legends, and folk tales) whereby transmitted values can be more deeply explored and understood. Hints of unconscious processes at work here are reflected in participants sometimes saying something like: "I don't why as middle-aged male I still need to make my bed so perfectly...with hospital corners every morning before I leave the house for work...Wait a minute, my father was a sergeant in the Army, maybe that explains this!" Such "do's" and "don'ts" learned even in early childhood can offer keen insights into current as

well as past behaviors and open the door for personal analysis, possible modification, and future behavioral change.

This is a unique chance (perhaps theoretically not the only chance, but likely the most ideal chance) in the lifespan to re-build or re-shape your life around an internal locus of control model, if you are prepared for challenging risk taking and reflection upon the lessons you learned in childhood. It is like the transmitted values and belief systems that helped you survive childhood are now no longer sufficient for adulthood. One key ingredient is ownership of these values, since the fact that no child can choose his/her parents or family of origin means that childhood values are not self-chosen. While we have few real personal value choices in childhood, such choices and responsibilities in adulthood are dramatically expanded and even demanded. A solid foundation of family values offers the adolescent the chance to discover individual uniqueness (fidelity) while still maintaining connections to family heritage. This is obviously a delicate balance and it would be hypothesized that an unduly harsh upbringing might bring about the perceived need for greater autonomy (even an overreaction filled with overindulgence) and a too lax upbringing (neglectful or indulgent) would offer few solid values to build upon. The authoritative parenting style where a balance between freedom and limits/rules as well as discussions of such issues are maintained in a warm and nurturing environment seems to promote self-reliance and social competence (see Baumrind, 1971, 1991).

Gender stereotypes might be transmitted through various biological and sociocultural means ranging from genetic predisposition to modeling to identification (remember that identifications are at least in part unconscious). The cognitive developmental approach suggests that human beings are capable of rising above these stereotypical views of what biology and society suggests that males and females “should” be like. Here an internal locus of control would have to reign over external control mechanisms already established. The idealistic result is a person that can transcend the stereotypes of what it means to be male or female and earlier sex typing in order to establish an androgynous gender-role identity. Such flexibility might allow human beings to use care-based reasoning to confront interpersonal dilemmas *and* justice-based reasoning to confront societal dilemmas. Pleck (1983) proposed the use of a gender-role transcendence approach where in competence situations an individual should be judged as a “person” and not on the basis of masculinity, femininity, or androgyny.

The developmental approach functions on the principle that internal and external control mechanisms can peacefully coexist with cognition as the central guiding force. It is integrative rather than adversarial in nature. Cognition is also the primary thoughtful mechanism that allows situational (contextual) variables to guide behavioral choices when basic rules of proper behavior are in conflict with each other. The process mechanisms are considered an important cognitive feature, since critical thinking holds the power to reinvent or redesign principles, values, and beliefs. Reasoning is

considered valuable and honored in its own right for its ability to be adaptive and integrative, understand related factors such as emotions, and allow for changes during the lifespan. The reasons or rationale we offer both in private self-talk and for public scrutiny are considered prominent features. This means that such an approach to values acquisition can manage a dual focus on process *and* end product. For example, such cognitive abilities can spot instances where individual (personal) values and group (socialized) values conflict and figure out a rationale for selecting one behavioral response over another or even how to creatively satisfy the demands of both value systems.

Bandura (1997) has employed the motivational construct of self-efficacy to describe competence in life situations. He defined self-efficacy as “beliefs in one’s capabilities to organize and execute the courses of action required to produce given attainments” (p.3). The cognitive elements of this construct can guide a person in becoming more confident in using his/her cognitive skills, integrating personal values, changing self viewpoints, and acting in ways congruent with such values. Most recently, Bandura (2004) has written about how the technology of communications has used modeling as a key vehicle for the diffusion of ideas, values, and styles of behavior, but also focused upon the self-directed and self-regulative cognitive processes that can counter such powerful social influences.

One common critique of Kohlberg was that he failed to adequately consider the societal influence on values development. The two-stage model described here helps us understand that Kohlberg was describing the “add-on” component that occurs primarily after the transmission approach has had its opportunity to inculcate values to the young. The developmental approach also allows for life-span developmental corrections (not only at adolescence), although such modifications will neither be easy or inevitable. At the micro-level individuals and at the macro-level societies might be able to employ the developmental process to reinvent themselves.

CASE INTERVIEW EXAMPLE

What does adolescent identity formation look like in a real person? How does this values struggle play out in the human personality? The various theoretical references presented thus far fail to capture how these warring values factions exist inside a human being. This section will attempt to bridge such a gap and offer pragmatic insights. The following quotations from a video-taped interview conducted by the author (Herman, 1986) will serve to illustrate several of the points developed so far. The original purpose of the interview was to demonstrate counseling techniques and so the approximately 22 year-old female Korean-American college student was invited to come to the campus television studio to speak about anything she wished. A revised title was selected, since Cecilia spoke primarily about family tensions and the difficulty she had in finding what she wanted to do with her life.

VIDEOTAPE TRANSCRIPT EXCERPTS

Cecilia: “There was an adjustment that I had to go through when I started college...before I started college and I guess you could say I’m still going through this right now...and that was knowing that I ran my life and not my parents or my grandparents or my family.”

Analytical Comments: Notice that Cecilia corrects herself with respect to when this adjustment began which was well before the start of her collegiate career. Ownership and boundary issues permeate this emotionally and intellectually based comment.

Cecilia: “Hey, these people are not living my life for me and I don’t want them to. But I’ve let them and it was a big adjustment for me to figure out: What do I want?... If I went along and did what they expected of me—I still wouldn’t know *me!*”

Analytical Comments: Cecilia continues to describe adolescent identity issues here and frames the problem around personal ownership versus parental control. She expresses the thoughtful realization that not confronting this crisis would mean the potential loss of identity. Note the awareness of choices here and the helplessness of childhood where we have no choice but to blindly allow our parents to make decisions for us. The risk associated with not asking “What do I want? is to never achieve self-discovery.

Cecilia: “Before [leaving home] I really didn’t have to do anything—everything was all thought-out for me. But now, I had to do the thinking and that there was a big adjustment.”

Analytical Comments: Here we see that decision making was not a part of Cecilia’s childhood circumstance, but now things have changed. At least at the naïve surface level, having someone make decisions for you allows you to escape the responsibility for decision making. Unfortunately, this also leaves Cecilia rather unprepared as a young adult when she must make her own responsible decisions without much practice in this domain.

Cecilia: “There’s a sort of a happiness that goes along with it—to know that I’m in control of my own life!”

Analytical Comments: Cecilia demonstrates how taking charge of her life has brought her personal fulfillment and happiness. She also demonstrates a sense of pride in her struggle and accomplishments. A sense of fidelity is established when Cecilia knows she must accept the challenge and be true to herself in order to control her own life.

Cecilia: “Well, being the oldest, I was more or less like-- a mother to my younger brothers....As I got older too, I just realized: I’m doing my mom’s job! Or They’re not doing their job!... Before my parents were more or less gods!— they told everyone what to do, but the person...well, the person couldn’t question or ask as to why or have a different opinion.”

Analytical Comments: Note that the discovery of what should be reasonably expected from a daughter comes at adolescence and not during childhood. Her more advanced cognitive capacity and richer social experiences help Cecilia make this discovery. It is as if the child lacks the capacity to understand the powerlessness of childhood, but this insight emerges more clearly in adolescence and resentment can occur as a result. A childhood identification might be revealed here when she readily accepted the care-giving role of caring for her brothers in later childhood without questioning its appropriateness as she is doing now later in adolescence.

Cecilia: “I became so involved with my brothers, whatever happened to them happened to me. I became a nobody. I was everybody else but me.... I had no time to think about what I wanted. I was just so filled with a sense of duty and responsibility that I didn’t have time to stop and think about What do I want? When I did finally get around to thinking: What do I want to do? I thought that was sort of a selfish question.”

Analytical Comments: Cecilia seems to describe a loss of personhood here—she is a person who has been cut-off from her true self. The sense of duty and responsibility are values that have been deeply etched into her personality (perhaps through childhood identifications). Guilt seems to emerge when she begins to ask deeper questions about her own future and search for her identity.

Cecilia’s reference to parents: “As much as I love them, I don’t want to be like them.”

Analytical Comments: Note the emotional tone of anger that results in a wish to reject all the characteristics of her parents. Love seems to survive this acid test when it might be expected that anger would give way to hate. At least hate does not seem to emerge at the conscious level here. Cecilia also demonstrates the need for individuation here.

Cecilia: “I found out a lot of things about me that I never really knew. And sometimes it requires me to do some even more thinking. I can see that I have grown....And there were times when I just got so afraid of what might come or couldn’t work through a problem, that I just wanted them to run my life. And then I recall, we tried that once remember. I would rather work

through these difficulties myself than go back and have somebody run my life. That I realize is much easier—you don't have to think!"

Analytical Comments: Cecilia is able to reflect on the self discovery process here and realize that the process of asking deeper and deeper questions really never ends. Note the references to cognitive processes here in terms of thinking, recalling, and self-monitoring. She also offers insights into her fears that when times get tough it is tempting to return to the child-like situation where decisions will be made for you and you can escape responsibility. Cecilia demonstrates the courage to own her own life and realizes that the easiest way to survive life is not always the healthiest. The easier way to deal with life (by following parental wishes) describes foreclosure where commitment is possible without a personal crisis.

Cecilia: "This didn't happen overnight, it took years for me to finally realize this!"

Analytical Comments: When Cecilia reflects upon her identity formation, she knows that this has been a long and arduous task that will continue on into adulthood. Yet she seems convinced that this quest has been both necessary and worthwhile.

SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR PARENTS, EDUCATORS, AND OTHERS

What does this two-stage model mean for those who work with children and adolescents? How important are locus of control issues? Why might process versus product elements be so crucial? A few key points are identified here for the reader, but this is certainly not an exhaustive list of implications. Readers are encouraged to take the ideas presented here and seek additional ramifications based upon the theory and research referenced in this paper.

- Values and morals need to be effectively transmitted *and* developed in order for the individual to successfully confront the perplexing dilemmas in life and strive toward mental health.
- Self-control and self-monitoring is promoted best by the more cognitive developmental approach. This is where personal responsibility is promoted and internal cognitive control is able to monitor transmitted external control mechanisms (some of which have been internalized).
- Rules in the home and classroom are primarily transmitted at first to children. Discussions regarding why these rules are important, exceptions to the rules, and conflicts between rules are best dealt with through the cognitive developmental approach.

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- How much children should be involved in the construction of household or classroom rules would seem to rely upon the nature of the rule, cognitive maturity of the child, and willingness to pursue the developmental approach to values acquisition. Note that most of this becomes unnecessary if you are using a transmission approach to impart values.
- Self-discipline in adolescence is most easily attained when earlier childhood values have been established (good and bad behavior differentiated, rationale for judging good and bad outlined, and open communication [lack of defensiveness] promoted). Adolescence ideally allows for fine tuning the personal values system rather than needing to scrap so much of the childhood values (this might be difficult due to unconscious influences) and designing an entirely new values and belief system.
- Since the developmental approach depends upon the value content of what was laid down in the transmission approach, a weak transmission foundation provides the adolescent with less to work with in the vices and virtues domain during adolescence.
- The extent to which individuals need to individuate (separate) themselves from their transmitted values/beliefs might vary depending upon individual, familial, parental, gender, and social characteristics while striving to become a unique person. The extremes here of having too much attachment to parents or societal standards and the need for too much separation from parents or societal standards would seem problematic in this mentally healthy process. As Gilligan (1982) astutely noted: “Attachment and separation anchor the cycle of human life, describing the biology of human reproduction and the psychology of human development” (p. 151). Individuation empowers us as a change agent by giving us personal choices in order to resist being enslaved by adherence to sex-role stereotypes and other societal expectations.
- The transmission approach produces behavior that is highly influenced by whoever holds power or authority over the person at a particular moment in time. Authoritarian parents may revel in pleasure when their children obey their strict rules, but be seriously disappointed when such children fail to stand up for themselves when they encounter other authority figures in life.

CONCLUSIONS

My desire is that this paper might help the reader move toward a different conceptualization of values acquisition and moral development. As Herman (1997) suggested "we must pay attention to how, when, and why we choose to take a particular approach to promoting distinct values, in addition to which values we choose to impart" (p.154).

This paper has attempted to pay homage to several major theories and forge a two-stage model of values transmission and values development that might integrate major psychological theories into a practical paradigm that clarifies several key points in the values acquisition process. It is hoped that by taking the best ideas that psychological theory and research has to offer and finding connections instead of the often written about distinctions, new insights can result. Instead of juxtaposing and arguing about the preference for the transmission or development of values, this paper attempts to suggest that all the theories mentioned here have their rightful place in the big picture of promoting positive values and moral behavior among children, youth, and adults in America. Perhaps this paper will be a unique contribution to the professional literature in promoting a truce among embattled theoretical camps that jockey for credibility and prominence in the public and professional arenas. In the end, it seems not only possible, but necessary to value both the transmission and developmental approaches and understand how an integrated synthesis might promote remarkably different research paradigms, practical models, and more impressive results.

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